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IPREFACE:
(
The African countries scene for over a quarter of a
. f !' ~.~}~:.~(_(\century of regional conflict of world-wide dimension is
__)pi ,'L I currently experiencing an important resurgence stemming
\ - . -
j from a newly found political and economic prominence. This
development can only be rationally comprehended in the light
of contemporary history of the African continent shaped by
the major events that have occurred there in the past
twenty-five years and which were often an expression of
the aspiration of its peoples. (
rt.o« u,
(/Perhaps~no better way to recount that history than
to dwell on the sources,describe the evolution and assess
the outcome 'of the major disputes that have involved the
states of the continent. This in turn might best be
achieved through ·an analytical study attempted in this
thesis of the role performed in the African regional
yp-j
disputes by the OAU whichzestablished on May 25th, 1963
.as the first regional organisation in the post-World ·l'lar-
(
Two era.
In dealing with this subject, it is hoped that the
thesis will be of great interest to international lawyers
and will generally contribute to a better understanding of
the African continent, the field of regional organisations
and the law and principles of peaceful settlement of
international disputes. In fact, there is a notable
scarcity of literature on the OAU generally as a regional
organisation comprising all independent African states
except South Africa. Moreover, there has been virtually
no detailed study of the particular subject of international
II
disputes involving the OAU member states. Such little
writing as there has been on this subject has suffered from
the difficulty of securing access to relevant materials
most of which are of a confidential nature. In conse quence,
scholars have either given inadequate attention to the
subject or else have dealt with it on a speculative basis.
It is the purpose of this thesis to attempt to fill, at
any rate in part, the gap in the literature referred to
above and thereby open the way to future studies on the.
subject.
The present study is '~ritten as a thesis to be
submitted to the Department of Public International Law,
Faculty of Law, for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
of Laws in the University of Glasgow.
The basic method adopted in the thesis is that of
dealing with the subject on a case-history basis and
legal consideration of the conflict. The general framework
within which this study has been fitted is as follows:-
In Chapter I some description and analysis has been
provided of the legal structure of the OAU system for
handling regional disputes. This chapter of the thesis
deals with the origins of the OAU and describes the
historical evolution that led to the establishment of
the OAU on May 25th, 1963. This is followed by an
analysis of the provisions ~f both the OAU Charter and the
Protocol of the Commission of J.iediation, Conciliation and
Arbitration, particularly those bearing on the question of
regional disputes and the machinery established to deal
with such disputes.C~ Chapter II examines the differences
N
III
between the OAU system for regional disputes and other
similar regional systems. 5'1\ iOAU and the system of the UN and how the particular nature
of the system has influenced the manner in which it has \
I
The question of Security Council responsibility'
The relationship between the
functioned.
for disputes threatening international peace and the issue
of priority for the OAU procedures over those of the UN are
examined. Some description and analysis has also been
provided of the practice of the OAU member states relating
to certain international issues such as African attitudes
towards traditional principles of international law, their
approach towards peaceful settlement of international
disputes and their reaction to secessionist self-determination.
Moreover, an appreciation is made of the role of the OAU in
the field of regional collective security, how the organisatioI
has discharged this function in disputes between OAU member
states and third states. Finally, a brief study is SOUg~\....___ .
to explain African reaction to existing boundary alignments
and the persistence of colonial boundaries after independence.
~consideration is given in Chapters III and IV of this thesis
to the manner in which the system has operated in relation
to the major disputes referred to the OAU, whether border
conflicts, tensions arising from internal conflicts, the
problems of political refugees, their implication in regional
disputes, the concept of non-interference in domestic
jurisdiction and internal conflicts within individual member
states. These two Chapters of ~~~-._:1_:~sis~~ a
~ -detailed;acc:Jn~of-the-OriginS of the disputes, the legal
consider~tion of the conflict, the role played by the UN
IV
and the OAU and how the disputes were eventually settled.
An attempt is further made to analyse various aspects of
each dispute, its significance and nature, its handling by l
the OAUand the relevance to it of UN-;rocedures.<\\l~·
Chapter V of the thesis purports to give an equally
comprehensive account of the emergence of new international
principles concerning dependent territories, the OAU role
in eradicating colonialism from Africa, and the compatibility
of the OAU collective measures with the provisions of the
UN Charter. This is followed by an analysis of the OAU
efforts which have been made in the past two decades to
solve the main colonial and racial problems in Africa and
evaluate its role and relationship with the UN, in each
case in terms of the extent of agreement on the issues.
The colonial problems of greatest concern to the OAU have
been those relating to Namibia, the policies of apartheid
in Southern Africa and the role it played in the attainment
of independence to Portuguese administered territories and
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). ~nal~ spe~l a~pr,=-iati~ i~
made to analyse the 1971 effort by the African Presidents- .-- - .----- /who aought; unsucceSSfUllY! to mediate in the conflict,
primarily between Egypt and Israel, and the immediate aftermath
of that effort whose failLre contributed to the transformation
I
of the system of in~ern~!i)nal relations between Africa and
the Middle East~ (ina~ the thesis contains an evaluation
of the OAU system for-regional disputes. An appreciation
is first attempted of the use actually made of each
procedure of the system. Did the technique resorted to
by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the
vCouncil of Ministers prove effective? How did the Secretary-
General perform his role? This is followed by a determination
of the relationship between the procedures of the OAU system
and those of the UN. Some general conclusions on the OAU
system are also drawn. Suggestions are made in respect of
improved techniques for peaceful settlement of African
regional disputes, establishment of new machinery and
development of the collective security system. This is
considered against a background of the broader question of
revision of theOAU Charter which in turn is linked to the
future evolution of the OAU and the existing solidarity
among its membership.
\In-preparation--Of-this-stud~ I wish to express my
sincere gratitude and deepest appreciation to my supervisor, f
~~. John P. Grant, Head of the Department of Public
International Law, Faculty of Law, the University of Glasgow,
for his help, guidance, inspiring suggestions throughout my
research on this subject. This study would not have been
possible without his valuable comments and perceptive
criticism. I can never thank him enough for his personal
encouragement, moral support and constant attention. I also
owe a very special debt of gratitude to my wife, Laila,
my daughter Magdalene and my son J.luhanned- special thanks
for their patience and encouragement throughout my study.
I owe thanks to the staff of Glasgow University Library
for their assistance, co-operation and valuable service.
I am grateful to Mrs. Fewson who kindly typed the manuscript.
Finally, I should like to acknowledge the intellectual debt
lowe to my maternal grandmother who above all taught me at
an early age to learn from my social environment.
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In conclusion of this preface, I must emphasise that
opinions and views expressed in this study are entirely my
own and should not"necessarily be taken to represent the
views of the OAU or those persons and institutions to whom
tribute has been paid.
OHAR ADUBAKAR BAKHASHAB
MARCH 1984·
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CHAPTER I:
F~~ORK OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
SYSTE~i FOR REGIONAL DISPUTES
HISTORICAL ORIGINS TO THE ESTABLISHHENT OF THE OAU
A surge of nationalism swept across the African
continent after the second \~orldWar. African politicians
who had taken a prominent part in a series of Pan-African
Congresses abroad returned home to lead national movements
for independence and the right to self-determination(l).
At the first Pan-African Congress which was held in 1945
at Manchester, the basic aims of African movements were
articulated as "the intensification of the struggle in
colonies against the continuance of colonialism, self-
government and eventual independence and unity, economic
and social development to be achieved by co-operation and
combating racialism allover the continent especially in
areas of European minority rule such as Rhodesia and
South Africa(2).. However, the idea of African nationalism
was given a revolutionary impetus of solidarity after the
Egyptian revolution of July 23rd, 1952(3). Despite
this, it would appear that there had been little connection
previously between the Arab States of North Africa and the
sub-Saharan states. This was because of the colonial
(l)Okoye, Felix Chuks, International Law and the New African
States, Sweet and Maxwell, London 1972, p.121
(2)Thompson, Vincent Bakpetu, Africa and Unity: The Evolution
of Pan-Africanism, Longman, London 1960, p.133
(3)Okoye, Felix Chuks, Ope Cit. p.121
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experience in Africa which had produced a psychological
barrier between those North and South of the Sahara.
Nevertheless, the newly independent sub-Saharan States
emerged with an enthusiastic desire to strengthen their
relationships with the Arab North African States and refused
to accept the Sahara as a political barrier. Thus, this
attitude created the environment for collective endeavours
towards the establishment of an all-embracing continental,
regional organisation. In this direction the first AlI-
African People's Conference of Independent African States(4)
was held in 1958 at Accra, Ghana, where eight African states
attended. The participants of this historic Conference
were Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Horocco, Sudan,
Tunisia and the United Arab Republic. These were the then
independent African states except South Africa which was
actually invited but refused to participate because
invitations were not extended to the colonial powers(5).
It would appear that Nkrumah had taken the initial
initiative to involve the Arab States of North Africa and
also brought Ethiopia and Liberia out of their isolation
by giving them a role to play in modern Africa(6).
(4)The aims of the Conference was to consider means of safe-
guarding the political independence and sovereignty of
participating states,to formulate the mutual policy of
ex~ending assistance to dependent African territories in their
attempt of the attainment of self-government, to discuss
problems of common interest and to strengthen mutual understanding
(S)Sanders AJGM, International Jurisprudence in African context,
Butterworths, London 1979, p.102
(6)Nkrumah placed Pan-Africanism at the cornerstone of Ghana's
foreign policy. In his book "Africa Must Unite" which lias ..
published in 1963, he set out his programme for Pan-Africanism.
He gave a whole new turn to the African regionalism by
welcoming non-sub-Saharan states into the rank of Africanism
with a view to establishing a nUnited States of Africa."
- 3 -
I
However, the participating states endorsed Pan-Af r-Lcand.sm, /".,'1
welcomed the formation of regional groupings which should not
be prejudicial to the ultimate goal of Pan-Africanism. They
-also declared themselves for a policy of non-alignment iQ
t~), ,)l : G.~-
world affairs and to co-ordinat~ African policies on inter-
national political issues. Moreover, they condemned
colonialism and racialism and supported African liberation
movements in their struggle for freedom and independence(Z).
It would appear that~ttitude was not too difficult /
at this first conference which was dominated by revolutionary
wI.(",
states andLEthiopia and Liberia were only just integrating J
themselves in the continent. Subsequently, a second
conference of independent African states was held on June 15th,
1960 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which followed the traditional
procedure of npalavar~ on decision-making by consensus. f .~
Consequently, it was able to worK out consensus on matters
of common concern such as decolonization, an African foreign
policy, economic, social and cultural goals as well as on
the methods to attain these aims by peaceful means. Despite
this common concern, the participating states agreed that
African unity would only be obtained gradually as the
regionally imposed psychological barrier vanished in the
\
!
process of time and which would give rise to the formation
of some kind of regional structure. But things worked out
quite differently(8). In fact, the second conference was-----
(Z)Tharp, Paul A., Regional International'Organisation!
Structure and Function, St. Martin Press, New York 1971, p.48
(8)Sanders AJGM, OPe Cit, p.l03
". ,",
I ; 'r - 4 -
"
the last gathering of independent African States for some
years to come. J.Ieanwhile,many African territories became
independent, most of them former French territories, with
moderate policies. At the same time, the Algerian and
Congo crises had plunged the continent into political· turmoil
and upon these two crises, African states reacted quite
differently. This immediately led to a polarization of
attitudes which lasted for some time and eventually extended
into the field of African inter-state organisation.
Accordingly, there was a rapid emergence and disappearance
of regional groupings among the independent African states.
Thus, the first conference of the French-speaking African
states which subsequently became known as the Brazzaville~.,
Group(9~held on October 24th, 1960 at Abidjan, Ivory
Coast. The group consisted of Cameroon, the Central
African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey (Benin),
Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal
and Upper Volta, all of whom had recently become
independent(10). It should be noted that the mutual bonds
of language and a shared colonial past had led them to join
in an exploration of common concern and the formation of a
Common foreign policy. Therefore, the Brazzaville States
addressed themselves to ~co.m;;;~-~o~~e~~ i~suesgas (
the harmonization of their economic policies, national
(9)The Brazzaville Group were frequently criticized by other
African groups,. particularly the Casablanca Group for their
close ties with their former colonial master and the way
they persistently refused to recognise the Algerian
Provisional Government which was contrary to Pan-Africanism.
(10)Sanders, AJGM, OPe Cit, p.l04
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development plans, pooled diplomatic representation and their
relations with their former colonial power. Despite this
common concern about these issues, the Brazzaville States did
- . -not plan to establish a formal organisation frame,~ork to
channel co-operation in the above-mentioned fields among
themselves. They simply agreed to hold periodic meetings
as the need arose, in order to formulate a united front
towards international issues of world concern. Nonetheless,
at a subsequent meeting of the Brazzaville States held on,.
e~larch 27th, 1961 at Yaounda, Cameroon, the African and
I
Malagasy Organisation for Economic Co-operation
(Organisation Africaine et ~lalgac'~ de Co-operation Economique:
O~'ICE) was established in order to co-ordinate economic
t . d t th I . t· . (11)co-opera 10n agree upon a e ear 1er mee 1ng • Thus,
once OAMCE was set up to co-ordinate economic matters, the
Brazzaville States felt that it was time to create the
political machinery in order to co-ordinate the political
affairs towards the harmonization. Consequently, the
Brazzaville States met again, this time in Tananarive,
l>Ialagasy,on September 12th, 1961, where it was agreed to
establish the African and Halagasy Union (Union Africaine
'\)et Malgache: U~I) which was designed to be a multi-purpose
organisation. The UAM Charter characterized the organisation
as a Union of independent and sovereign states to which all
independent African states were eligible for membership, but
only upon unanimous ap~roval. r \Subsequently, Togo and Rwunda
\~
were admitted in 1963. Nevertheless, t~e organisation
remained limited to French-speaking African states(12).
(11).!2.!!!p.104 (12).!lli p.l05
- 6 -
The objectives of the UAH were to organise co-operation
between member states in order to maintain and promote
solidaritYI collective securitYI development in various
fields and peace in both Africa and in the world at large(13).
Neanwhile, the then revolutionary states of Ghana, Guinea,
Nali, Morocco1 the United Arab Republic, including the
Algerian Provisional Governmentl signed an African Charter
at the conclusion of a conference held on January 4th, 1961
at Casablanca, Morocco(14). This was done in order to
regain the lead in the movement for the establishment of a
multi-purpose regional structure. Consequently, the
Casablanca Charter called upon all independent African states
.to associate themselves with the signatories in order to
strengthen solidarity among African states and maintain
peace in Africa and the world(15). However-, the Charter
provided for the establishment of a supra-national African
Consultative Assembly which would hold periodic sessions
and would consist of representatives of every African
state. There was also the African Political Committee
comprising the heads of state or their representatives
which would be responsible for co-ordinating the general
policies of the various African states. l-Ioreover,it
provided for the creation of an African Economic Committee
to be staffed by the ministers of economic affairs, and
was responsible for economic co-operation. Finally, the
(13)Okoye, Felix Chuks, Ope Cit, pp.123-124
(14)Sanders, AJGM, Ope Cit.p.l06.
(IS)Tharp, Paul A., Ope Cit, p.49
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Joint African High Command was set up)composing the chiefs
of staff, which was responsible for ensuring the common
defence of Africa in the event of aggression against any part
of Africa and for safeguarding the independence of African
states(16). It would appear-that the Casablanca Charter in-
corporated the same aims and goals as those in the Charter of
the African and Malagasy Union;with the addition of the estab-
lishment of a Joint African High Command. The aspiration!of
"
I
J-
the Casablanca group appeared from the preamble to the African
Charter wherein the signatories declared their determination
to promote liberty and unity among African states. It also
enshrined provisions for the preservation and consolidation
of identity of views and unity of action in international
affairs, and to reinforce peace in the world by adopting a
policy of non-alignment. Moreover, it envisaged a pledge
to safeguard African states' political independence,
territorial integrity and to liberate African territories
still under foreign domination by giving assistance to
national liberation movements in their struggle to liquidate
colonialism(17). Subsequently, the group further
elaborated their original Charter by establishing a payments
union, an African Common Market, an African Economic
Development Bank, an Economic Council to co-ordinate
economic planning and a postal and telecommunication union.
Finally, a Protocol for the implementation of the Casablanca
African Charter was signed in June 1961 by the heads of state(18)
(16)Sanders. AJGM, Op. Cit, p.l07
(17)Ibid p.l08
(18)Okoye, Felix Chuks, Ope Cit, p.124
- 8 -
It would appear that the Casablanca group had hastily been
thrown together in their efforts at regional integration.
They also had little in common to make their ties lasting.
The only common grounds were mainly the result of a common
attitude to the Algerian and Congo crises and of their
militant anti-colonialism in general. To counteract the
prevailing polarization in the continent, three states
which were not members of either group, namely Liberia,
Nigeria and Togo proposed the idea of a conference to be
held on Hay 8th, 1961 in Honrovia, Liberia, to discuss the
Algerian and Congolese crises. But, in fact, the conference
was designed to explore the possibilities of establishing a
wider regional organisation with multi-purpose co-operation
on political and other fields. However, two Casablanca
states, Guinea and Ha1i and two Brazzaville states, Cameroon
and Ivory Coast, agreed to attend and co-sponsor the proposed
conference(19). It was hoped that the position of sponsor-
ship given to these states would bring the two groups
together, but difficulties arose immediately over the question
of the Algerian Provisional Government's participation at
the conference. The two Casablanca states insisted that
the Algerian Provisional Government be invited, while the
two Brazzaville states objected to this request on the grounds
that Algeria was not yet an independent state(20). As a
(19)!!?,!gp.124 .
(20)At ~Ionrovia, the Brazzaville Group joined, with a majority
of the English-speaking states,to establish the Honrovia
Association. This meeting was the largest gathering of
African states ever to have taken place and it was considered
an important landmark in the pattern of African power bloc
policies.
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result, the two Casablanca states withdrew as co-sponsors
and charged the Brazzaville states of being directed by
their former colonial power on the issue of the Algerian
Provisional Government's participation. Some states
attempted to find a compromise, but their endeavours were
unsuccessful. Under these circumstances, the remaining
states decided to go ahead with their conference in the hope
of establishing the first step towards the desirable goal
of regional integration. The conference was attended by
twenty-two of the twenty-seven then independent African
states. It was agreed that all the independent African
states were ipso facto eligible for membership of the
conference and a number of liberation movements were admitted
to the conference with observer status(21). This meeting
was the largest gathering of African states ever to have
taken place and became known as the Honrovia group. The
purposes of this group were to promote inter-African
co-operation and give the participating states an opportunity
to articulate their respective views concerning the legal
structure of a regional organisation which the group aimed
to establish. On the political issues of the day, the
conference called upon France and the Algerian Provisional
Government to conclude a cease-fire agreement leading to
. \
eventual independence for Algeria, and supported the UN
.actions in the Congo. It also adopted a number of
resolutions to provide the machinery for political and
economic co-operation to achieve unity for Africa.
(21)Tharp. Paul A., Ope Cit, p.48
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~Ioreoever, it established a provisional secretariat which
would be responsible for drawing up a draft charter of the
proposed I.nter-African and Malagasy organisation (IANO)
which would be submitted to the subsequent summit meeting
of the group(22)., Thus, a committee of experts met in
July 1961 at Dakar, Senegal, to elaborate the legal details
of the draft'charter which envisaged the principles of
sovereign equality for all member states, respect for
territorial integrity, inalienable right to political
independence, non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful
settlement of disputes and the promotion of co-operation
among member states. Subsequently, the draft charter was
submitted to and approved by the second summit meeting of
the group held on January 25th, 1962 at Lagos, Nigeria(23).
Again, the Casablanca states decided to stay away because the
Algerian Provisional Government had not been invited; in
addition, Libya, Sudan and Tunisia boycotted the conference
for the same reason. However, Congo-Leopoldville (Zaire)
and Tanganyika were added to the ranks of the Nonrovia
group(24). At all events, the most important activity of
the Lagos Conference was the consideration of the draft
charter for the proposed (IAMO) submitted by the committee
of experts. It was also decided to endorse the proposed
charter in principle and agree to transmit it to all
(22)Sanders, AJGM, Ope Cit, p.l08
(23)Ellas, T.O., The Charter of the Organisation of African
Unity, AJIL, Volume 59. 1955, p.243
(24)Sanders, AJGJ.I,Ope Cit, p.109
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independent African states for comments. }loreover, the
conference decided that foreign ministers were to meet in
June 1962, again in Lagos, to consider the comments of
independent African states, in order to harmonize the
prop~sals in a revised draft(2S). Subsequently, the third
conference of the Monrovia group held on December 23rd, 1962
at Lagos, Nigeria, was attended by sixteen states in an
attempt to bridge the gap and reconcile the different
approaches of the Honrovia-Casablanca groups. At the
same time, the participating states signed the charter of
the Inter-African and Malagasy Organisation. (IMI0) at the
conclusion of their meeting. The attending states were
unanimous in their desire to establish a loose-form of
association based upon the principles of sovereign
equality, respect for territorial integrity, the inalienable
right to political independence, non-interference in internal
affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes and the promotion of
co-operation among member states. The consensus was also
that inter-African organisation of economic and technical
co-operation should take precedence over political union
at this stage of evolution while a great part of the
continent was still under foreign domination(26). However,
the Lagos Charter provided for three principal organs.
The assembly of heads of state and government was designed
as the supreme organ of the organisation which would decide
upon the general policies and actions of the organisation.
(25)Ellas. T.O., Ope Cit, p.244
(26)Ibid pp.243-244
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The council of ministersl charged with the responsibility
of considering matters of common concern in the areas of
co-operation in various fields of regional integration,
and the third principal organ )~a$ the general secretariat) Vi;'":~'
_. J~(;~t,~(;1
aSzthe central administrative organ of the organisation.
Finally, the charter envisaged a pledge by the contracting
states to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to
. I~y"that end,~agreed to conclude a separate treaty for the
establishment of a permanent conciliation commission to
function in conformity with the provisions of the afore-
said treaty which would be regarded as forming an integral
part of the Lagos Charter(27). Once again, the states
of the Casablanca groupB did not participate in this
third conference of the Monrovia group for various
reasons which vitiated the aim of the conference, of
bringing about continental unity(28). Therefore, the
charter never came into force, but it was of more than
academic value as .itestablished an important blueprint
for the subsequent charter of the Organisation of African
Unity. It also enshrined the formation of a loose_- -association of sovereign states and the adoption of a
;~t
functional or gradu~ approach to regional integration. I
Thus, the functional approach towards the pursuit of
limited goals provided the only realistic way of inter-
African co-operation at this stage of contemporary African
realities(29). In fact, the Casablanca group also
)
(27)sanders. AJGM, Ope Cit, p.l10
(28)padelford
A
Norman J., The Organisation of African Unity,
JIO) Volume 1 , !2&!, pp.521-S22 .
129 ElIas. T.O., Op. Cit, pp.244-245
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followed a functional position and the fundamental differences
that divided the two groups were merely the consequences of
their different approaches towards the achievement of African
unity. The Casablanca group put the emphasis on technical
co-operation and political consultation rather than-political
federation. It was, therefore, possible to conceive of the
two groups forging a common policy on the matter of African
regional integration. It is worthwhile mentioning that
the Monrovia states wisely kept the door open for the
Casablanca group by modifying their relative political
COlOU~S~~:~~
~--- \:::-- ..-r=:>:
apartheid and colonialism in Africa, whereby a dialogue
___ c« __ "
They also adopted resolutions condemning
(
'>
could possibly be facilitated with the Casablanca group.
Under these circumstances, the tension between the two
groups had sharply declined towards the end of 196~with ')
Algeria's accession to independence and the lull in the
Congo crisis(30). Therefore, the time was ripe for
reconciliation and thus, Tunisia offered to be the host
of the proposed conference of all-African independent
states if that was acceptable to the states of the Casablanca
group(31). But, Ethiopia, a non-member of either group,
successfully initiated efforts to end the split on the
African continent. It had previously succeeded in
bringing the Brazzaville group, with a number of African
moderate states, to the Monrovia conference of May 1961.
Eventually, it had been agreed that Ethiopia should serve
(30)Duncan, Patrick, Towards Unity in Africa, JFA,
Volume 42, 1964, pp.Z67-275
(31)Ellas, T.O., gp. Cit, p.245
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as the host of the unanimously reconmrended next sunwit
conference of all independent African states, at whd ch the
Ethiopian Emperor in person, for the first time, participated
/''''in such a gathering of ~~the Afr~can People's Conference
of Independent States(32). The Addis Ababa Summit Conference
of heads of state and government was preceded by a foreign
ministers' meeting of thirty independent African states(33)
from May 15th to 22nd, 1963 to prepare a detailed agenda
for the summit conference. They also prepared a draft
charter, based upon the Casablanca charter, the Lagos
charter and an Ethiopian draft charter which drew heavily
on a similar idea to that of the Organisation of American
States(34). The Ethiopian draft charter proposed the
(32)Duncan, Patrick. Ope Cit. p.270
(33)J.Ioroccoand Togo did not participate in the summit
conference. Nonetheless, both were signatories to the
Addis Ababa Charter. The thirty independent African
states attending at Addis Ababa were Algeria, Burundi,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, CongO-Brazzaville,
Congo-Leopo1dvi11e, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea,
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Hadagascar, 1>1a1i,l-1auritania,
~rorocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab
Republic and Upper Volta.
(34)"'allerstein, Tmmonu a'l, The Early Years of the OAU:
The Search for Organisational Pre-emence, JIO, Volume 20
~, pp.774-775
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establishment of a loose association of states, but
emphasised functional co-ope~ation in various fields and
ignored political unity. Thus, the foreign ministers
meeting ended ,,,ithout reaching a definite agreement on
the charter of the proposed regional organisation because
of divergent views between the supporters of a loose
confeder~tion and the advocates of a federation of African
states. Nonetheless, the summit conference of heads of
states and governments took place on }.!ay23rd 1963 where,
the then Ethiopian Emperor Las host, del ivered the keynote ",
speech and submitted a draft charter for the proposed
regional organisation which provided the guidelines for
the summit meeting. Eventually,' a charter of the
Organisation of African Unity was adopted in response to
the collective efforts of the participating states who had
common interests in regional peace, security, liberty,
economic co-operation and in finding African solutions to
African disputes(35). The legal structure of the
Organisation of African unity(36) was envisaged in the
charter as a regional, international arrangement designed
f_' }<l fJ«to e'ffeet a non-supra-national organisation of states.
Its principles provided for respect of sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence,
(35)Duncan, Patrick. Ope Cit. pp.275-281
(36)The Organisation of African Unity is the name that lias
finally agreed upon for the organisation. The summit found
it unnecessary to include the word Halagasy in the·title and
also recognised the confusion that the title "Organisation
of African States" (OAS) wou Ld create with the Organisation
of American States (OAS). Eventually, it was agreed that
a distinct title, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)
should be adopted for the new Organisation.
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non-interference in internal affairs, condemnation of subversi\
activity and colonialism and non-alignment in world affairs.
The charter also reaffirmed the principles of the UN charter
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provided
a solid foundation for peaceful and positive co-operation
among states in the world at large(37). As a matter of fact,
all independent African states and those t~at will attain
independence are ipso facto eligible for membership in the
new organisation, with the exception of the Republic of
South Africa and the Government of Southern Rhodesia(38).
Thus, in spite of basic disagreement on a number of inter-
African affairs, the independent African states maintained
a facade of unity. A number of events had led towards the
then existing disagreement. l-loroccoquarelled with Tunisia
over the latter's recognition of l-lauritania's right to exist. .
~s a separate sovereign state(39) and Nigeria attained
independence and challenged Ghana's claim to leadership.
Another cause of dissension was the close ties of the
French-speaking African states with their former power and
the participation of their troops in combating the Algerian
Front of National Liberation. Finally, the Congo crisis
split the African states into two blocs. One supported the
Gizenga government in Stanleyville while the other supported
Kasavubu government in Leopoldville. But African states
(37)Padelford. Norman J., Ope Cit, p.523
(38)Brownlie. Ian. Basic Document on African Affairs,
The Clarendon Press, Oxford 1971, p.l.
(39)Thus, Morocco refused to attend the summit conference of
Addis Ababa because of the presence of l-Iauritania, over which
it then claimed sovereignty.
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eventually realised that the secessionist province of
Katanga was being used as a vehicle for neo-colonialist
penetration of Africa. Therefore, all states on the
continent approved the UN actions with a view to using
force to bring about the termination of the secessionist
regime in Katanga. Thus, the Congo crisis was one of
the direct incentives that gave rise to the efforts at
reconciliation between the various competing regional
groupings. After ~ealizing the danger, prompt efforts
had been made which brought about a consensus among African
states uniting them on the question of Pan-African
movements, the eradication of remnants of colonialism,
neo-colonialism and the preservation of the existing
political system and frontiers on the African continent.
Thus, the Addis Ababa Summit Conference was a landmark
which united the diverging efforts of the Pan-African
factions. Consequently, the conflicts between the
moderates and the radicals came to an end. Thus,
co-operation and compromise prevailed and the outcome
of the Summit Conference was the adoption of a Charter
of African Unity.
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THE CHARTER OF THE OAU:
The preamble commences with L"we the Heads of African ("
States and Governments," and ends with the declaration that
"We have agreed to the present Charter(I).n The Charter,
therefore, is an international contractual instrument
establishing the legal foundation of the organisation.
The legal obligations derive from the principlesof inter-
national law that states are bound by their consent and
must implement~in good faith(2). The preamble also J
emphasises the fundamental principles of the inalienable
right of all peoples to self-determination, freedom,
justice, equality and dignity, in order to promote
co-operation among African peoples based on mutual
understanding and transcending ethnic and national
differences. The member states reiterate their
responsibility to maintain a solid foundation for peace
and security among them in order to safeguard their
political independence, territorial integrity and to
eradicate colonialism as well as neo-colonialism in all
its forms. The preamble further states that the member
states should unite henceforth in order to ensure the
welfare, well-being of their peoples by establishing
close links between them and strengthening common
(l)The" OAU Charter and Rules of Procedure, Published by the
Division of Press and Information of the OAU General
Secretariat, Addis Ababa, 1981, p.9
(2)A Short Histor; of the OAU (Principles and Objectives),
a Pamphlet Published by the General Secretariat of the OAU,
Addis Ababa 1977, pp. 4-6
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institutions. However, the present text reiterates
[the confirm-at1.on-~f!the African states' faith that the Cl/-- _-- ~- (
Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights provide a solid foundation.for peaceful and positive
co-operation among states in t~e world at large(3).
;~pl,';;' I
The reference to the UN Charter de~otes--not merely \
the adherence of the member states to the principles of
the UN Charter, but also the awareness of the African
States of the need for international co-operation in
practical terms. It is also possible that African leaders
had in mind the necessity of bringing their organisation
within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter
which laid down the principles governing co-operation
between the UN and regional arrangements(4).
Article 2 of the OAU Charter sets out the purposes
of the organisation, and paragraph (2) requires member
states to co-ordinate and harmonize their general policies,
particularly in the following fields:-
1. "political and diplomatic co-operation;
2. economic co-operation, including transport and
communication;
3. educational and cultural co-operation;
4. health, sanitation and ~utritional co-operation;
5. scientific and technical(~Q-operation and
co-operation for defence ~)."
The member states reinforce the aforesaid by stating in
Articl,e 3 their adherence to the following principles:-
(3)Ellas, T.O., The Charter of the OAU, AJlt, Volume 59,
!2ii, pp.522-533
(4)Brownlie, Ian. OPt Cit, p.l6
(S)The Charter of the OAU, Article II, p.lO
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1. "the sovereign equality of all member states;
2. non-interference in the internal affairs of states;
3. respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of each state and for its inalienable right to
independent existence;
4. peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation,
mediation, conciliation or arbitration;
5. unreserved condemnation in all its forms, of
political assassination as well as of subversive
activities on the part of neighbouring states or
any other states;
6. absolute dedication to the total emancipation of
the African territories which are still dependent;
7. affirmation of a policy of non-aligrunent with
regard to all blocs(6)."
In respect of the first principle of "the sovereign
equality of all member states(7)n it is obvious that the
same principle is enshrined in Article 2(1) of the UN
Charter which provides that the UN is based upon the
principle of sovereign equality(8). The inclusion of
the assurance of the principle of sovereign equality into
ill t: c c ~ f'~'''''1
the OAU Charter was deemed exigent in order to reassure the
/'
(
smaller African states and to demonstrate the spirit of new
solidarity and unity, despite the fact that)unlike the
Organisation of American States, the OAU did not have a
,
super power amongst its members.
This compares with recent practice in similar
international instruments. The text of the Pacific Charter,
signed at ~lanila on September 8th, 1954, contains a provision
"
comparable to Article 3 (1) of the OAU Charter whd.ch reads:
Article III p.IO
Article I
(8) .~G;..;:o;.::o:..:;d~r..:1~c;:h~,....;L~e~l~a .:n~d:.....::J.f:.:.•. z,--=e; :t~a~l,.,The Charter of the UN,Columbia University Press, New York 1969, p.23--~~~~~~~~~~~:
p.IO
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"first, in accordance with the provision of the UN Charter,
they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples and they will eventually strive
by every peacefu!means to promote self-government and to
secure the independence of all countries whose peoples
desire it and are able to undertake its responsibility(9).n
The Asian states uhich had recently won independence needed
help, but they also feared to accept such assistance from
the ''lesternpowers because they were afraid that that
would become the start of Western domination. Therefore,
the Pacific Charter laid great stress on sovereign equality
in order to protect the Asian members from any attempt at
domination by the European members. Thus, it would also
seem that the stress on sovereign equality was also a
confirmation that the legal structure of the OAU as a
regional organisation was not intended to have a supra-
national character(10).
Regarding the second principle of Article 3 of the OAU
Charter of non-interference in the internal affairs of member
states, it is worthwhile to refer to its general adherence
to the principle of the UN Charter enshrined in Article 2(7)
prohibiting UN intervention in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state(II).
(9)'Vhiteman, r-larjorie~I.,Digest of International La\'1,
Volume 5, !.2..2.l, Department of State Publication, \\TashingtonD.C.,
l2Z.!., p.90
(10) 8Pandelford. Norman J., Ope Cit, p.52
(11)~, p.529
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e.
Nonetheless, the UN has often ass~rted jurisdiction over
an extremely wide range of matters, including those of
Human Rights(12). Thus, the UN Charter makes a distinction
between obligations imposed upon the UN itself and those
imposed upon its member states, but the OAU Charter only
imposes the obligation of non-interference upon the member
states and not upon the Organisation itself(13). In this
connection, the Charter of the Organisation of American
States enshrines this principle in Article 15 which provides
that "No state or group of states has the right to intervene
directly or indirectly for any reason whatever in the
internal or external affairs of any other states. The
foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also
other forms of interference or attempted threat against the
personality of the state or against its political, economic
and cultural elements(14).1t Thus, the OAU Charter, unlike
that of the Organisation of American States, models itself
closely on the principle of the UN Charter. It is clear,
however, that intervention in civil strife by the Organisation
of American States is a delicate matter because in principle
it is a matter of domestic jurisdiction of the states. In
any event, international agreements impose upon states the
obligation to refrain from threats to the peace, and
respect the principles of self-defence of peoples and
(12)Goodrich, Leland :f.1., et al., The Charter of the UN
and Documents, Columbia University Press, Neli York
12&.2., pp.60-61
(13)Kononu, Onyeonoro, Secession and the Right of Self-
Determination: An OAU Dilemma, JMAS, Volume 12, l21!, p.371
(14) n 0 H • 0 0 M 0 COt p 463\\Jl1.teman,!',arJor1.e, ., p. 1., •
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human rights. Consequently, it would seem that the
/J organisation of American States cannot evade its responsibility
to interpret these obligations and to act, if investigation
indicates that international peace or human rights are
violated.
This principle is, however, the corollary of the
principle of sovereign equality •. Thus, it also emphasises
its importance in paragraph (5) which obliges members to
condemn unreservedly political assassination in all its
forms as well as subversive activities on the part of
neighbouring states(15). It can be argued that the
~imary o~_~he _pr~n.-~_~~leof non-interference is inherent
_...
?
in the sovereignty which the OAU Charter stresses heavily.
However, since its inception, the OAU has been faced with
the problem of how to handle regimes coming to power through
illegal seizure of authority(16).
(IS) Several African governments in the past made a number of
charges against Ghana for political assassination, as well
as of subversive activities against several African govern-
ments. At the Addis Ababa Summit Conference of )lay,23rd
1963, many African leaders were, therefore, determined that
subversion should be condemned in very explicit terms.
(16)The coup d'etat in Togo was the first crisis that faced
the OAU after being established. The new regime in Togo
was, however, prevented from attending the inaugural
conference because of the opposition of a number of members.
The second Summit Conference debated a proposal expounded
by a number of members to deny participatory legitimacy to
the new regime in Ghana. The attempt failed, whereupon,
a number of delegations walked out from the Summit. In
February 1971, the sixteenth session of the Council of
}tfinistersheld in Addis Ababa debating the competing claims
of representation of Uganda, in consequence of both the
new regime and the deposed regime having sent delegations
to the meeting. However, certain members backed the deposed
delegation while others supported the new regime's delegation.
The conference broke up without deliberating any item on its
agenda, so neither of the delegations was seated at the
meeting.
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It is hard to draw a definite conclusion of interfercnce
by the OAU, but at any rate, those coups had been discussed
in the forums of the organisation(17). As far as the
principle of non-interference is concerned, it is understood
that interference in the internal affairs of member states
,
is prohibited, but this is not applicable to South Africa
which is one of the non-member states affected by the sixth
principle of Article 3, that of "absolute dedication to
total emancipation of the African territories which are
still dependent."
The third principle is that of respect for sovereignty
and territorial integrity of each state and for its
inalienable right to independent existence(18). This is
one of the fundamental principles of the law of Nations by
which a sovereign state is supreme \dthin its own territorial
domain where its citizens have the r"ight to enjoy and use
their territory \'1ithoutinterference from outsiders. This
obligation imposes the duty on every state itself to refrain,
and its responsibility to prevent its agents and subjects!
r-.
from committinglany act which constitutes a violation of
another state's sovereignty and territorial integrity(19).
It is clear that this is one of the fundamental
I
/I )
principles of the UN Charter which is enshrined in
Article 2 (4), whd ch reads as follows : "All members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or
(17)Polhemus. I1igbe J., The OAU and Intra-System Conflict
Management, 1963-68, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, .
Duke University 1971, p.70
(18)Once a state is in existence, it may claim the right to
continue to exist because there is no right for a state to be
born. Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations
provided protection for existing political independence, but
it Was not enforced, nor has the UN done more in this matter.
(19)'\'hiternan,~Iarjorie H., Ope Cit, pp. 183-184
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use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purpose of the UN(20).n This principle is equivalent
to Article 7 of the Charter of the Organisation of American
/--,
States which provides - "Every American/State has the duty
'-- '<,
\
J
to respect the right enjoyed by every other ~tate in
accordance with international law(21)."
However, the OAU system designated no institution
with particular powers in the matter of peace and war,
equivalent to the UN Security Council, in which no privileged
position has been given to the great powers of Africa.
Accordingly, it is clearly understood that the African States
deliberately determined to avert the emergence of any kind
of hegemony, de facto or de jure, on the model of the
Organisation of Anlerican States, where the United States
of America plays a primary role. It also avoided the
weighted voting formula at present in effect in the European
Economic Community. and in some of the UN Specialised Agencies,
such as the International Honetary Fund (DIF) and International
Finance Corporation (IFC). The OAU Charter endorsed the
formula of one vote for one state and the supreme organ of
the organisation is the Assembly of Heads of States and
Governments with a two-thirds majority requirement to pass
measures.
The fourth principle, that of the peaceful settlement
of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or
(20)Brownlie. Ian, Ope Cit, pp.3-4
(21)T.n... u" Unu1teman. ~!arJOr1e 1'1., Ope Cit. p.221
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arbitration is the most essential of the seven principles set
forth in the OAU Charter. The Charter further states in
Article 19 that - "member states pledge to settle all
disputes among themselves by peaceful means and to this
end decides to establish a commission of mediation,
conciliation and arbitration(22).n Article 3(4) of the
OAU Charter is comparable to Article 33(1) of the UN Charter
and imposes the same obligation upon the UN member states
to settle all disputes among themselves by peaceful means.
It reads as follows: "The parties to any dispute, the
continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security shall first of all
seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort
to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful
means of their own choice(23).n This article imposes on
the member states of the OAU the duty to maintain peace and
security in the continent at all costs. As the OAU is a
regional organisation of the UN under the auspices of .
Chapter VIII, this does not bar extra-African agencies'
involvement in African disputes, and leaves the way open
for resort to the other regional arrangements, such as the
League of Arab States and the Commonwealth. There is,
however, no provision in the OAU Charter comparable to
Article 20 of the Organisation of American States which
(22)The Charter of the OAU, Ope Cit, p.14
(23) . D t· I t ti 1 LBrownlie, Ian, BaS1C ocumen 1n n erna ona aw
(Second Edition) The Clarendon Press, Oxford ~ p.12
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provides for the subnlission of all disputes between American
States to the peaceful procedures of the OAS before being
referred to the Security Council of the UN. This article
reads as follows: nAIl disputes which may arise between
American States shall be submitted to the peaceful procedures
set forth in this Charter before being referred to the
Security Council of the UN(~4).u
The African states discerned that the peace which
'AJ r;.Jthey so badly needed is 'in danger because of threats of
border and frontier disputes between certain OAU members.
Therefore, the initial undertaking of all member states is
)
to observe the principle of peaceful settlement by
negotiation, conciliation and arbitration provided in the
OAU Charter. To this end the OAU member states endeavoured
to adopt an additional Protocol of Mediation, Conciliation
and Arbitration which provides for the establishment of a
commission as the fourth principal institution of the
organisation(2S) •.
The sixth principle is of a somewhat different character.
It imposes on the organisation and the member states the duty
of absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the
African territories which are still dependent. In this
connection, the UN Charter expresses in Article 1(2) inter
alia, the principle "To develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination(26) of all peoples." Subsequently,
(24)Polhemus, Higbe J., Ope Cit, p.74
(2S)Padelford, Norman J., Ope Cit, p.322
(26)It has been held that self-determination applies to the
peoples of non-self-governing territories while denying this
right to the minorities living within the boundaries of astate. Consequently, self-determination by the initial
instance is a question of international concern beyond the
scope of domestic jurisdiction.
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on December 14th, 1960, the General Assembly of the UN
adopted the famous Resolution 1514 on the "Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples(27).n The African representatives at the UN took
an active part-in the formulation of the UN General Assembly-
Resolution 1514 which set up a 17-member committee with a
view to supervising the implementation of the 1'960 declaration.
The aforesaid resolution called upon all administering powers
of non-self-governing territories to respond in good faith
, (28)to the application and implementation of the declaration •
Under the terms of the declaration - naIl peoples have the
right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development(29).u
To this end the OAU set up the Liberation Committee, with
headquarters at Dar-es-Salaam. It is charged with the
responsibility of providing and co-ordinating financial
assistance for all African liberation movements which are
still struggling for the political independence of their
countries.- In pursuance of the principle of absolute
dedication to the total emancipation of African territories,
the African representatives at the UN enthusiastically
endeavour to secure the legitimacy of the armed struggle
against the colonial powers in order to attain the legal
recognition of liberation movements. Accordingly, the UN
General Assembly adopted Resolution 2189 on December 13th, 1966,
(27)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.3.
(28)Krishnan, Maya, African States Practice Relating to
Certain Issues of International Law, IYBIA, Volume XIV,
1965, pp.197-99
(29) 8Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.l 9
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which recognised the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples
under colonial rule to exercise their right to self-
determination and independence and urged all states to give
material and moral assistance to national liberation movements
in colonial territories(30). The conclusion which could be
drawn from the African stand on self-determination emphasised
the demand of the African states for peoples' right to self-
determination, aimed at the attainment of independence for
African dependent territories. Under these circumstances,
the right of self-determination is the right of the majority
within an accepted territorial unit to exercise power.
There is no such right as self-determination for the minorities
that live within the political unit of an independent African
state.
The last of the seven basic principles of the organisation
is that of the affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with
regard to all blocs. This principle is also articulated
in the "Solemn Declaration on General Policy,ft which reads
as follows: "In order to help reduce the tension between
blocs, we have subscribed to the policy of non-alignment and
to give meaning to th~s commitment, we have expressed our
deep desire to see Africa rid itself of all foreign military
bases and stand aloof from any mi~itary alliances and from
the armaments race(31).R
In this connection, it is very difficult to claim that
the OAU have developed an all-African foreign policy.
(30)Yakemtchouk I Romain, The OAU and International Law: .~
OAU After Ten Years, Comparative Perspectives, edited by
El-AyoutYI Yassin, Praeger Publishers, New York 1975, p.99
(31)The Solemn Declaration on General Policy, Published by the
Division of Press and Information of .the OAU General Secretariat,
Addis Ababa, !21l, p.2.
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It is obvious that the OAU member states do not have an
identical foreign policy; nevertheless, they have sufficient
points of common interest on a number of crucial questions
to constitute a continental approach to international affairs.
This approach is sometimes determined by pressure of the
majority on unwilling states to make them accept the dominant
view. For this reason, a number of heads of state chose to
stay away from OAU summit meetings for long periods, but they
cannot afford to take the political risk of leaving the
organisation.
Article 4 provides that "each independent sovereign
state shall be entitled to become a member of the
0~ganisation(32)." Accordingly, the aforesaid article
excludes all African liberation movements as well as African
territories still under colonial domination. The Republic
of South Africa would be excluded from membership of the
organisation in consequence of its apartheid policy which
is in absolute conflict with the aims and purposes of the
OAU Charter~ Thus, the illegal government in Southern
Rhodesia was also banned from the right of adherence to the
OAU Charter(33). All independent sovereign African states
that duly signed and ratified the Charter are original
members in conformity with Article 24(1) which stipulates
that "••••the Charter shall be open for signature to all
independent sovereign African states and shall be ratified
(32)The Charter of the OAU, Ope Cit. p.ll
(33)Southern Rhodesia' was debarred from adhere~ce as a
consequence of its illegal status and its policies and
institutionalised racial discrimination. There is nothing
in the Charter of the OAU to prevent a Caucasian or a
member of any other racial group from representing an
African state.
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by the signatory states in accordance with their respective
constitutional process(34).n }Iembership of the organisation
may also be acquired by adhesion and accession to the Charter.
According to Article 28(1) - Rany independent sovereign
African state may at any time notify the Secretary General
of its intention to adhere or accede to this Charter(35).n
However, Article 28(2) further states n •••• the Secretary
General shall on receipt of such notification, communicate
a copy of it to all the member states. The decision of
each member state shall be transmitted to the Secretary
General who shall upon receipt of the required number of
votes, communicate the decision to the state concerned(36).R
It should be noted that under this procedure it is simple
enough to achieve admission to the organisation without the
need for the applicant state to wait for the next meeting
of either the Assembly of Heads of State and Government or
the Council of Ministers.
In any event, the procedures for the termination of
membership in the OAU is also very easy. Article 32 provides -
"any state which desires 'to renounce its membership shall
forward a written notification to the Secretary General.
At the end of one year from the date of such notification,
if not withdrawn, the Charter shall cease to apply with
respect to the renouncing state, which shall thereby cease
to belong to the organisation(37)." It is clear that the
(34)The Charter of the OAU, Ope Cit, pp.15-l6
(35)Ibid p.16
(36)!£!g
(37)Ibid
p.17
p.17
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reason for the stipulation of a "cooling offn period
between the submission of the notification and the cessation
of membership is to give both the organisation itself and
the renouncing state time to adjust all pending obligations
and rights.
It is worthwhile mentioning that the Charter contains
no provision for collective security defence in case of an
external aggression against' any member state, or when a
member state has recourse to war in the effort to solve a-
dispute with another member state, or to subvert the
political independence of its neighbours. C~"sol-'there
_)
is no provision for partial or comprehensive saricti~~or
--
1
f
Iequivalent to Article 6 of the UN Charter which provides -
ha member of the UN which has persistently violated the
Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled
from the. organisation by the General As~embly upon the
recommendation of the Security Council(38).n
It has already been mentioned that the OAU Charter is
based upon the principle of sovereign equality of all
member states. As far as the question of equal rights is
concerned, there is an apparent doubt concerning the question
of equal duties. It is obvious that this is more so in
theory than it is in practice. Accordingly, Article 23
provides _ "the budget of the organisation prepared by
the Secretary General, shall be approved by the Council
of Hinisters. The budget shall be provided by contributions
from member states in accordance with the scale of assess-
.ment of the UN, provided, however, that no member state
(38)B l' Iro\\'n:I.eI an, Ope Cit, p.5
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shall be assessed an amount exceeding twenty percent of
the yearly regular budget of the organisation. The member
states agree to pay their respective contributions
regula~ly(39).- Thus, Article 23 of the OAU Charter,
therefore disregards the principle of absolute equality
in its requirement for member states to contribute to the
budget on the same basis as that of the UN which is related
to unequal incomes and is not allocated on the basis of
equality. The only limitation to a membership contribution
is the provision that a member state may not be assessed
an amount exceeding twenty percent of the annual estimate
of the regular budget of the organisation. Consequently,
the provisions of Article 23 are in sharp contrast to that
in Article 17(2) of the UN Charter which provide -
-the expenses of the organisation shall be borne by the
member as apportioned by the General Assembly(40).-
-It is worthwhile to note that the exact formula for
apportionment could only be found in the scale of
assessment recommended by the Committee on Contribution,
subject to the approval of the Preparatory Commission.
According to the recommended scale of assessment, the
committee is required to advise the UN General Asse~ly
on the apportionment to be fixed for new members. As far
as a minimum contribution is concerned, the UN General
Assembly has determined this at 0.02 percent of the
current budget estimate. In any event, revision of scales
is the annual task of the Committee on Contribution.
(39)The Charter of the OAU, Op. Cit, p.lS
(40) 8Brownlie, Ian, Op. Cit, p.
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The UN Assembly's Rules of Procedure provide for revision
every three years except in the case of an appeal by a
member state for a change of assessment(41) or action to
be taken i~ conform-ity with Article 19 of the UN Charter-(42).
It should also be noted that there is no OAU provision
equivalent to Article 19 of the UN Charter which allows the
suspension of voting rights in the UN General Assembly of
those states which are in arrears with their financial
contributions to the organisation. There are a number
of the OAU member states who are in arrears of payment
of their assessed contributions and therefore, the entire
organisation is caught in financial problems.
(41)Bowett. D.'v., The Law of International Institutions
Stevens & Sons, London 1975, pp.370-371
(42) .1Brownlie, Ian, Ope Ciy, p.S
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TIlEINTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE OAU
Article 7 of the OAU Charter provides that
"••••the Organisation shall accomplish its purposes
through the following principal institutions:
1. the Assembly of Heads of State and Government;
2. the Council of Ministers;
the General Secretariat;
the Conunisst'oQ.of Hediation,
Arbitration IJ."
Conciliation and
3.
4.
The principal institutions are clearly distinct from the
specialised conunissions of the organisation wh Lch are
provided for in Article 20 of the OAU Charter.
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government:
According to Article 8, it is provided that -
litheAssembly of Heads of State and Government shall be
the supreme organ of the organisation. It shall, subject
to the provisions of the Charter, discuss matters of
common interest to Africa with a view to co-ordinating
and harmonizing the general policy of the organisation.
It may, in addition, review the structure, functions and
acts of all the organs and any specified agencies which
may be created in accordance with the present Charter(2)."
In virtue of the above-mentioned article the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government is the supreme
organ of the organisation. It consists of the Heads of
State or Government, or their duly accredited representatives(3)
(l)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Ope Cit, Article VII,
Pp.11-12
(2)Ibid, Article VIII p.12
(3)Ibid, Rule 2, p.42
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The Assembly meets at least once a year in ordinary session,
but it may meet in extraordinary session at the request of
any member state upon approval by a two-thirds majority of
the membership(4). The place of meeting should generally
be decided by a simple majority(S), but at the second
ordinary session of the Assembly, it was decided that all
future meetings should be held in Addis Ababa(6).
The Assembly's meeting requires a quorum of two-thirds
of the total membership, whether the meeting is an ordinary
or extraordinary session, before any debate can take
Each member has one vote in the Assembly
where all resolutions and decisions shall be determined
by a t''lo-thirdsmajority of the member states. Questions
of procedure require a simple majority only(8). In this
connection, it is necessary to distinguish between
resolutions and decisions. Neither the Charter nor the
Rules of Procedure clarify the precise nature of either.
(4)Ibid, Rule 5, pp.42-43
(S)Padelford, Norman J., Ope Cit, p.323
(6)The first ordinary session of the Assembly accepted
Nkrumah's invitation to hold the second ordinary session
of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Accra.
This caused the problem of dealing ''lithhostile activities
against a number of French-speaking states by Nkrumah's
regime. Consequently, those states accused the Ghanaian
government of harbouring dissident political groups from
their respective countries and of encouraging subversive
activities. Despite conciliatory efforts made by the
Council of loIinistersat a special session, eight states
(Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Congo-Kinshassa,
Burundi and Senegal) were absent from the ~ccra meeting.
(7)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Rule 1~, Op. Cit, p.44
(8) .
~, Rule 24. 25 and 26, p.47
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It is worthwhile to- mentioxl_1that a resolution is
a consequence of a decision, but that not all decisions
I
naturally t~ke the form of a resolution. Legally, both
constitute the same sort of obligation. It should be
noted that all decisions in conformity with Rule 26 require
a simple majority of all members of the organisation. The
only decisions that require a two-thirds majority of the
quorate assembly in order to be acted upon, are those
concerned with amendments to the Charter and the Rules of
Procedure, the appointments of the Secretary General and
his assistants, as well as those concerning budgetary
matters. However, it is worthwhile mentioning that in
the context of the Charter, resolutions should be
recommended to the member states of the organisation in
conformity with recommendations adopted by the UN General
Assembly(9). This conclusion could be draw'llfrom the
principles of non-interference and sovereign equality whd.ch
the OAU Charter stresses heavily. Moreover, the OAU
Charter neither established an organ with d~sciplinary
powers in order to enforce compliance with the OAU resolutions,
nor allowed the expulsion of a member ,...hich had persistently
violated such resolutions(10). The Assembly's agenda is
prepared by the Council of Hinisters from a provisional
draft submitted by the Secretary General(ll). It has
become customary for the head of the host government to be
(9)Okoye. Felix Chuks,
(101 .
t'olhemus. Higbie J.,
Ope Cit, p.132
Ope Cit, p.72
(11)bAU Charter and Rules of Procedures Rule 11, Ope Cit, p.44
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elected as the Assembly's Chairman along with eight vice-
Chairmen(12). The Assembly's powers to debate, deliberate
and adopt resolutions on any matters of common concern to
A~rica are extremely broad. The obvious limitation to
its power is that its resolutions legally take the form
of a recommendation to the independently sovereign member
states(13). The Assembly is not specifically charged with
the settlement of regional disputes but as the supreme organ
of the OAU, it has inevitably become involved in the
settlement of inter-member disputes through a variety of
proc~dures and techniques. By and large the Assembly has
provided a forum for negotiation bet,...een the member states
in dispute. In practice it has become a permanent organ
of conciliation, mediation and good office, and is usually
relied upon by the Council of Ministers to implement these
procedures. Sometimes, ad hoc commissions are established
to carry out such functions. The predominance of the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government in the settlement
of African disputes, is especially characteristic of
developing states whose rules tend to be personal.
Consequently, the heads of state or government are in a
position to commit their countries to a specific international
obligation. Basically, the Assembly's approach to African
disputes is that it favours conciliation between the parties,
rather than adjudication of their claims. This could be
(12)Harkakis, John, The OAU: A Progress Report, ~,
Volume 41, 1966, p.150
(13)MeyerS, David, Inte~natiohal'Conflict Management bX
the OAU, JIO, Volume 28, !21!, p.348
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explained on the following grounds: Firstly, the DAU's
fundamental policy is seeking to preserve solidarity and
unity among its member states. Such a policy is no more
than a consequence of the inherent nature-of some regional
arrangements. ISecondly, the Assembly's emphasis on
conciliation resulted from its policy of giving precedence
to the preservation of solidarity among its members. It
should be noted, however, that the Assembly has made use
of the techniques of conciliation, mediation and good
offices in dealing with inter-member disputes. It has
seldom resorted to them on the other hand, in disputes
involving members and non-members. Here the,OAU always
acted in support of its mernber- states rather than attempting
to settle the question between the disputant parties. The
nature of the OAU intervention in that context is that of a
regional system against an external threat, rather than a
regional procedure for the settlement of disputes.
The Council of Ministers:
According to Article 12(1) ofthe~QP Charter, it is ~
provided that "the Council of Ministers shall consist of
Foreign Hinisters or such other Hinisters as are designated
by the government of member states(14)." Uith reference
to the aforementioned phrase "••••such other ministers as
are designated by the government of member states" this
accounts for the name "Council of Ministers" and not the
"touncil of Foreign Ministers. It The composition of this
(14)The OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures Ope Cit, p.13
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organ is clearly flexible in order to aLlow member states
~o designate any minister to represent them as circumstances
may require(15). Article 12(2) provides that "the Council
of Hinisters shall meet at least twice a year. lfuen
requested by any member state and approved by·two-thirds of
all member states, it shall meet in extraordinary session(16).n
The reason that the Council is required to meet at least
t,dce a year is given in Rule 6 (Rules of Procedure of the
Council of ~linisters) ••••nat its ordinary annual session
which shall be held in February each year, it shall consider
and approve, inter alia, the programme and budget of the
organisation for the next fiscal year (17) ,It ,~hilst the
other ordinary annual session which shall be held in August,
shall be devoted to the preparation of the Assembly's
annual summit conference of Heads of State and Government,
and is usually held at the same place where 'the summit
conference is taking place. The Council's meeting requires
a quorum of a two-thirds majority of the total membership
whether the meeting is an ordinary or extraordinary session
before any debates can be begun(18).
It is worth mentioning that the organisation of an
extraordinary session is slightly different from those
of ordinary sessions. The bureau is elected at the
preceding ordinary session and its term of office continues
until the commencement of the forthcoming ordinary session.
(15)ElIas, T.O., Ope Cit, p.245
(16)OAU Charter and Rules. of Procedures, Rule 12, Ope Cit, p.13
(17) .ElIas, T.O., Ope Cit, p.246
(18)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Rule 13, Ope Cit, p.35
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Rule 17 provides that •••••the agenda of an extraordinary
session shall comprise only items submitted for consideration
in the request for convening the extraordinary se88ion(19) ••
Nevertheless, the Council has adopted a flexible approach
to the limitation on agenda items of its extraordinary
sessions(20).
In conformity with Rule 9, all meetings of the Council
shall be held in private, unless it decides otherwise by a
simple majority. According to Rule 29, all resolutions of
the Council of Ministers shall be determined by a simple
majority whilst no distinction is made between substantive
and procedural questions. The Council's relationship
with the Assembly is defined by Article 13 of the OAU
Charter, which reads as follows - ·the Council of Ministers
shall be responsible to the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government. It shall be entrusted with the responsibility
of preparing conferences of the Assembly •••(21}. ·It shall
take cognisance of any matter referred to it by the Assembly.
It shall be entrusted with the implementation of the
decisions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
(19)Ibid, Rule 17, p.3S
(20)For instance, the second extraordinary session of the
Council held in Dar-es-Salaam, February 12th 1964, to
consider an African settlement to the situations arising
from army mutinies in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, the
Council at the same time debating an additional item on
its agenda concerning the border disputes between Somalia-
Kenya and Ethiopia. But, the Ghanaian proposal was
rejected on the grounds that the said proposal did not
inscribe on the session's agenda.
(21) .OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Article 13, p.13
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It shall co-ordinate Inter-African co-operation in accordance with
the instructions of the Assembly and in conformity with Article
11(2) of the present Charter(21)." ~Ioreover, the Council is given
competence by Article 22 to approve the Regulations governing the
specialised Commissions and by Article 23 to approve the budget
of the organisation prepared by the Secretary General.
The Council is given a supervisory role over the organs
that have actual or potential powers to implement policy. These
are the Commission of ~Iediation, Conciliation and Arbitration,
the General Secretariat and various Specialised Comnlissions.
It has already been mentioned that the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government are the decision-making orga~ but in practice, the
Council makes decisions on a wide variety of matters, some of
great importance(22). As far as the Council jurisdiction are
concerned, it has been established in practice and theory that
the Council's resolutions are not binding upon member states
unless they are approved by the Assembly(23).
(22)For" instance, the decision of November 11th, 1965 to respond
to the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence, the
Council decided by an overwhelming majority that if Great Britain
did not take the appropriate measures to restore law and order in
Rhodesia, and subsequently prepare the way for majority rule by
December 15th, 1965, the OAU member states would sever diplomatic
relationship with the UK.
(23)By December 15th, only nine member states broke their diplomatic
ties with the UK. These were the United Arab Republic, Algeria,
Sudan, Mauritania, Ghana, Guinea, ~iali, Congo (Brazzaville) and
Tanzania. Subsequently, at the second session of the Assembly
of Heads of State and Government, the Liberian President did
question authority being exceeded by the Council but also went
beyond that conclusion. He stated that "••••the Liberian Govern-
ment's views that the Foreign Ministers who met in Addis Ababa
exceeded the scope of their authority. No Foreign Minister
on the Liberian political leve~ would direct a breach of diplomatic
relations between Liberia and any foreign government. This can
only be done by the President of Liberia, generally in consultation
with the Cabinet and Legislature. Therefore, I consider the act
of the Foreign ~tlnisters ultra vires and void ab inito. This
procedure and condition imposed by the resolution I consider
to be harsh, u~easonable and impracticable."
(Polhemus, Higb1e, J., Ope Cit, p.96)
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It has been a most active organ ,."ithinthe OAU system in
settling regional disputes. It has already been mentioned
that neither the Assembly nor the Council are specifically
charged with the settlement of regional disputes, but as far
as the Council is concerned, this competence ,...ould be assumed
under Article 2(9) of the OAU Charter.
The Council has assumed its immediate role to respond
with extraordinary sessions in case of emergencies and to
promote amicable settlement of regional disput'es(24) • Its
most effective technique in such emergencies is to have a
ready meeting place for all concerned parties and a forum
for a swift exchange of opinion between' the OAU member states
in order to promote a mutually acceptable solution to the
issue in dispute. The Council usually pursued the procedure
of meeting ~he ~oncerned parties in.a dispute and subsequently
adopted a draft resolution reflecting the consensus among
member states. The Council has always used the technique
of setting up an ad hoc commission entrusted ,dth the dual
function of fact-finding and conciliation. Such a function
invol ved the investigation of the issue in dispute bet,...een
the parties and simultaneously endeavoured to bring about
a mutually acceptable solution. This, for instance, was
envisaged in the' OAU missions established in connection ,dth
the Algerian-~roroccan dispute in 1963, the second Congo
(24)
Markakist John, Ope Cit, p.148
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crisis in 1964 and the Ethiopia and Kenya-Somalia boundary
disputes. In a number of situations, however, conflicting
interests and political antagonisms prevailing among the member
states impeded meaningful decisions from being taken(2S).
The General Secretariat:
Article 16 of the OAU Charter provides that ••••there shall
be a Secretary General of the organisation, who shall be
appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
The Secretary General shall direct the affairs of the
Secretariat(26) •• The Secretariat is located in Addis Ababa
as the permanent organ of the organisation headed by the
Secretary General. In conformity with Article 17, the
Secretary General shall be assisted by ••••one or more
Assistant Secretary General of the organisation, who shall be
appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government(27) ••
It would appear from the aforesaid articles that the Council of
Ministers are not competent to consider nomination for the
Secretary General and his Assistants, or even to make
recommendation to the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government on this particular matter(28).
(2S)The meeting of the Council on March 3rd, 1966 was indefinitely
adjourned in consequence of the walkout by the delegations of
the United Arab Republic, Algeria, Mali, Tanzania, Somalia,
Kenya and Congo (Brazzaville). The reasons given for the
walkout were varied. Some posed the objections to participation
of the Ghanaian new regime's delegation; some mentioned that the
OAU attitude towards the situation in Rhodesia was too soft.
(26)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Ope Cit, pp.13-14
(27)~ p.14
(28)There was a considerable debate on the question of the
Secretary General and his assistants, during the first ordinary
session of the Council of Ministers held at Dakar in August 1963,
but no decision was taken. Subsequently, the appointment of the
first Secretary General and his assistants was made by the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its first ordinary
session which took place in Cairo in July 1964.
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As has already been seen, the OAU Charter only referred
to the administrative and budgetary functions of the Secretary
General, such as drawing up the budget of the organisation,
communicating applications of intent to adhere to the Charter,
receiving notification of intent to withdraw from the organisation
and processing proposed amendments to the Charter requested by
member states(29). The other aspects of his functions are
defined in the internal regulations of the General Secretariat
which were drawn up by the Council of Ministers at its first
meeting. According to Rule 1, the Secretary General
•••••shall carry out the functions assigned to [him]by the
Charter of the organisation, those that might be specified
in other treaties and 'agreements among.the member states and
those that are established in these regulations(30).. In
accordance with Rule 2, the Secretary General is also responsible
generally for "••••supervising the implementation of decisions
of the Council of Ministers concerning all economic, social,
legal and cultural exchanges of member states(31) ••. In a
provision closely patterned after Article 100 of the UN Charter,
Article 18 of the OAU Charter provides •••••in the performance
of their duties the Secretary General and the staff shall not
seek or receive instructions from any government or from any
other authority external to the organisation. They shall
refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as
international officials responsible only to the organisation.
(29)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Articles 23. 28. 32
and 33. Ope Cit. p.16-18
(30)Ibid p.20
(31)Ibid p.20
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Each member of the organisation undertakes to respect the
exclusive character of the responsibilities of the Secretary
General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in
the discharge of their responsibilities(32).a However, the
Secretary General is directly responsible to the Council of
~Iinisters for the adequate discharge of all duties assigned
In addition to these specific powers given to
the Secretary General, the latter is also authorized by Rule 10
to attend the meetings of the"Assembly, the Council of
~Iinisters and the Specialised Commissions." In this connection,
the Secretary General is required to submit at every ordinary
session of the above-mentioned organs, a report on the work
concerning each(34). "As" a matter of fact,"it clearly
,appears from the OAU Charter and the Functions and Regulations
of the General Secretariat that the Secretary General's
contribution to the settlement of African regional disputes
has been severely limited. The Secretary General's authority
was progressively weakened during the drafting of the OAU
Charter in which there was an article that would have allowed
him to initiate action in case of threats to the peace,
this was struck from the draft documents(35). Thus, could be
attributed to the deep cleavage among the African states which
eventually affected the influence of the post of OAU Secretary
Generalship. The cleavage reflects such basic factors as
British or French background and the differences between Arab
and non-Arab cultures(36).
(34) 12!£ p.22
(35)Polhemus, Higbie J., Ope Cit, p.98
(36)Legum, Colin, the OAU Success or Failure, ~, Volume 51
!2li, pp.208-210
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The other divisions stem from differing foreign and domestic
orientations. The divisions have been institutionalized
in trans-regional organisations such as the Arab League and
the Commonwealth of Nations(37). Moreover, the other
divisions were institutionalized in African sub-regional
organisations such as the Casablanca
MOnq~V~ Group(38).
\_/-
Group, the Brazzaville
Group and the At any rate, these
cleavages have not completely separated African sub-regional
groups even at times of the culmination of divisions. There
have always been some non-aligned states avail themselves
,,------"------ -._--
to provide the vehicle of mediation between opposing groups.
The agreement on the site of the OAU headquarters and the
election of the Secretary General could largely be explained
in terms of Africa's major cleavages(39). In the years
preceding the establishment of the OAU, the major cleavage
between African states involved their attitude towards the
Algerian '~ar of Independence and their support of different
factions in the first Congolese War. These divisions were
institutionalized in the rival sub-regional organisations j-
established at Casablanca, Brazzaville and MontroJa. In
1963, Ethiopia, a non-member of any of the SUb~regiOnal
organisations, successfully initiated efforts to end these
splits on the African continent. Ethiopian diplomacy
succeeded in bringing the Brazzaville Group, with a number
of moderate states, to the Monrovia Conference. Subsequently,
V
(37)Higgins Ro(e~, The Commonwealth Secretary General's
Limits of Leade~sh1E' ~, Volume 55, !222, pp.67-71
(38)Andemicael Berhanykum, The OAU and the UN, Africana
Publishing Company, New York !iZ&, p.10
(39)Polhemus Higbe James, The Provisional Secretariat of the OAU,
J~~S, Volume 12 !21!, pp.287-294
I
J
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the Guinea President's efforts succeeded in convincing the
leaders of the Casablanca group to participate at the Addis
Ababa Summit Conference and, together with all other African
states, to establish the OAU(40).
Similarly, sub-regional cleavages have determined the
nationality of the Secretary General. In 1964, the Guinean
candidate for the post of the OAU Secretary General was
acceptable to b~th radical and moderate African states as a
reward for its president's mediatory role(41). The two subsequent
I religious and colonial heritage.O\_ (incumbentsjla~ come from the Cameroon, a country with a dualI The Cameroon are a federation
of ex-British and ex-French territories. Its candidates are bi-
lingual and potentially useful in bridging the gaps between
Anglophone and Francophone. In addition, the Cameroon federation
is predominantly ltluslim. This condition may make its candidate
acceptable to both Arab and non-Arab OAU member states(42).
(40)Sanders. AJGM, Ope Cit, pp.117-120
(41)Mr. Diallo Telli, the Guinean Ambassador to the UN was
elected in 1964 as the organisation's first Secretary General
and served two terms in office.
(42)In 1972. Mr. Neo Ekangaki of Cameroon was elected the
Organisation's second Secretary General and served two years in
office. He had been Minister of Labour and Social Welfare in
the Cameroon. In 1974, efforts were made to choose a successor
to Mr. Neo Ekangaki and again, it was the Cameroon candidate
whose application secured the unique distinction of being elected
as a compromise candidate acceptable to all members because of
their polarised positions. The election was contested by
Somalia'S Foreign Minister, supported by the Arab States and
French-speaking member states, and Zambia's Foreign Minister,
supported by Ethiopia and the English-speaking states. After
twenty deadlocked ballots, the Cameroon President was asked to
furnish a candidate. He nominated Mr. William Eleki, an
experienced politician and former Cabinet Minister who was then
unanimously elected as the Organisation's third Secretary
General. The current Secretary· General is Mr. Eden Kodjo of
Togo, elected in 1978. He was Togo's Foreign ~llnister.
Previously, he was President of the West African Monetary Union
and played a prominent role in promoting Afro-Arab co-operation.
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The severe divisions among the African states will probably
continue to limit the number of countries that can furnish
candidates for the post of OAU Secretary General, whose
application must secure the required two-thirds of the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government(43). In August
1964, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government elected
the first Secretary General who regularly participates in
the deliberations of all organs of the OAU. The Secretary
General has used his report to initiate debates on controversial
problems which he felt the Assembly and the Council of ~unisters
might endeavour to avert(44) •. As the head of the OAU, the
Secretary General has become a spokesman for the organisation.
On a number of occasions, the Secretary General was entrusted
by the Assembly or the Council of.l-linisters,with powers which
have the nature of executive functions. Consequently, the
representatives of the member states endeavoured to constrain
those initiatives and reminded the Secretary General of the
limit of his authority(45). The Secretary General's inability
(43)Meyers David, the OAU's Administrative Secretary General,
JIO, Volume 30 ~ pp.515-520
(44)For instance, the report submitted to the Assembly in 1967,
called attention to the occupation of Egyptian Sinai territories
by Israel, the Civil lvarin Nigeria and the Rebellion of
l-Iercenariesin Zaire. All these were issues which some member
states tried to keep off the Conference's agenda.
(4S)For instance, in November 1965, the Heads of State entrusted
the Secretary General with an initiative to establish contact
with the UN. However, at the next session of the Assembly, the
Secretary General was reproved for having signed the Agreement
with the UN Secretary General. In 1974, a similar set of
circumstances, led to the resignation of the Secretary General,
~~. Neo Ekangaki for having signed an agreement with the
British Multinational Lohnro, as the OAU's advisor, on how to
assist African states hit by the oil crisis after the 1973 War
between the Arab States and Israel.
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to recruit the personnel serving in the Secretariat General
has also limited his influence. The Assistant Secretaries
General,.each of whom heads a department within the Secretariat,
are also elected by the Assembly of Heads of State and
Gover~ent(46). Nomination for these posts must be on the
principle of geographic, linguistic and political
equilibrium(47). Under these circumstances, the Secretary
General has been unable to impose control over the Secretariat's
personnel from the very moment of establishment(48).
However, the continued reluctance of the African states
to provide the General Secretariat with sufficient material
resources also limits the potential influence of the.
Secretary'General. The limited financial contributions
allocated for the Secretariat have restricted the Secretary
General's activities for providing services to the meetings
of the OAU organs. The OAU also lacks adequate numbers of
professional staff. Throughout its existence, the OAU
Secretariat has had great difficulties in recruiting well-
qualified Africans because such citizens are in considerable
demand by their own governments(49). In addition to the
(46)The current Assistant Secretaries General are ~w.Peter Onu
(Nigeria), Mr. Chimuka (Zambia), Mr. D. Hurego (Rwanda),lw. Paul Etiang (Uganda) and ~~. Noureddin Djoudi (Algeria)
representing Africa's five regions.
(47)
African Research Bulletin, Volume 15, No.9, October 15th
.!.21§., p.4978
(48), '
There has been considerable disagreement and disputes
between the Secretary General and the Executive Secretary of
the Liberation Committee. .Despite the decisions of the
Assembly and the Council of Hinisters that the Liberation
Committee's Secretariat is responsible to the OAU Secretary
General,·the Liberation Committee's Secretariat is independently
financed, and its Executive Secretary is appointed by the
Tanzanian President.
(49)Sanders AJGH, Op. Cit, p.lla
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aforesaid limitations on the Secretary General's role, the
latter does not possess the unique prominence of the UN
Secretary General who is usually perceived as the primary
representative of the UN. The OAU Secretary General has
rivals each year, one being the Chairman of the Assembly
of Heads of State who issues statements on behalf of the
OAU(SO). Other rivals for prominence are the Secretary
General of the Commonwealth(Sl) and the Secretary General
of the Arab League, whose prestige has been increased by
his successes in the settlement of Arab regional disputes(S2) •
.Thus, the OAU practice is to appoint one or more of the
African Heads of State to lead efforts to initiate the
peaceful settlement of African regional disputes, the
OAU Secretary General has never been the mediator in any
-major African dispute and is unlikely to be so in future
conflicts. In addition to the aforesaid practice, the
OAU response to the settlement of African regional disputes
has often been to refer such disputes to an ad hoc committee
representing the diversity of views witHin the organisation.
These committees either postpone difficult decisions, or
f'attempt to reconcile the conflicting viewpoints. This led tOJV'~-- -
severe handicap and inability of the OAU to find an African
~lution~t~ the Civil War in Chad and-in the Western Sahara(S3).
(SO)l-reyerDavid, Op. Cit, p ,S16
(51) r \Higgins Roselyn, Ope Cit, p.68
'--"(52) . .Bakhashab Omar, A., The Legal Structure of the Arab League,
unpublished LL.~I. Dissertatio~, Glasgow Universitx 1212,_p.96
(53) . .African Research Bulletin, Volume 18, July 15th 1981, p.6067
I
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It is apparent that legal institutional restraints
supplemented by suspicion of the incunilient's activities
6~have been the predominant causes r~ the powerless position
of the OAU Secretary General. The Office was designated
as a weak, non-political institution and the incumbent's
efforts to expand his authority have been mistrusted and,
in general, rebuffed by the member states. The conclusion
which could be drawn from this analysis is that the OAU
Office may be compared to the similar Office of the League
of Nations, conceived as an International Office of high
level civil servants, set up to implement instructions
rather than to act as a guiding hand for the Organisation(S4).
Despite all these facts, the OAU Secretary General has
travelled widely and endeavoured to involve himself in
numerous matters, for which he can be given credit and
respect. He has regula~ly visited the leaders of member
states involved in disputes, to remind them of their
obligations under the OAU Charter and to serve as a
mediator between the disputants. The time during which
the Secretary General was prominently active, was the
Nigerian Civil liar and the Second Congo crisis. On a
number of African conflicts he has issued public calls for
a peaceful settlement within the context of the OAU Charter.
He has occasionally and privately lent his good offices to
the heads of member states in dispute, with a view to
achieving mutually acceptable solutions to African problems.
However, a practice has developed according to whd ch the
(54) Polhemus Higbie. :I., Op. Cit, p.l07
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Secretary General or his representatives participate in
the drafting of the Assembly and the Council of Ministers'
resolutions on the proposals submitted to the parties to a
dispute. A further role of the Secretary General is the
submission at every ordinary session of either the Assembly
or the Council of Hinisters, of a report on the work of the
Organisation. These reports refer to the measures under-
taken for the implementation of the Assembly and the
Council's resolutions, and frequently contain proposals
relating to various aspects of regional disputes. The
Secretary General of the OAU has exercised his general
power to act upon his own initiative in the absence of any
specific mandate, whenever such action seemed warranted in
the interests of the Organisation. They, therefore,
constitute a further means by whd ch the Secretary General
can exercise a role in Inter-African relations.
The Commission of ~rediation, Conciliation and Arbitration:
At the Addis Ababa Summit Conference, the African
leaders expressed the urgent importance of maintaining
peace and security in the African continent. Accordingly,
they called for the creation of a formal OAU institution
to deal with the settlement of African regional disputes.
In response to the above-mentioned appeal, the OAU Charter
enshrined Article 19 in wh Lch "••••member states pledge to.
settle all disputesarnong themselves by peaceful means and
to this end decide to establish a Commission of Mediation,
Conciliation and Arbitration, the composition of which and
conditions of service shall be defined by a separate
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protocol to be approved by the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government. Said protocol shall be regarded as forming
an integral part of the present Charter(5S).ft At its
second regular session held in Lagos in February 1964, the
Council of Ministers set up a committee of seven legal
experts to draw up an acceptable text. A final draft
protocol of mediation, conciliation and arbitration was
submitted to the third regular session of the Council of
ltUnisters, held in Cairo in July 1964, and was endorsed by
the Council and subsequently approved by the Assembly at
its second regular session(56). The competence of the
Commission is obvious in settling regional disputes. It
is the sole organ of the OAU exclusively and specifically
responsible for such functions.
Part I of the OAU Protocol deals with the composition
of the Commission in addition to the conditions of service
of its officers. The twenty-one members of the Commission
shall be elected by'the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government and ~equire to be persons with recognised
professional qualifications. The eighteen members are to
be part-time while the President and the two Vice Presidents
are to constitute the Bureau of the Commission, which is
charged with the responsibility of consulting with the
parties to a certain dispute concerning the appropriate
mode of settling the dispute within the context of the
OAU Protocol(S7).
(55)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Op. Cit, p.14
(S6)Ellas. T.~., The Protocol of the Commission of J.lediation,
Conciliation and Arbitration of the OAU, BYBIL, Volume 40,
1964, pp.336-338
(S7)~p~r~o~t~o~C~O:I~O~f__th~e_C_M_C~A~,OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures,
Ope Cit, Article 5, p.53
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'vhen the members of the Commission are engaged in official
duties, they shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities in
conformity with the provisions of the OAU Convention on Privileges
and Immunities(S8). It is obvious that the members are considered
independent experts and not government representatiyes. The member
states in general, and the parties to a certain dispute in
particular, are under obligation to give their unlimited co-
operation to those members of the Commission engaged in the course
of mediation, conciliation or arbitration, as well as to those
instructed to conduct an investigation, fact-finding or enquiry
in connection with the efforts to settle the issues in dispute.
It should be noted that the potentialities of commissions of
enquiry, fact-finding and investigation in the peaceful settle-
,ment of African regional disputes appeared to have been largely
vitiated. The OAU member states are obliged to have recourse to
anyone of three modes of peaceful settlement - mediation,
conciliation or arbitration - all dependent on the consent of the
parties to a certain dispute. In the absence of such consent,
. .
the Commission is only competent to refer the ~atter to the
Council of l>Hnisters for consideration(S9). In such circumstances,
the Council of ~Hnisters shall endeavour to find a mutually
acceptable solution, but in case of disagreement, the matter shall
be referred to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government(60).
(S8)Polhemus Higbie J., Ope Cit, p.118
(S9)Protocol of the C1-1CA.OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures,
Article 13, Ope Cit, p.S4
(60)This practice had been used in the second Congo crisis in
1964. The Council of ~linisters met in Nairobi on March 4th 1964
to debate the situation in,the aftermath of the Belgian-United
States rescue operation in the Congo. However, the
Council had met for twelve days, the longest session in the
Council's history in which it adjourned ,,,ithouthaving adopted
any resolution on the Congo. On Harch 9th, the final day of the
session, it issued a communique expressing its decision to submit
the whole Congolese question to the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government to find the appropriate settlement.
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The three methods of peaceful settlement are alternative and
not necessarily successive procedures, by which parties to a
certain dispute are free to make a choice of anyone of these
three methods in respect of a dispute. .However, the
member states are under an obligation, in conformity with
Article 3(4) of the OAU Charter, to seek an amicable settle-
ment in case of not being willing to confine themselves to the
protocol procedures. The member states may have recourse to
pacific procedures which may obtain quicker results, such as
diplomatic negotiation. It clearly appears from the protocol
that the OAU Commission has no compulsory jurisdiction over
member states, but is rather optional ~~ the International
:Court of Justice and other international tribunals. As' a
matter of fact, the African states would not accept, generally,
the principle of compulsory jurisdiction at their earliest
phase of development. Therefore, the attitude of the OAU
member states towards compulsory jurisdiction is less than
certain. Whilst showing some interest in the development of
the Commission of J.lediation,Conciliation and Arbitration, in
practice, the member states continue to express a preference
for mediation and conciliation, usually under the auspices of
African Heads of State and Government.
Mediation:- Article 20 of the OAU Protocol provides that
•••••when a dispute between member states is referred to the
Commission for mediation, the President shall, with the
consent of the parties, appoint one or more members of the
Commission to mediate on the dispute(61).n The mediator's
(61)Protocol of the C~fCA, OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures,
.QE.. Cit, p.56
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role is confined to reconciling the claims and views of the
parties concerned. '~en the parties to the dispute accept
the means of reconciliation proposed by the mediator, then
the proposed formula will constitute the basis of a protocol
of arrangement between the parties(62). It should be noted
that the context of the provision o~ Article 21 of the
Protocol is quite vague; nevertheless, it would seem to
imply that the parties to the dispute shall initially have
to reach a mutual agreement,even when the mediators have
been appointe~before the machinery of mediation is set in
motion. The Protocol is patterned after customary inter-
national practice concerning the nature of mediation. The
Protocol mentioned that the mediation is to consist of the
direct conduct of negotiations between the parties to a
certain dispute on the basis of proposals made by the
mediator. It clearly appeared that the provisions did
not, however, necessarily exclude the resort to good offices
which consist of various kinds of efforts being conducted
by a third party when a member or member state or any
other organ of the OAU endeavours to bring about negotiations
between the parties to a dispute in order to reach a mutually
acceptable solution.
Conciliation:- The OAU Protocol provides that n•••• request
for the settlement of a dispute by means of conciliation may
be submitted to the Commission by means of petition addressed
to the President by one or more of the parties to the dispute.
The petition shall 'include a summary explanation of the
grounds of the dispute(63).- The President of the Commission
(62)Ibid
-'
(63)Ibid,
Article 21, p.56
Article 22(1)(3), pp.56-57
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in agreement with the parties in the dispute, shall appoint three
members from among the members of the Commission, while one
each shall be appointed by the parties of the dispute.
However, no two members of the Board shall be_nationals
of the same state(64). The Board of Conciliation is
responsible for the clarification of the issues in dispute
and to endeavour to bring about an agreement between the
disputants upon mutually acceptable terms. In implementing
such an assignment, the conciliators may hear any witness
capable of giving relevant information on the dispute;
moreover, they may undertake any investigation, fact-finding
or enquiry. The essential duty of the Board is to adjust
the interests of the conflicting parties justly and equitably,
whenever"that is possible, but at any rate, peacefully. The
parties to a dispute shall be represented before the
conciliators by agents who shall act as intermediaries between
them and the Board. The agents may be assisted by counsel
and independent experts and may also request the summoning
of witnesses whose evidence may appear to the Board to be
relevant(6S). On conclusion of its proceedings, the
Board of Conciliators shall prepare a report stating either
that an agreement has or has not been reached between the
parties to a dispute. The report shall be sent to the
President of the Commission and also to the parties to
the dispute without delay.
(64).!2.!9.p.57
(65)
.!!?!!! p.57
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Arbitration:- Article 27 of the OAU Protocol provides that
u •••• where it is agreed that arbitration should be resorted
to the Arbitral Tribunal shall be established in the
following manner:
(a) each party shall designate one arbitrator
from among the members of the Commission
having legal qualifications;
(b) the two arbitrators thus designated shall,
by common agreement, designate from among
the members of the Commission a third
person who shall act as Chairman of the
Tribunal;
(c) where the two arbitrators fail to agree,
within one month of their appointment in
the choice of c_ the Chairman of J the
Tribunal the Bureau shall designate the
Chairman(66) ••
Article 27 of the OAU Protocol further states under paragraphs
(2) and (3) that •••••the President may with the agreement
of the parties, appoint to the Arbitral Tribunal two
additional members who need not be members of the Commission
but who shall have the same powers as the other members of
the Tribunal. The arbitrators shall not be nationals of
the parties or have their domicile in the territories of
the parties or be employed in their service or have served
as mediators or conciliators in the same dispute. They
shall be of different,nationalities(67).- It clearly
(66).!Q!!!p.S8
(67)~ p.58
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appears frontthe provisions of the aforesaid article that
the constitution of the tribunal is absolutely at the
discretion of the parties. Even in the case of the Chairman
having been designated by the Bureau, it can be implied that
the disapproval of a party to give its consent would debar
further proceedings. It is worthwhile noting that the
Permanent Court of Arbitration introduced the independent
appointment of neutral members to the arbitration tribunal
in order to lessen the iron control of the parties over the
course of arbitration and, furthermore, to limit their
authority in the drafting of the compromis~(68). A more
progressive development has been introduced by the UN
International Law Commission model rules on arbitral
procedures which give the tribunal a radical autonomy from
,/_._---) \
B~he way, these
model rules were rejected by the Sixth Comm~ttee of the UN
the will of the parties to a dispute.
General Assembly in its thirteenth session. This could be
imputed to the influence of many states which e_;'nSist 1
on the consent aspect of arbitration(69). In conformity
with the provisions of Article 27(a) of the OAU Protocol,
~ ~'t stipulates that at least two members of the arbitration\~
)~~ ribunal having legal qualifications. It would be better
I
if all members of the tribunal had legal qualifications or
were competent in international law. The aforesaid
provisions are comparable to the provisions of the Hague
Convention which provides that individuals designated as
(68)Castel, J.G., International Law, Butterworths, Toronto,
~ pp.1240-1241
(69)Okoye, Felix Chuks, Ope Cit, p.143
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members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration shall be of .
recognised competence in international law(70). In general,
this practice in a number of arbitration tribunals, requires
that their members have legal qualification.
However , it is worthwhile mentioning that at the 1899
Hague Conference which created the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, the German delegation argued about the
possibility of designating members to the Court who had
competence in economics, law, military science and diplomacy.
The practice of many arbitration tribunals in recent years
proved the correctness of this point since some special and
technical knowledge by the members of the arbitration
tribunals is more important than a recognised competence
in law. In some notable instances, members of arbitration
tribunals had been designated with no'legal qualifications
but had satisfactorily discharged their functio~s(71). In
recent treaties, arbitral functions have been assigned to
political organs such as the Council of the Arab League,
and the Council of the Organisation of American States~
which have also undertaken both fact-finding and
conciliation(72). In the practice of the Arab League,
it was, however, only on one occasion that member states
had recourse to arbitration. This occurred in Nay 1949,
over a territorial dispute between Syria and Lebanon.
(70)Bowett. n.w., OPe Cit, p.234
(71) :Okoye, Felix Chuks, Ope Cit, p.144
(72) . J' Pi I . 1 ..Cot, ean- erre, nternat10na Conc1l1ation, Europa
Publications~ London 1972, pp.254-2S5
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Through the intervention of the Arab League, Syria and
Lebanon agreed to entrust the Governments of Saudi Arabia
and Egypt with the settlement of their dispute by
arbitration(73). Article 28 of the OAU Protocol provides
that n••••recourse to arbitration shall be regarded as
submission in good 'faith to the award of the Arbitral
Tribunal(74).n This Article is similar to Article 37 of
the 1907 Hague Convention which stipulates that
n••••recourse to arbitration implies an engagement to
submit in good faith to the award(7S)... The OAU Protocol
requires the parties to a certain dispute to conclude an
arbitration compromise undertaking to accept the decision
of the tribunal as legally binding and as defining the
subject matter of the dispute and if they agreed to
adjudicate ex aequo et bono(76). In the absence of an
agreement upon the applicable law~ the tribunal shall
settle the dispute according to treaties concluded between
the parties, international law, the OAU Charter, the UN
Charter and if the parties to the dispute agree ex aequo
et bono(77). It is clear from the above-mentioned provisions
that the power of the tribunal is severely limited by the
consent of the parties to a dispute. In the arbitration
(73)Hassouna, Hussein, The League of Arab States and Regional
Disputes, Oceana Publications, Inc. Dobbs Ferry, New York,
.!..2.ll, p.368
(74)Protocol of the C~ICA,OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures,
Ope Cit, p.59
(75)£118s, T.O., Ope Cit, p.325
(76)Protocol of the Cl>rCA,OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures
Article 29, Ope Cit, p.S9 '
(77)~; Article 30, p.59
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compromise, the parties are free to select the applicable law,
moreover, in consequence of failing to specify such law the
tribunal has only a limited choice by which it is authorised
_to apply the general principles of international law.
However, the ..members of the arbitration tribunal must
be of recognised competence in both municipal and international
law. According to Article 38(2) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice which provides that
u •••• this provision shall not prejudice the power of the
court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties
agree thereto(78) •• This provision is still lacking an
authoritative interpretation in the jurisprudence of the
International Court of Justice. In general, the provisions
of the above-mentioned article are taken to mean that the
Court shall go outside the bounds of international law and
endeavour to solve the dispute on the basis of justice,
equity and fair dealing. However, it would be
better if the OAU Protocol had followed the example of the
Bolivia-Peru Treaty of 1902 which laid down quite generally
that a boundary dispute be determined by arbitration ex aequo
et bono in which the arbitrators are authorized to decide
according to their true knowledge and understanding, and
in conformity with justice, equity and fairness(79). An.
international tribunal which has failed to apply the law
stipulated by the arbitration compromise or the applicable
principles of international law, is obviously exceeding
(78)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.276
(79)J.lunkman,A.L.W., Adjudication and Adjustment, International
Decision and the Settlement of Territorial and Boundar~
Disputes, BYBIL, Volume 46, 1972-73, pp.24-25
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its jurisdiction and accordingly, its decision will be void.
It clearly appears from the OAU Protocol that it does not
authorize the arbitration tribunal to determine its own
jurisdiction. This question would become quite an important
issue in case of allegation by any party to a dispute of
absence or excess jurisdiction as grounds for nullity.
However, the Permanent Court of International Justice
decided in the Greco-Turkish Agreement of 1928 that any
judicial body that possesses jurisdictional power has the
right in general principle, to determine the extent of its
jurisdiction(80). It should be noted that this assertion
has often been challenged since the parties to a dispute
provide for no rights whatsoever, except so far as may
appear from the arbitration compromise. The modern practice
is, however, to confer upon the judicial tribunals the
power to determine the extent of their jurisdiction. The
general principle is enshrined in the 1907 Convention
establishing the Permanent Court of Arbitration. It has
also been attributed by reference to the Hague Convention
in some international instruments(81). It is worthwhile
mentioning that the OAU Protocol ignored a number of
arbitral issues such as whether the decision of the
tribunal is to be determined by a majority vote of the
arbitrators or differently. As whether the decision of tribunals
is legally binding and settling the dispute definitely
(80)World Court Reports, edited by Hudson. Manky 0., Advisory
Opinion No.16, August 28thA 1928, Volume 4, 1927-32,Washington 1935, pp.321-33
(81)Okoye, Felix Chuks, Ope Cit, p.146
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without appeal to any higher organs of the OAU. The matter
of interpretation of the award and the mode of revision are
also ignored. It clearly appears from the OAU Protocol
that extreme limitations of authority are imposed on the
Commission which ,lacks the competence to interpret the
OAU Charter and its optional jurisdiction. The consequence
of this situation is that a party to a dispute may easily
frustrate the process of arbitration. In addition to
these severe limitations, it has been proved in practice
that the member states of the OAU were reluctant to avail
themselves of the Commission's jurisdiction after it had
been finally established. Thereupon, in November 1966
the President of the Commission suggested to the Assembly
of Heads of State and Government that in the consequence
of these circumstances, there was no necessity to maintain
the Bureau of the Commission in fu11,-time operation.
Despite this proposal, the member states stressed the
importance of the Commission and stated that no weakening
tendencies should be permitted(82). In spite of these
commitments of support for the Commission, it is however,
obvious that the OAU member states continued to prefer
recourse to the pattern of flexible ad hoc processes of
settling regional disputes. These processes were
developed by the political organs of the OAU, such as the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government or the Council
of J.linisters.
(82)Polhemus, Higbie 3., Ope Cit, pp.127-128
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CHAPTER II:
THE OAU PRACTICE RELATING TO CERTAIN
ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL LA'f
THE CONCEPT OF REGIONAL ARRANGE~mNTS
-At the early stage of planning the structure of a
universal organisation for the post-war world, some leaders of
the great power-s laid a certain degree of emphasis on the
concept of regionalism. Sir \vinston Churchill posed the idea
of the establishment of a number of regional organisations
through which the great powers might exercise leadership in
the maintenance of peace and security in their regions, while
the new organisation should be given definite authority to
deal \dth the basic issues of war and peace globally(l).
At the deliberations of Dumbarton Oaks Summit in 1944, the
leaders of the great powers recognised the valuable collateral
role that regional organisation might play in the maintenance
of international peace and security. Accordingly, the
Dumbarton Oaks proposal .envisaged regional arrangements on
condition of compatibility with the purposes and principles
of the UN Charter. The Conference anticipated the construc-
tive role of regional arrangements in the settlement of
regional disputes, either on the initiative of the states
concerned, or by reference from the UN Security Council,
in addition to the agreement that in certain circumstances,
the Security Council might utilise regional arrangements
for enforcing action on the understanding that this could be
done only under the Security Council's authorisation(2).
{l)Wilcox, Francis 0.·,Regionalism and the UN, .110, Volume 19
!.ili, p.770
(2)Kelsen, Hans, The Law of the UN, Stevens & Sons Limited,
London 1950, pp.319-324
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At the 1945 UN Conference on international organisation at
San Francisco, the issue of regional arrangements was high-
lighted by the endorsement of the right of veto which was
given to the five super poweys. In consequence of granting
such privileges to the super powers, a number of delegations
insisted that the veto would not be permitted to block
regional actions undertaken by regional arrangements. The
great powers, however, maintained that the UN would be
totally weakened if regional arrangements were authorized to
take enforcing action without going through the UN Security
Council(3). In order to reconcile these conflicting views,
three fundamental amendments were introduced to regulate
the relationship of the UN with regional arrangements.
The first amendment was designed to encourage regional
arrangements to endeavour to work out peaceful settlements
of regional disputes before turning to the UN for assistance
in this field. The second amendment mentioned that
regional arrangements were given exclusive jurisdiction
over regional disputes. The third amendment reserved
the basic right of the UN Security Council to deal with
any dispute, whether regional, inter-regional or global,
so as to discharge its primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security(4).
However, there were three groups of delegations who were
determined to obtain special privileges for regional
arrangements to which they were already parties. The first
(3)Bowett, D.W., Ope Cit, pp.21-25
(4)Wilcox, Francis, Ope Cit, pp.791-792
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group consisted of the Arab delegations who endeavoured to
strengthen the role of the League of Arab States which had
just been established before the Conference, to deal with
regional disputes. At the same time, they endeavoured to
define regional arrangements narrowly, with a view to
excluding military alliances because they feared that such
alliances might be used by non-Arab powers to maintain the
Arabs in subjection(S). To this end the Egyptian delegation
at the San Francisco Conference proposed the following
amendment to the draft of the UN Charter "••••there shall be
considered as regional arrangements, organisations of a
permanent nature, grouping in a given geographical area,
several countries which by reason of their proximity,
community of interests or cultural, linguistic, historical
or spiritual affinities make themselves jointly responsible
for the peaceful settlement of any disputes which may arise
between them and for the maintenance of peace and security
in their region as well as for the safeguarding of their
interests and the development of economic and cultural
relations(6).a The Egyptian amendment was rejected by
twenty-nine votes to five in Committee 111/4 on the grounds
that it was superfluous and also pointless(7). In any
event, the real unstated reason for the rejection was that
certain delegations discerned the possibility of excluding
military arrangements which had already been established,
such as the Anglo-Soviet Pact of mutual assistance of 1942(8).
(S)Akehurst. ~Iichael, Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies
with Special Reference to the OAS, BYBIL, Volume 42, !221, p.176
(6)Kelsen. Hans, Ope Cit, p.320
(7).Th1£, p.320
(8)Ibid p.320-'
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The second, and biggest group consisted of the Latin American
delegationswho, together with the United States of America,
concluded in Nexico City the Pact of Chapultepoc in 1945,
shortly before the convocation of the UN Conference on
international organisation at San Francisco, providing for
the prevention of intervention by extra-regional powers(9).
It should be noted that the Latin American States had
relatively little interest in extra-hemispheric affairs.
Their main concern was to create inter-American institutions
in order to induce the United States to subordinate itself
to the decisions of the majority and to the rules of Law,
As small powers, the Latin American States were apprehensive
of the great powers' privileges in the UN Security Council
and their delegations were determined to delete the require-
ments that enforcement actions of regional arrangements
should be subject to the Security Council's authorisation.
They agreed that such privileges would enable an extra-
regional great power- to block regional enforcement action
with a view to interfering in regional affairs(lO). A
compromise was finally found ld th the insertion of
Article 51 in the UN Charter which gives authority to
individual states and regional groupings of states to act
in collective self-defence without the UN Security Council's
authorisation(11). Thirdly, a certain European power had
already concluded bilateral treaties for mutual assistance
in case of aggression by former enemy states(12).
(9)Luisa. Levin, The OAS and the UN, Regionalism and the UN,
Oceana Publications inc., Nel~ York, !.2l.2., p.149
(lO)\\'hiternan.J.Iarjorie,Digest of International Law, Volume 12
p.491
(11)Kelsen, Hans, ~O~p~.~C~i~t,p.328
(12)Akehurst, J.lichael, Ope Cit, pp.177-178
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To meet this issue, the Conference inserted Article 53
into the UN Charter wh Lch provides that prior authorisation
of the Security Council is waived with respect to measures
taken against the resurgence of aggression by former
enemy states(13).
It should be noted that the most important amendment
enshrined the recognition of right of individual and
collective self-defence against armed aggression. This
amendment, introduced by Article 51 provides for the right
of individual and collective self-defence against armed
attack until the Security Council has taken the appropriate
measures to maintain international peace and security.
This shall not, however, in any way, affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council to take action as it
deems necessary in order to restore international peace and
security(14). It should be noted that there are no other
conditions laid down and that there is nothing in the UN
Charter to prevent a non-member of the UN or an ex-enemy
state from becoming party to a regional agency or
arrangement(15). According to Article 52(1) of the UN
Charter, a regional arrangement or agency (i) must be
concerned with matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security, (ii) must be consistent
with the purposes .and principles of the UN Charter,
(iii) must be in some way a regional arrangement(16).
(13)Kelsen, Hans, Ope Cit, p.321
(14)Greig, D.W., International Law, Butterworths, London$' p.765 . '
(15 The difference between a regional agency and arrangement
would appear to be that an agency possesses an institutional
super-structure whereas an arrangement does not. Accordingly,
an agency is a highly developed form of a regional arrange-
ment and, in the present study, arrangement is used to
include agency.
(16)Panhuys, H.F. van, et al., International Organisation and
Integration, Nijhoff, Leyden, Netherlands 1968, p.36
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This last requirement may be the only one which poses
difficulties of interpretation. "Regional arrangement"
is interpreted broadly - thus, the Anglo-Soviet Hutual
_Assistance Pact is considered within the fr~mework of
Chapter VIII 'of the UN Charter. But the interpretation
cannot be wholly devoid of meaning. Thus, an arrangement
between two states at opposite ends of the earth could
hardly be regarded as a regional arrangement within the
framework of Chapter VIII, though in itself it is not
contrary to the UN Charter. It should be mentioned
that there is nothing in the text of the UN Charter or
in the practice of the UN that wou l.djustify restrictive
definition which could have the effect of denying the
establishment of regional arrangement if they do not
comply with a whol,e string of implied conditions.
Thus, such restrictive definition would exclude the
mutual assistance pacts against former enemy states whd ch
are mentioned in Article 53 of the UN Charter, as an
instance of regional arrangements(17). A number of such
arrangements had come into effect before the convocation
of the San-Francisco Conference on international-organisation
and the states that were, party to such arrangements
represented at the Conference, did not allow the exclusion
of these arrangements from the framework of Chapter VIII
of the UN Charter. There is, therefore, an argument
expounded by some jurists, that an arrangement which
(17) Ibid, p.16
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satisfies the requirements of regionalism must automatically
be considered a regional arrangement within the meaning of
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter(18). Since the UN Charter
does not establish a precise definition of regional arrange-
ments, there is, therefore, some sense in this argument.
Accordingly, any regional arrangement is governed by
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, whether the parties to the
arrangement desire this 'consequence or not. In this
connection, the Commonwealth of Nations is a clear instance
of a regional arrangement which by any definition cannot be
regarded as regional(19). The Organisation of American
States, on the other hand, is clearly a regional arrange-
ment within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.
This is expressly stated in Article 2 of the OAS Charter
which proclaims that the organisation, in order to put into
practice the principles upon which it is established and to
fulfil its regional obligations under the UN Charter, has
the following purposes ••••• (a) to strengthen the peace and
security of the continent; (b) to prevent possible causes
of difficulties and to assure the pacific settlement of
disputes that may arise among the member states;
(c) to provide for common action on the part of these
states in the event of aggression; (d) to seek the
solution of political, judicial and economic problems that
may arise among them; (e) and to promote by co-operative
action their economic, social and cultural development(20).a
(18)Akehurst, Michael, Opo Cit, p.177
(19)Haas, Erust B., The UN and Regionalism, d!B, Volume 3,
1966, p.797
(20)Levin, Aida Luisa, The Organisation of American States and
the United Nations, Relations in the Peace and Security Field,
Regionalism and the UN, edited by Andemicael Berhanykum
Oceana Publication inc., New York, ~, pp.149-1S0 '
- 73 -
The OAS is closely geared to the peaceful settlement of
regional disputes and to the enforcement machinery of the
\
UN. It is explicitly stated that the OAS Charter is based
on Article 51 of the UN Charter which provides for the
right of individual or collective self-defence against
armed attack. But, it is also tied specifically to
Article 54 of the UN Charter which provides that the
Sec~rity Council must be kept informed of activities
undertaken by regional arrangements with respect to the
maintenance of international peace and security(21).
Accordingly, when a regional arrangement acts in collective
self-defence, its actions are governed by Article 51.
Therefore, it is necessary to look not only at the nature
of the organisation, but also at the nature of each of
its functions. There is nothing to prevent a regional
arrangement such as the OAU, the Organisation of American
States and the League of Arab States whose main functions
are governed by Articles 52-54 from acquiring subsidiary
functions which are governed solely by Article 51, such
as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, while the latter may acquire
subsidiary functions which are governed solely by Articles
52-54. The distinction has important practical effects
because, action under Article 51 does not require
authorization by the Security Council and may be reported
ex post facto, whereas enforcement actions under Article 53
do normally require such authorisation and are in theory
to be reported in advance under Art'icle 54 (22). The OAU
(21)Greig, D.W., Ope Cit, pp.766-767
(22)Haas, Erust B., Ope Cit, pp.797-801
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Charter provides that u •••• one of the purposes of the OAU
is to promote international co-operation, having due regard
to the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of
It is obvious that the OAU Charter
does not contain provisions similar to those of the OAS
Charter, but its travaux preparatoires make it clear that
the OAU was intended to be a regional arrangement within
the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter(24). A
number of the UN resolutions expressly consider the OAU
a regional arrangement within the meaning of Chapter VIII
of the UN Charter{2S). The Pact of the League of Arab
States which was established before the creation of the
UN also does not maintain any provision similar to
Article 2 of the OAS Charter, but in a series of its
own resolutions it does consider itself a regional
arrangement within the framework of Chapter VIII of the
UN Charter(26). The UN General Assembly subsequently
issued a permanent invitation to the League of Arab
States to send an observer to attend its session(27).
(23)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Article 2(e)
Ope Cit, p.lO
(24)Solemn Declaration ~n General Policy, Ope Cit, p.2
(25)security Council Resolution No. S/609, December 30th 1964
(26)Memorandum on Co-operation and Liaison Between the UN
and the League of Arab States, Hassouna Hussein,
Ope Cit, pp.441-442
(27)When the UN General Assembly decided to extend to the League
of Arab States a permanent invitation to send an observer to
attend its session, Israeli representative to the UN argued
that the League was not a regional arrangement because, inter
alia Is~aeL alleged that its activities were aggressive and
therefore inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the
,UN as provided by Article 52 of the UN Charter. Nevertheless,
the General Assembly issued the invitation without passing
upon the status of the League.
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Moreover, when the Security Council were debating the
Lebanese crisis of 1958, the consensus in the Council
confirmed that the League of Arab States was a regional
arrangement within the framework of Chapter VIII of the
UN Charter(28). On the othe~ hand, military arrangements
such as NATO, the l~arsa'iPact and the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organisation have caused severe controversy in the past.
The North Atlantic Treaty refers only to Article 51 of the
UN Charter which provides that any measures that shall be
taken against an armed attack shall immediately be reported
to the UN Security Council. Such measures taken according
to the said Treaty are to be terminated when the Security
Council have taken the appropriate measures to restore
international peace and security(29). Consequently, no
reference is being made to Article 52-54 of the UN Charter.
Hence, the conclusion can be drawn that the signatories
did not wish to consider NATO a regional arrangement in
the strict sense of the term. The Southeast Asia Treaty
Organisation, established in 1954 reiterates the right of
individual and collective self-defence but it does neglect
to mention any regional relationship(30) within the terms
of Chapter VIII of the UN Charte~(31). The advantages of
this attitude are obvious. The compulsory reliance of
(28)Hassouna, Hussein, Ope Cit, pp.71-77
(29)Leech, Noyes et al., International Legal System,
Foundation Press, New York 1973, p.878
(30)Thesignificance of this change is obvious. The Cold
was at its peak at the conclusion of this pact in whd ch
parties·to the new arrangement considered it desirable to
avoid the limitations and restrictions contained in the
provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.
(31)Wilcox, Francis, Ope Cit, pp.793-794
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parties on the UN is reduced and they are able to act freely
in an emergency without the possible delay and handicap
imposed by the restrictiomand limitations of Chapter VIII
of the UN Charter, and the military arrangements such as
I
SEATO could not become effective with the Security Council's
authorisation. Moreover, the defence plans would have
had to be disclosed in advance to the Security Council in
conformity with Article 54 of the UN Charter. It should be
mentioned that the OAU, the League of Arab States and the
Organisation of American States are distinguished from the
military arrangements by their roles as agents for settling
regional disputes among their member states. The OAS
can take collective measures under Article 5 of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in order to
establish and maintain peace between two or more of its
own member states or in case of external armed aggression
against any of its members(32). The League of Arab States
alsolhave the power under Article 6 of the 1950 Arab
Collective Security Pact to determine measures to maintain
peace between its own members and to repulse any external
armed aggression against any of its members(33). In
contrast to the foregoing examples, the OAU can hardly be
regarded as having elements of a defence arrangement. The
OAU Charter only requires member states to co-ordinate and
harmonize their general policies regarding defence and
security matters(34). It also provides for the establishment
(32)'Vhiteman. Harjorie, DIL, Volume 5, 1963, p.105'0
(33)Bakhashab, Omar A., Ope Cit, p.62
(34)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Article 2(c), Ope Cit.
p.10
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of a Defence Commission, ,~hile its provisions have not
been accompanied by a collective defence treaty such as
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of the
OAS or the 1950 Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation
Treaty of the League of Arab Stat~s.
It is well known that Chapter VIII of the UN Charter
contains three Articles. Article 52 deals with the
peaceful settlement of international disputesj Article 53
deals with enforcement actio~and Article 54 deals with
the reporting of measures taken by regional arrangements
to the Security Council(35). Concerning the peaceful
settlement of disputes, there is a shift in the balance
between regional arrangements and the UN. This stems
from the role of those arrangements which have been far
less active in the peaceful settlement of regional disputes
than the founders of the Charter anticipated. MoreQver,
regional arrangements have not eased the burden of the UN
very much by serving as a court of first recourse for the
peaceful settlement of regional disputes. It would appear
that there are at least two basic reasons why regional
arrangements have played only a limited role in the
process of peaceful settlement. Firstly, the military
arrangements were not established for the purpose of
settling regional disputes between member states. The
(35)
Panhuys. H.F. van et al., Ope Cit, p.36
- 78 -
precise function of the military arrangements is collective
defence of the regions against external armed aggression.
Secondly, most regional arrangements do not play significant
roles in the peaceful settlement of regional disputes because
-- ( 6)of the various limitations of their membership 3 • Thus,
most of the conflicting issues of the post-war era have
not been settled at regional level, but have found their
way into the UN forum. As far as the settlement of African
regional disputes is concerned, the OAU could perform a
valuable service for the UN in a continent which contains
states made up of a conglomeration of nations with a
number of difficult frontier and boundary disputes. The
UN and the OAU share the objectives of peace and security,
the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms
and the economic and social development of Africa. OAU
member states h~ve been strongly inclined to seek settle-
ment of regional disputes within an African framework and
have accordingly stressed the need for the primacy of the
OAU over the UN on such matters. The UN has encouraged
the initial consideration of peaceful settlement by the
OAU(37). By settling such disputes effectively, the
OAU might be able to maintain its autonomy, while at the
same time contributing to the achievement of the objectives
that it shares with the UN. To the extent to which OAU
capability, authority, function, structure and personnel
(36)The Republic of South Africa is not a member of the OAU,
nor are Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland members of .
any regional European arrangements. Other examples abound.
(37)Andemicael, Berhanykum, The OAU and the UN, Regionalism
and the UN, Edited by the Writer, Oceana Publications inc.,
New York 1979, pp.233-236
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_are inadequate to effect regional settlement(38), it would
seem advisable that the OAU devise ways of remedying any
remaining shortcomings by requesting an appropriate UN role.
In the matter of enforcement action, there is not much
difference between regional and non-regional arrangements.
It is true that regional arrangements possess a certain
advantage in case of enforcement action against ex-enemy
states. Accordingly, Article 53 gives wider authority
than Article 107 but despite these articles, it is unlikely
that any state would rely upon the term "ex-enemy"
nowadays(39). In any event, regional arrangements may
take enforcement action to give effect to the Security
Council decisions or to their own decisions. Since the
Security Council must, in all cases, give authorisation
for action, the difference is not .very great. It is
worthwhile mentioning that Article 51 has always
been invoked by the League of Arab States in· its struggle
against Zionism(40~, and the OAU in its struggles against
colonialism and racial discrimination(41). As far as the
OAU's enforcement action is concerned, attention should be
paid to the moral and material assistance extended to
African liberation movements. This can hardly be regarded
as enforcement action requiring the Security Council's
(38)The Guardian, ThurSday January 21st. 1982 p.5
(39)Panhuys. fI.F. van et al., Qp. Cit, p.36 and 47
(40)Bakhashab,Omar_A., Ope Ci'ti,P.95
(41)nugard. C.J .R., The OAU and Colonialism: An Inquiry into
the Plea of Self-Defence as a JUstification for the Use of
Force in the Eradication of Colonialism, ~, Volume 40,
l.2..21., p.165
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authorisation. Similarly, diplomatic and economic measures
recommended by the OAU against the colonial and minority
y regimesin Southern Africa cannot be considered as enforce-
ment actions re quir ing author isation (42) • It wou l.d appe ar
that these measures have never raised any serious controversy
within the UN organs. In fact, the type of measures
such as diplomatic and economic sanctions and assistance
to liberation movements have been endorsed by the UN General
Assembly in a number of resolutions which directly or
indirectly support them(43). Moreover, Security Council
endorsement of these General Assembly resolutions can be
regarded as constituting legitimisation of these activities(44).
Only in the case of the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of
independence in November 1965, was there a real possibility
of direct enforcement action by the OAU against the Smith
regime, in conformity with Article 51 of the UN Charter.
(42)
To quote the British representative at the UN's statement
before the Security Council: DThere is nothing in inter-
national law, in principle, to prevent any state if it so
decides, from breaking off diplomatic relations, instituting
a political interruption of economic relations ''lithany other
states. These steps which are the measures decided upon
by the OAS with regard to the Dominican Republic are acts
of policy perfectly within the competence of any sovereign
state." (Greig, D.W., Ope Cit, p.768)
(43)The UN General Assembly requested the UN member states
to give moral and material assistance to the Southern
Rhodesian and Namibian liberation movements in their
struggles for independence of their respective countries.
(44)The UN Security Council Resolution No. 216 November 12th,
~, No. 217 December 16th, 1966, No. 231 April 9th, 1966,
No. 232 December 1966 and Resolution" No. S/253 Nay 29th, 1968,
(\\7J1iternan, J.iarjorie, ill, Volume 12, p ,403)
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It would appear that the enforcement action was probably
intended to be taken without authorisation by the Security
Council. Despite the fact, there was no actual armed
attack against any OAU member state justifying the
invocation of the right of individual or collective self-
defence against the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia.
The OAU argued that the rebellion by the illegal regime
was considered as a threat to the security of neighbouring
African states, especially Zambia, which had welcomed
African refugees and liberation movements within its
territory(45). This claim implied that the existence
of colonialism and minority regimes in Africa was
considered an act of aggression against all OAU member
states. Hence, the OAU claimed that it was entitled to
recommend and co-ordinate enforcement action in defence
of its members against aggression in conformity with
Article 51 of the UN Charter. Thus, it seems that the
OAU has adopted a·broader interpretation of the inherent
right of individual and collective self-defence referred
to in Article 51. It would appear that such interpretation
by the OAU stems from despair about the relative
ineffectiveness of the UN in achieving the common
objectives of the peoples of Southern Africa. Nevertheless,
it seems that the problem of racial discrimination in
South Africa is of particular concern to the UN. As an
organisation devoted to the maintenance of international
peace .and security as well as to human progress, the UN
(45) . 1 B nh ku h .Andem1cae I e any m, T e OAU and the UN, Africana
Publishing Company, New York 1976, pp.149-150
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has a special responsibility to prevent war in Southern
Africa by assisting in bringing about peaceful changes in
the area. Finally, an important aim of the OAU'S extra-
continental diplomacy is aimed ·on the one hand at preventing
external intervention in African regional disputes, and on
the other hand at securing effective external assistance,
especially from the super powers with a view to eradicating
colonial domination and racial discrimination in Africa.
The only regional organisation whd.ch has been involved in
a series of arguments about Article 53 is the OAS which
interprets the Article in such a way as to minimise
Security Council control in the cases of a number of
crises in Central and Latin America(46). Nevertheless, the
OAS is the only regional arrangement which has conscientiously
observed Article 54. The League of Arab States and the
OAU have only submitted reports sporadically and there have
been no reports at all by other regional bodies(47).
(46)Sharp controversies have arisen between the OAS and the
UN in connection with several disputes. The first occurred
in 1954 when the Government of Guatemala simultaneously
requested both the OAS and th~ UN Security Council to take
the appropriate measures to bring about an end to the attack
launched against it by Nicaragua and Honduras. In submitting
its case to the UN Security Council, the Guatemalan govern-
ment, in effect, by-passed the OAS, arguing that it had a
right under the UN Charter to appeal directly to the Security
Council for assistance. The United States supported by
certain Latin American states insisted that the OAS members
were obliged to submit such dispute initially to the OAS
which functions as a court of first appeal in regional
disputes. After a prolonged procedural wrangle, the Security
Council failed to adopt the agenda by a vote of four in
favour, five opposed with two abstentions. In consequence
of the failure of the Security Council to take a positive
position, the dispute was turned over to the OAS for further
consideration.
(47)Akehurst, Hichael, OPe Cit, pp.183-184
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As a result, compli'ance ,dth Article 54 has become virtually
optional in practice and it certainly provides no guide for
distinguishing between regional and non-regional arrangements.
In some cases, political and even military sanctions have been
applied without the approval of the Security Council. The
necessity for reporting enforcement measures to the Security
Council appears to have been ignored. The consequences have been
that the authority of the Security Council to co-ordinate or to
control the enforcement actions of regional bodies have been
sadly diluted. The economic boycott of Israel wh Lch was
initiated by the League of Arab States in line with its policy
of strangling Israel economically(48), was never submitted to
the UN Security Council for formal approval. As regards OAS
activities, this matter initially came to a head during the
conflict of 1960 between the Dominican R~public and Venezuela(49).
In this connection, the OAS decided to impose diplomatic and
econO,mic sanctions including suspension of trade in arms on the
Dominican Republic. These measures were reported to the Security.
Council by the OAS but it did not apparently consider it necessary
to seek the approval of the UN Security Council. Unlike the OAS
and the League of Arab States, the OAU has not been involved in
any jurisdictional squabbles with the UN in connection with
collective measures. On the contrary, the African States have
taken the lead in the UN in promoting and encouraging the use of
collective action through the UN against South Africa.
(48)As a case in point, the boycott was designed to achieve its
purpose in cwo ways; by preventing trade between Israel and the
Arab World and by blacklisting foreign companies and ships doing~
business with Israel.
(49)At the Heeting of ~Iinisters of Foreign Affairs of the OAS Ln
San Jose in 1960 the Dominican Republic was condemned for
interfering in the domestic affairs of Venezuela and it was voted
to impose diplomatic, economic and military sanctions against
the Dominican Republic. (Greig, D.W., Ope Cit, p.768)
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RELATION BET\w"EENTHE OAU AND THE UN
It has already been mentioned that the OAU has been
recognised as a regional arrangement wi thin the f'r-amewor-k
of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The UN Security Council
gave recognition to an emerging relationship with the OAU in
the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter by encouraging
the OAU's role in the peaceful settlement of African regional
disputes. The preamble to the OAU Charter declares that
n •••• the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights," to the principles of which we reaffirm our
adherence, provide a solid foundation for peaceful and
positive co-operation among states(l). The obvious intent
of the founders of the OAU of closely affiliating their
organisation to the UN was expressed in Article 3 of the
OAU Charter which included provisions for the enhancement
and promotion of international co-operation as expounded by
the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights(2). Horeover, Article 26 of the OAU Charter· provides
that·n ••••this Charter shall, after ratification, be
registered with the Secretariat of the UN through the
Government of Ethiopia in conformity with Article 102 of the
UN Charter(3).n Furthermore, since then all OAU member
states are also members of the UN whd.ch me ans the OAU by
reference to Article 103 subject to the provisions of the
(I)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Article 2(e)
Ope Cit, p.13
(2)~ p.tO
(3)Ibid p.t6
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UN Charter including Article 51, 52(4), 53 and 54. These
articles are designed to ensure the paramount and ultimate
responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance
of international peace and security(4). This proposition
seems to be amply confirmed by the UN attitude towards the
OAU roles in both the Congo crisis of 1964 and the Rhodesian
independence crisis of 1965(5). In this respect the Security
Council Resolution 199 of December 30th 1964, affirmed its
confidence that tt •••• the OAU should be able, in the context
of Article 52 of the Charter of UN, to help find peaceful
solutions to all the problems of disputes affecting peace
and security in the continent of Africa(6).n Moreover,
the Security Counci~ expressly'encouraged the OAU
"••••to pursue its efforts to help the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to achieve national
reconciliation(7).n Similarly, in the Rhodesian crisis
of 1965, follo\iing the unilateral declaration of independence,
the Security Council called in its Resolution 217 of
November 1965 on the OAU ......to do all in its power to
assist in the implementation of the present resolution in
conformity with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the UN(8).1t
At any event, the process of co-operation between the UN
(4)Panhuys, II.F. van et al., Ope Cit, p.35, 36 and 46
(5)Okoye, Felix Chuks, Ope Cit, p.158
(6)Hoskyns. Catherine, Case Studies in African Diplomacy,
Tanzania, Litho, LTD, Arusha. 1969, p.61
(7)~, Volume 3, !22!, pp.201-202
(8)~, Volume 4, ~, pp.167-168
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and the OAU is based on the UN General Assembly resolution
and its counterpart in the OAU Assembly of Heads of State
and Governments. On October 11th, 1965 the UN General
Assembly, at the request of the African states, adopted
a resolution on co-operation between the UN and the OAU
in conformity with the purposes and principles of the two
Charters of the organisations. Accordingly, it requested
the UN Secretary General to invite the OAU Secretary General.
to attend sessions of the UN General Assembly with observer
status. It also requested the UN Secretary General to
explore, in consultation with the appropriate organs of the
OAU, the means of enhancing and promoting co-operation
between the two organisations (9) • In response to this
gesture, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Governments
adopted a resolution at its second ordinary session held in
Accra on October 25th, 1965, on relations with the UN.
In this it express~d its appreciation of the UN General
Assembly resolution on co-operation with the OAU and
requested the OAU Secretary General to invite the UN
Secretary General to attend sessions of the OAU Assembly
of Heads of State and Government and the Council of
}Iinisters, as well as those the OAU Specialised Commissions
with observer status. It further requested its Secretary
General to do his utmost to ensure that co-operation
between the two organisations be as close as possible and
cover all fields of interest to both organisations(10).
(9)
UN General Assembly Resolution 2011(xx), October 11th, 1969
(10)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Ope Cit, p.14
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Despite the above-mentioned resolutions of both organisations,
the relationship in the sensitive field of maintenance of
international peace and security remains to be determined
exclusively on the basis of the Charters and the practices
of the two organisations. According to Article 19 of the
OAU Charter, all member states pledge themselves to settle
any disputes among themselves by peaceful means(11). In
this connection, attention should also be paid to
Resolution (C) of the Addis Ababa Summit Conference of
May 25th, 1963, establishing what the OAU called "Africa
and the UN. n This expressed the desire of the OAU to
strengthen and support UN efforts for the maintenance of
international peace and security among nations and for
the promotion of economic and social development of all
peoples(12). As far as the peaceful settlement of African
regional disputes is concerned, the DAU has clearly
indicated its preference for settling them within its
framework without expounding a rigid attitude .of exclusive
jurisdiction. This policy conforms with the relevant
provisions of the UN Charter as already outlined in the
previous section. The foundation of this policy was laid
as early as 1963(13). The first instance was that of the
Algerian-Horoccan border dispute which erupted into major
hostilities in October 1963. Morocco preferred bilateral
negotiations in order to settle the dispute and consideration
(11)Andemicael, Berhamykun, Ope Cit, pp.299-300
(12)Sa~ders. AJGM, Ope Cit, p.145
(13)Resolution (C) May 25th, 1963, Andemicael nerhanykum,
Ope Cit, p.299
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by the UN Security Council in case of failure, \~lile Algeria
sought consideration of the situation by the OAU. However,
a number of the UN Security Council members, including some
permanent members were able to persuade }'Ioroccoto try and
seek the OAU consideration initially(14) •. Three months
later, the Council of ?·1inistersheld an emergency meeting
at Dar-es-Salaam on February 12th, 1964 to consider the
border disputes in the Horn of Africa. At this meeting
it expressed its conviction that settlement of all African
regional disputes should initially be sought within the
OAU forums(IS). The OAU's initial authority was confirmed
by the OAU Assembly resolution on border disputes among
African states which was adopted at its first ordinary session
in Cairo on July 21st, 1964 • It recognised the
imperative need to settle all African regional disputes by
peaceful means within a strictly African framework. On
November 24th, 1964, the Stanleyville operation took place,
carried out by the· USA and Belgium with the consent of the
Congolese Government. The operation was launched to rescue
hostages, mainly Europeans, held by Congolese rebels. On
December 1st, 1964, the United States and Belgian delegations
at the UN informed the UN Security Council of the completion
of their operation. The OAU members' representativeJl6) at
the UN requested an emergency meeting of the Security Council
(14)Fox, Hazel, Ope Cit, p.394
(1S)Polhemus, Higbie J., Ope Cit, pp.245-250
(16)Algeria, Sudan, Ghana and the United Arab Republic (Egypt)
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to consider the situation created by the Stanleyville operation
which was regarded as an extra-regional intervention in African
affairs, thereby constituting a threat to the peace and security
of Africa. On December 9th, 1964, the Congolese representative
at the UN also requested an emergency meeting of the Security
Council to examine its complaint that interference in its
domestic affairs by the acts of a certain number of African
,governments had occurred(17). The Security Council held
an emergency meeting in response to the request of those
African states and the Congolese Government. The foreign
intervention in the domestic affairs of the Congolese
Government had been elaborately discussed but after a long
and bitter debate the Council did not reach any conclusion
over the extent of intervention. Thus, neither the US-
Belgian rescue operation nor the allegation of interference
imputed to the' four African states wer-e condemned(18). Of
more importance to the present study is that the Security
Council dealing with this situation expressed its conviction
in a resolution that the OAU should be able in conformity
with Article 52 of the UN Charter, to help find a peaceful
settlement to all African regional disputes wh Lch would
affect the peace and security in the African continent.
Accordingly, the Security Council encouraged the OAU to
pursue its endeavours to assist the government of the
Democratic Republic of Congo to achieve national reconciliation.
(17)Sanders, AJGM, Ope Cit, p.146
(18)Ibid p.146
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At the same time it requested the OAU, in conformity with
Article 54 of the UN Charter, to keep the Security Council
fully informed of any measures that might be implemented
under the said resolution(19). Consequently, the OAU
position that African regional disputes should preferably
be settled within its framework has thus been fairly
generally translated into practice. Firstly, because
of the willingness of the OAU member states to turn to
the OAU institutions initially and not to insist on
immediate access to the UN forums. Secondly, as a result
of the fears of the OAU member states that they might draw
the super powers competitively into African regional disputes.
It is notable that in the absence of a practice of
direct representation of regional arrangements in the
deliberations of the Security Council, it has become common
for a non-permanent ~ember in the Security Council to speak
on behalf of the group of states in its own region(20).
This role has been played by the African members of the
Security Council who have acted to represent the interests
of the OAU. A further step has been taken by the OAU in
order to strengthen the representation of its interests in
the UN forums by despatching a number of African
foreign ministers with a mandate to speak on its behalf(21).
Thus, the role of spokesman for the OAU has been recognised
in practice. At the same time, African foreign ministers
(19)~, Volume 3, !22!, pp.201-202
(20) .Goodw1n. Geoffrey L., The Commonwealth and the UN,
d!Q, Volume 19, ~, p.681
(21)Polhemus, Higbie J., Ope Cit, pp.244-245
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of the states concerned participate as representatives of
their respective governments in the deliberation over the
issues before the Security Council without the right of
vote(22). According to Article 54 of the UN Charter,
regional institutions are obliged at all times, to.report
to the Security Council, activities conducted under their
auspices concerning the maintenance of international peace
and security(23). In practice, the OAU does not often
report its activities concerning African regional disputes
to the Security Council but it does transmit its resolutions
regarding apartheid and colonial issues. On the other
hand it does not communicate the activities of its co-
ordinating committee for the African liberation movements
and its Defence Commission. The OAU attitude in this
respect is that this duty is more clearly defined as a
responsibility to take action in defence of humanity.
Therefore, reliance is placed on a humanitarian doctrine
which does not require to be reported to the Security
Council in conformity with Article 54 of the UN Charter(24).
This doctrine constitutes a part of the customary inter-
national law and was known as early as the seventeenth
Consequently, intervention by a state or
group of states in the domestic affairs of another state
is legal insofar as the affected states are guilty of
cruelties against their nationals in such a way as to deny
their fundamental human rights(26). Thus, in the opinion
(22}Panhuys"A.F. van et al.,.Ope Cit, p.32
(23)Ibid p.36
(24)Kelsen. Hans, Ope Cit, pp.30-31
(2S)0IConnell. D.P., International Law, Stevens & Sons, London,
~'P.159
(26 Kelsen, Hans, Ope Cit, p.30
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of African states, apartheid and colonialism are seen as
flagrant violations of human rights and the principle of
self-determination of peoples. African states believe that
humanitarian intervention constitutes an exception not only
to the prohibition of interference in the domestic affairs
of states but also to the prohibition of the threat of use of
force . and to the provisions of Article 52 of the UN Charter
which provides that regional enforcement action requires the
Security Council's authorisation(27). The OAU activities
in this respect have never been criticised by the UN. In
fact, the UN General Assembly has recognised such activities
in a number of its resolutions adopted by overwhelming votes
in which UN member states were requested to extend material
assistance to national liberation movements in their
struggles for independence(28). In this connection, the
Security Council also endorsed the authority of these
resolutions in a number of its resolutions(29). The OAU's
co-operation with the UN organs other than the Security
Council is based on parallel resolutions of the UN General
Assembly(30) and the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and
Government(31). No formal agreement has been concluded
on relationships between the UN as a whole and the OAU
but the Secretaries General have mutually agreed in the
(27)Sanders, AJG~r,Ope Cit, p.136
(28)~, Volume 4, ~, pp.369-373
(29)Resolution 253 of 1968 and Resolution 277 of 1970
(30)Resolution 2011(xx), Octob~r 11th, 1965 (Appendix
Andemicael, Berkanykum) p.300 .
(31) . .Resolut1on 33 II October 25th, 1965 (Appendix
Andemicael,Berkanykum) Ope Cit, pp.299-300
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spirit of the aforesaid resolutions, to exert their utmost
endeavours to develop the relationship into one of positive
and dynamic co-operation. It would appear that there
have been no problems in the application of the procedures
of reciprocal representations between the UN and the OAU.
It has been the practice of the UN Secretary General to
respond to the invitation of the OAU Secretary General by
personally participating or arranging high-level represent-
ation at the sessions of the OAU Assembly. He has usually
participated in a number of sessions and has delivered major
addresses(32). On the part of the OAU, there has been three
types of representations at the meeting of the UN General
Assembly and its subsidiary organs. Firstly, it has been
the practice of the OAU Secretary General or his represent-
atives to participate without voting in the deliberations
of several sessional committees and special subsidiary organs
of the UN General Assembly, particularly the Special Political
Committee, the Fourth Committee, the Special Committee.of
Twenty-Four, the Special Committee on Apartheid and the
Council for Namibia, in whose work the OAU is interested.
Whenever any of these special organs conduct their meetings
in an African capital, the OAU Secretary General participates!
~
(32)
The UN Secretary General, U-Thant, stated at the meeting
of OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in
Kinshasa in 1967 that •••••it is to be generally recognised
that the OAU had not made the progress expected towards
achieving its aims. Africa was beset by the twin dangers
of nationalism and regionalism. Just about everyone of the
boundaries her~ is beset by border disputes, deep-rooted
internal political strife and nagging problems of disease,
poverty and mass illiteracy.· (Fox, Hazel, Ope Cit, p.394)
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in their deliberations and extended proposals. Secondly,
a representation has been pursued by the African represent-
atives at the UN whose chairman of the month acts as the
spokesman for the group in various UN meetings. Thirdly,
the attendance of an African head 'of state at the UN in
order to deliver special messages to the UN General Assembly
or the Security Council in his capacity as Chairman of the
OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government(33). In
addition to the aforesaid representations, there is the
liaison between the Secretariats of the UN and the OAU
which is facilitated by the existence of an OAU office in
New York and by the fact that Addis Ababa is the location
,of the headquarters of the ECA, the principal UN office
in Africa(34). This makes it possible for consultation
and ~xchange of information to be carried out on a day-to-
day basis. It would appear that liaison concerning the
exchange of documents seems not to have been implemented
with satisfactory reciprocity. In this connection, the
OAU Secretariat has had access to most of the UN documents
whilst the UN Secretariat has various difficulties in
acquiring OAU documents on a regular basis(35). The major
obstacle in this respect is that the records and documents
of the OAU Assembly and the Council of Ministers, except
the resolutions, are considered as confidential documents
designed only for limited and restricted circulation.
(33)Sanders, AJGM, Ope Cit, p.150
(34)Andemicael, Behanykum, Ope Cit, pp.161-162
(35)Ibid p.163
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Although the OAU have not encountered any problem in
this respect, the Rules of Procedur~of the UN General
Assembly, regional organisations, are not entitled to
request direct inclusion of an item on the Assembly's
agenda(36). In the event of the OAU wishing to propose
the inclusion of additional items, it utilises the African
group at the UN as its channel and this ensures that items
of interest to the OAU are, in any event, regularly placed
on the provisional agenda prepared by the UN Secretary
General. Consequently, items on the denuclearisation of
Africa and co-operation between the UN and the OAU are
included in the agenda of successive sessions of the UN
General Assemb1y(37). Concerning economic and social
co-operation, the UN General Assembly resolution serves
as the basis for relations between the UN Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) and regional bodies(38). Accordingly,
-the ECOSOC adopted a resolution on August 10th, 1951 whereby
it invites to its sessions, with observer status, those
representatives of regional bodies who are accorded
similar privileges by the UN General Assembly. This
resolution became applicable to the OAU in 1963. The
OAU also maintain relations with most UN subsidiary
bodies such as the office of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD), the UN Development Organisation (UNIDO) and
(36)
Ibid p.162
(37)~, Volume 5, ~, pp.174-175
(38)Reso1ution 2011(xx) October 11th, 1965
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the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). As far as the
ECA is concerned, because it is the only body exclusively
devoted for Africa, it is essential to mention its relations
with the OAU briefly. The ECA was established by ECOSOC
on April 29th,-19S8 in response to recommendation of the
UN General Assembly in conformity with Article 68 of the
UN Charter(39). The Commission is responsible to the
UN ECOSOC and is financed from the regular UN budget.
It functions through experts, conferences and seminars
and provides technical assistance and training to OAU
member states. It also collects and distributes
statistical and analytical information in addition to
arranging meetings between African states for the
formulation of economic strategies or negotiation of
inter-African economic treaties(40). In spite of these
facts, the ECA has been less successful in the promotion
of a major scheme for the creation of major sub-regional
economic communities in accordance with the major.sub-
regional division into which it has divided the continent.
Its task is aggravated by the diversity of channels of
co-operation in the regions and by economic nationalism.
In addition to this problem, there exists considerable
(39)Sanders, AJGM, Ope Cit, p.1Sl
(40)An instance of such treaties was the one establishing
the African Development Bank. The treaty was concluded
on August 4th, 1963 at the Conference of Finance Ministers
of the OAU member states on September 10th, 1964. The
function of this bank is to contribute to the economic
development and social progress of ±ts members individually
and jointly. The principal office of the bank is located
in Abidjan.
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duplication of functions and overlapping of tasks between
the ECA and the OAU Specialised Commission for Economic
and Social Affairs. In order to co-ordinate effective
co-operation between the Commissions concerned, an
agreement was concluded between the UN and the OAU on
December 15th, 1965(41). The agreement maintains the
framework of mutual consultation between the ECA and the
OAU Specialised Economic and Social Commission on all
issues of common concern(42). In addition to these
relations with the UN and its subsidiary bodies, the OAU
also concluded a number of agreements with the UN
Specialised Agencies such as the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) in 1965, the UN Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in 1965, the Food and
Agricultural Organisation (FAO) in 1967, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1967 and the World Health
Organisation (WHO) in 1969. The agreements are similar
in terms to the UN-OAU agreement in respect of co-operation
in technical and economic fields between the UN and the
OAU(43).
(41)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Appendix, Ope Cit, p.301
(42)Ibid pp.301-304
(43)Sanders, AJGM, Ope Cit, p.152
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THE AFRICAN CAUCUS AT THE UN GENERAL ASSE1-1BLY
At the San Francisco Conference on international
organisation in 1945, the only African states to participate
and, therefore, to become members of the UN were Egypt,
Ethiopia and Liberia(1). Subsequently, an enormous increase
in African membership has occurred in consequence of the
dissolution of Anglo-French colonial domains. This process
was initiated by the original Afro-Asian members of the UN
and was fully supported through the UN General Assembly's
debates and implemented through the pressure exerted by its
various resolutions(2). On the establishment of the UN,
the Latin American states were considered the largest single
group in the UN General Assembly. Consequently, they were
able to play an important role in mediating between the five
super powers, at the same time gaining for themselves
- valuable concessions in election to major UN posts(3).
At that period the African states had no such influence
and, therefore, they joined the Asian states which shared
their interests in economic development, human rights and
the struggle against colonialism, in order to form a pressure
group in the UN General Assembly. Thus, especially emerged
after the First Conference of Non-aligned Nations in 1955
which took place at Bandung, Indonesia(4). Subsequently,
(1)Sohn, Louis B. et al., Cases on UN Law, Foundation Press,
New York, !2&Z, p.SS
(2)Al-Ayouty, Yassin, The UN and Decolonisation; The Role
of Afro-Asia, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, !2Z!, p.XXIII
(3)Karafa-Smart, John, Africa and the UN, dIQ, Volume 19,
.!.2ii, p.165
(4)Bakhashab, Omar, Ope Cit, p.92
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the African-Asian delegations at the UN unofficially met
regularly, whenever questions relating to geographical
distribution arise at the UN organs, in order to vote as
a uniteS). This period did not last long, however, in
consequence of the rapid increase of African membership
in the UN which allowed them to express themselves as a
separate caucus(6). Thus, the delegations of African
states began to meet at monthly intervals at the UN and
followed the familiar UN practice of having a rotating
Chairman. The purpose of the caucus is prior consult-
ation and informal exchange of views in respect of matters
of common interest in economic development, human rights
and the struggle against colonialism. The caucus was
given official status by a resolution adopted at the
Addis Ababa Conference of 1963 establishing the OAU(7).
Accordingly, the African delegations to the UN were
authorised to establish a Secretariat in New York to
co-ordinate matters of common interest to OAU member
states and to make contact with any other groups that
shared its objectives. Under these circumstances, the
(S)Hoskyns, Catherine, The African States and the UN,
1958-1964, dlQ, Volume 40, ~, p.468
(6)1 use the term caucus in the sense of a group of member
states having some degree of formal organisation whereby
they hold regular meetings concerning matters of common
interest, before the UN General Assembly. In distinction
a voting bloc is more than a caucus, i.e. a group of states
like a military alliance which are bound by its decision
concerning general matters before the UN General Assembly.
(7)Resolution C, ~Iay 25th 1963 (Appendix II, Andemicael B.,
Qe. £ii, p.299)
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African caucus began to make its presence felt at UN
forums. During the first fifteen years of the UN, the
original African members had been represented on the UN
Security Council within the M.E. and Commonwealth
geographical distribution of the seats located to non-permanent
members in conformity with the San Francisco "Gentleman's
Agreement{B).n After the rapid increase in their member-
ship, the African states laid claim to more equitable
representation in the UN organs and its specialised
agencies(9). Accordingly, amendments to Article 23,
27 and 61 of the UN Charter were made and endorsed by the
UN General Assembly in its resolution of December 17th,
By virtue of this resolution, the composition of
the Security Council was increased to fifteen seats, ten
of them allocated to non-permanent members in accordance
with geographica~ distribution(10). As to the composition
of the ECOSOC and ICJ, development has been made in line with
that of the Security Council(11). The present geographical
distribution of seats for non-permanent members of the
Security Council is as follows: two to Latin America,
two to Africa, three to Asia, one to Eastern Europe, one
to Western Europe and one to others(12). But this is not
(B)Karafa-Smart, John, OPe Cit, pp.765-766
(9)The OAU Resolution C, ~tay25th. 1963 (Qe. £i1, Andemicael B.)
(10)GA Resolution 1991A and B VII, December 17th, ~.
(11)ICJ Year Book 19BO-Bl, The Hague 1981, p.7
(12)Bowett, n.w., Op. Cit, p.26
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all that the African states want, for they also believe
that there are certain provisions of the UN Charter which
should be revised to provide for adequate equality at
representation on the principal organs of the UN(13).
They argue that the UN Charter was written and adopted
while most of the African states were still colonial
territories. Nevertheless, they hold the UN Charter in
the highest esteem because it embodies their hopes for a
world in which all nations, large and small, rich and
poor, powerful and weak will work together in peace and
security to contribute to the development of the world's
resources and to the economic, social and cultural better-
ment of all peoples and the preservation of freedom and
human dignity. They are also aware that many African
states owe their independence to UN pressure and are
beholden to it for that(14). In this sense, they regard
the UN as the foster mother of all former dependencies
which have now become its members and therefore are
convinced that their needs have been met to some extent.
It is obvious that without the UN it would have been
difficult for new nations, especially when they were at
the same time weak and impoverished, to break into the
closely knit diplomatic circle of the older states. The
(13) The OAU Council of Ministers'Resolution 486 (xxvii)
paragraph (4) - •••••Requests all member states of the
OAU to work towards making amendments to the UN Charter
in a bid to achieve the principle of equality among
member states of the UN through the outright suppression
of the right .of veto.- ~, 1976-77, p.13
(14)Al-Ayouty, Yassin, Op. Cit, p.xx-xxi
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UN provides a forum in which African representatives
can express their views on world problems and seek support
in matters of special interest to their countries. The
privileges of using this forum derive solely from rnember-
ship in the UN and do not depend on the size and power of
the country. The UN also makes it possible for the
African states to exert concerted pressure in terms of
promises of reciprocal support until reasonable satisfaction
is achieved. In this way success has been achieved in
getting the UN General Assembly to pass resolutions on
human rights, the speedy liquidation of colonialism, the
,
peaceful settlement of international disputes and
flagrant breaches of the principles of the UN Charter, as
in the case of the resolutions against the policy of the
South African government(lS).
It should be noted, however, that there has not
always been unanimity among African states in deliberations
of problems which affect the African states and in .
deliberations of problems which affect the African
continent(16). There were serious differences of opinion
over the manner in which the peace-keeping forces of the
UN in the Congo crisis were used. There were some who
believed that the UN peace-keeping forces in the Congo
should have been recruited exclusively from African sources.
They argued that it was wrong and undesirable to bring armed
forces from other continents, and there were those who
disagreed with the manner in which the peace-keeping forces
(15)GA Resolution 20S4{xx), December 22nd, 1965
(16)Hoskyns, Catherine, Ope Cit, pp.64-65
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were used. It was felt that the measures taken were
sometimes principally directed against the nationalist
movements and that, therefore, these measures exceeded
the peace-keeping mission and took sides in the political
struggle of the Congolese people. Finally, there were
many who felt no longer able to justify the costs of the
maintenance of the peace-keeping forces which had become
an unjustifiable encumbrance upon their own development.
In spite of these views, they did appreciate the UN
presence in the Congo which had undoubtedly saved the
African continent from other forms of extra-regional
intervention(17).
At the time of the increase in African membership,
the solidarity and cordiality which had prevailed towards
the end of World War II and had given birth to the UN,
had already given way to the divisions of the so~called
·Cold War.- Under these circumstances, on the one side
there were the Western states with the USA in the lead,
allied within ~he North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)(18).
On the other side, there were the Eastern European Communist
states with the Soviet Union in the lead, allied within the
Warsaw Pact(19). These opposing blocs faced each other
in a divided world. Consequently, African states discerned
that practically every question that appeared on the UN
Assembly"s agenda or on the agenda of any of its various
(17)Karefa-Smart, John, Ope Cit, pp.767-768
(18)Haviland, Field, The United States and the UN, dIQ,
Volume 19, ~, pp.645-646
(19)Mosely, Philip, The Soviet Union and the UN, d!Q,
Volume 19, ~, pp.668-671
- 104 -
committees, was deliberated in terms of the prevailing
East versus l\Testalignments. The East and l\Testvied with
each other for the role of championing the caucus in
economic and social questions, human rights and self-
-determination as well as peaceful settlement of inter-
national disputes(20). The UN was far from united and
the East and West constituted two separate powerful blocs
competing to gain the votes of the new members. Under
these circumstances, the African states followed the lead
taken by India, to a position of non-alignment with respect
to the two rival blocs(21). It should be noted that the
term anon-alignmentU as used by African states only means
a refusal to be committed in advance to giving support to
one bloc or the other in the deliberation of international
. (22)processes and is, therefore, not intended to mean
neutrality. The African delegations always decide in
each individual case on which side to cast their votes or
to whom to promise support in.return for reciprocity.
Such support is ad hoc and is only intended to be limited
to the subject matter in hand. Therefore, it does not
apply to other future controversies or disputes •.
Consequently, the position of non-alignment pursued, is
only intended to safeguard freedom of action at all times.
Moreover, it does avoid entrance into bilateral treaties
or agreements by which the African states would bind
(20)Karefa-Smart, John, Ope Cit, p.769
(21)Claude, Inis'L., Implication and Questions for the Future,
~, Volume 19, !22i, pp.840-843
(22)nodge, Dorothy, African Voting Cohesion in the UN,
African Report, Volume 12, 1967, p.58
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themselves to one of the contending blocs. It is clearly
obvious that the African states are generally not impressed
by ideological considerations. They are interested in
economic development and social welfare. To these urgent
problems, they prefer to apply their resources and, in
order to solve them, they are prepared to receive assistance
from any source. Under these circumstances, they fear
that to become involved in ideological disputes and to
commit their support to any bloc, would restrict their
freedom to accept assistance from both sides(23). Under
the present conditions of the rekindling of the ueold WarD
the huge sums of money spent by the super powers on defence
and armaments are a cause for concern to the African states.
They regard the super powers'refusal to conclude a treaty
on reduction of the various arms, as a constant threat to
the freedom of all small nations(24). Even more alarming
is the recent extension of the nCold Warn to African
regional disputes(2S). In addition to these facts, the
African states have been distressed by Western refusal to
support their demands in the Security Council for strong
economic sanctions against South Africa. The failure to
back up positive measures endorsed by a number of the UN
General Assembly resolutions against apartheid policy, has
led the African states to doubt the UN's ability to bring
(23)Ibid p.60
(24)Karefa-Smart. John, OR. Cit, p.773
(2S)Cervenka. Zolenek, The OAU in 1976, African Contemporary
Record 1976-77, pp. A68-A69
- 106 -
about a peaceful settlement(26). Despite these facts,
African states have not lost confidence in the UN but
they have become increasingly fearful of the permanent
members1proposal of revising the system of one member,-.
one vote. . This proposal seems to be intended to curtail
the growing importance of the smaller states by the
introduction of some weighted voting system which would
depend on the size of population, gross national income
and other material factors and would be disadvantageous
to African states. Acceptance of this kind of voting
system would be a serious threat and an attempt to destroy
the equality on which the UN Charter depends(27).
To conclude, the African states need the UN and it would
appear that the UN also need them.
(26) •Legum. Col1n, Southern Africa: The Year of Whirlwind,
~, 1976-77, Rex Collings, London, !211, pp. A28-A31
(27)Karefa-Smart. John, Ope Cit, p.773
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ATTITUDE OF AFRICAN STATES T01'lARDTHE TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
It is well known that the process of authoritative
decision-making in international law owed its genesis and
growth to the interaction among the Western European states
during the last·four centuries. The world-wide community
inherited international law as it stands today from the
common source of l'lesternEuropean conscious acti vity and
beliefs. For the sake of historical accuracy, however,
it should be noted that the then European great powers at
the Congress of Vienna in 1815 set up an exclusive club,
"The Concert of Europe," through which they appointed
themselves as guardians of the European Community and
executive directors of its international affairs. These
great powers also assumed the authority to admit new
member states to this closed international club(I). Under
these circumstances, most of the African territories had
been considered a legal vacuum which led to their character-
ization as terra nullius, just as America had been prior
to European settlement(2). In consequence of these
developments, the European jurists of the nineteenth
century asserted that international law was applicable only
between Christian peoples of Europe and those of the
civilized peoples of European origin. Accordingly, the
(l)Stockton. Charles H., Outlines of International Law,
the Scribner Press, New York, !2!!, pp.44-46
(2)Anand, R.P.; Attitude of the Asian-African States Toward
Certain Problems of International Law, ICLQ, Volume 15,
!.2.2..2., p.59
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acts of colonialization came to be considered as valid and
legal on the basis of the aforesaid argument, as did the
establishment of colonial rule in Africa by actual physica~
control and the test of effectiveness. Under these
circumstances, the existing African states did not play an
active role in the development of international law during
this most creative period of its history in the nineteenth
and at the beginning of the present century. In the process
of time, the Christian European family of nations were
initially extended to include the peoples of North and South
America, while Turkey was admitted in 1856 in consequence of
the conclusion of the Crimcan War Treaty and the establishment
of diplomatic relations with the European states(3).
Consequently, international society had thus outgrown the
common qualifications for participation in an international
club which were based on a_common civilization. Japan was
admitted(4) after the wars with China and Russia in 1894
and 1904/5 respectively(5). At the Paris Peace Conference,
two African states participated, Ethiopia and Liberia.
They were also the only African states that had membership
in the League of Nations. The rest were still under
colonial domination(6). It should be noted that African
(3)Stockton, Charles H., Ope Cit, pp.47-55
(4)~ pp.57-59
(5)The required criterion of civilization was based on the
technical and industrial know-how and, of course, military
power.
(6) South West Africa Case (2nd Phase) 1966, pp.17-18
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participation at the San Francisco Conference of 1945 was
increased, but African states have no effective voice.
It was only after 1955, under pressure of world public
opinion in support of the principle of self-dete~mination,
aided by the unusual conditions of the cold war, that a
number of African countries acquired independence and
became members of international society(7). It is notable
that during the last two decades, African states
acquired an exceptional influence in the UN General Assembly
and in international affairs at large(8). Thereupon, the
criterion of "civilized nation" has been abandoned, in spite
of the fact that the term has still been used in Article 9
and 38(1)(c) of the statute of the International Court of
Justice(9) and in Article 8 of the statute of the Inter-
national Law Commission(10). It does not, however,
correspond to the aforesaid connotations. Under these
circumstances, international society has established the
criterion of the peace-loving nations and the notion of
Christian and civilized nations became an element of the
historical background of international law. It must be
admitted that international law created by and for a few
prosperous industrial nations with a common cultural
(7)S~hn. Louis, Ca~es on United Nations Law, The Foundation
Press inc., Brooklyn, New York, 1967, p.55
(8)Legum, Colin, The African Crisis, dfA, Volume 57,
1978-79, pp.646-650
(9)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.269-376
(10)PanhuyS, A.F. van et al., Ope Cit, p.134
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background and strong liberal, ind{vidualistic features
is hardly conceived as suitable by African states for the
present heterogeneous world society. The majority of
African states are small, weak and poor, and badly in
need of technological and industrial know-how. Accordingly,
African states want the protection of a system of inter-
national law which they would be able to mould in accordance with
their interests. They based their arguments on the grounds
that alterations in the sociological structure of the
international community must be accompanied by alterations
in international law. They argue that law is not a constant
in society, but one of its functions. Therefore, inter-
national law ought to change with changes in power, views
and interests in the international community in order to
be effective. The conditions in which international law
developed, the views which it contained and the interests
which it protected, have all greatly changed. Consequently,
African states seek to reshape and renovate some of the old
concepts of international law according to changed circumstances.
Having been, in their eyes, victims of an unequal position
and passive contribution to the present system of inter-
national law, it is not surprising to find African states
protesting against some of the old established principles.
African states want to change the status guo in order to
be able to share in the blessings of modern civilization
on an equal footing. They are endeavouring to exert as
much influence as possible in modifying as many of the
principles of international law. In conjunction with
Asian and Latin American states with whom they also share
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certain aspects of a conunon background, they are attempting
to reshape international law according to their own interests.
In the first instance, these states demand annulment of the
former international law of domination as expressed in the
colonial system and abrogation of unequal treaties(ll). At
the first conference of non-aligned nations at Bandung in
1955, the African-Asian states declared that colonialism in
all its manifestations is an evil, and demanded a speedy
termination of domination(12). The African determination
of fullest support of the principle of self-determination
has been reiterated by African states time and again at
every opportune moment. In 1960, African states in
conjunction with some Asian states, introduced a declaration
at the UN General Assembly which recognised that all peoples
have an inalienable right to self-determination and demanded
a speedy and unconditional end to colonialism(13). It
should be noted that African states have considered colonialism.
as a sort of permanent aggression and, therefore, believe that
it is legal to throw off colonial rule by force, if other
means fail, since it is more or less an act of self-defence(14).
(ll)Jacobini, H.G., A Study of the Philosophy of
Law as seen in Works of Latin American \'lriters,
Nijhoff, the Hague, !2i!, pp.l04-118
(12)Krishnan, Maya, OPe Cit, p.197
(13)Ibid p.198
(14)In the words of the Algerian delegate speaking in the 16th
Committee of the UN General Assembly "The Charter itself
contemplates the lawful use of force in certain circumstances.
One of those circumstances was individual or collective action
in the exercise of the right of self-defence. The Addis
Ababa Charter had simply exercised the right by providing
for collective action to assist national liberation."
(!2x, Hazel, Ope Cit, pp.397-398)
International
Martinus
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Consequently, they argue that it is not prohibited to use
violence in the struggle for liberation under Article 51
of the UN Charter(15) in which self-defence is an admitted
exception to the general prohibition against the use of
force. They further stated that the UN Charter does not
contain provisions relating to rebellion against constituted
authorities if such rebellion is in conformity with the
legal right of self-determination. Accordingly, they
considered aid given to the African liberation movements
as lawful and consistent with the principles of the UN Charter.
African states also endeavour to rebel against some of
the economic and political rights obtained by their former
colonial powers during the period of colonial rule. They
believe that these rights are inequitable because they had
to accept them during a period of sUbjection. Consequently,
they insisted that unjustified and inequitable-political
conditions must be eliminated through mutual negotiation,
and inequitable treaties and the principles of international
law must be modified in conformity with changed circumstances.
As we have already mentioned, African states are not the
first to demand the modification of these legal rights. Most
of the developing countries of Asia and Latin America, and
even some European states, have joined in demanding that
international law should be responsive to the needs of the
factual situations to which it is applied. The jurists of
the developing states argue that states tend to disregard
treaties which no longer serve their interests; and they
have given several examples where the Western Powers
disregarded the treaties when they felt that their interests
(15)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.16
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were adversely affected by them. In 1932 the French
Parliament refused to pay the war debt to the United States
of America on the grounds that the determining circumstances
had changed since the conclusion of the Peace Conference of
Paris in 1919. And, in 1934 the British Government ceased
to pay its regular instalment dues under the war treaty
with the United States of America on the grounds that the
treaty was unreasonable and inequitable, therefore, it no
longer served the British interests(16). Apart from thus
endeavouring to remove old colonial rights and their
lingering remnants, African states demand the general
application of those principles of international law that
formerly regulated .the relationships between the "civilized
nations.- It is on this basis, they argue, that inter-
national law will be a positive law of peace and welfare
which may promote their economies and assist them in raising
their standard of living. Thus, it has been rightly pointed
out that international law, in order to become a law which
would protect the weaker states, especially economically
against the richest ones, must be reshaped.
It would appear that none of the African states have
denied the binding force of international law and that
they accept large parts of it unquestioningly, pleading
their case in conformity with it. It can also be claimed
that the strong criticism voiced by quarters in the old
countries concerning the disregard of the traditional
principles of international law by African states is an
(16)Anand, R.P., Ope Cit, p.68
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indication of double standards rather than principle.
Recent events clearly demonstrate that lvestern states
are no less guilty of such disregard when it suits their
perceived interests. In fact, their attitude towards the
traditional principles was always determined by their
perceptions of self-interest, thus affecting the develop-
ment and the course of international law. Thus, for
instance, at the two Geneva Conferences on the Law of the
Sea in 1958 and 1960, no agreement was reached on the
breadth of the territorial waters in consequence of the
conflicting interests of the developing states and the
maritime powers(17). Another factor determining the
attitude of the African states to the traditional principles
of international law is that they impose a slow progress,
inadequate for keeping international law up to date in an
age of rapid changes in technology and relations between
states. It also has an element of uncertainty which
sometimes makes it very difficult to establish in a firm
manner what has become a binding rule. In response to
this argument some development has taken place within the
UN and its subsidiary agencies to codify traditional
international law. The crucial role played by the UN
in the process of formulating and promulgating norms of
international law is generally acceptable to the African
(17)
Keto, David B., Law and Offshore Oil Development,
The North Sea Experience, Praeger Publishers,
New York, 1978, p.64
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states and seems adequate to meet their requirements. African
states, therefore, look to other sources of law as a more
effective means of achieving reforms and progressive develop-
mente This is especially true of the UN General Assembly
resolutions dealing with hitherto unregulated subjects such as
the deep sea bed, air space and outer space(18). The attitude
of African states to the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the
Sea clearly provided a good illustration on the force of
national interest which determined their approach(19). It is
worthwhile mentioning that most African states now in existence
had attained their independence after the conclusion of the
Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1958(20). This fact
in itself was reflected in the consequent claims of African
states that the Geneva Conventions were drafted without their
interests being consulted. In this connection, the ratification
of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas by the landlocked
African states(21) was clearly executed in pursuance of self-
interest, since they have no maritime territories(22). The
other African states(23) which ratified the Geneva Convention
on fishing in every case expressed their dependence on
the fishing industry as an extremely important branch of
their economy. Hence, the state concerned assumed a
positive position towards this matter(24). At any rate,.
(18)Panhuys, H.F. van et al., Ope Cit, p.153, 144, 293 and
pp.189-192
(19)Janis, Mark, Sea Power and the Law of the Sea, n.c. Heath& Company, Toronto, 1976, PP.76-80
(20)Rembe, Nasila, Africa and the International Law of the Sea,
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Maryland, 1980, pp.7-13
(21)Malawi, Upper Volta, Uganda and the Central African Republic.
(22)Rembe. Nasila, Ope Cit, pp.74-76
(23)Nigeria, Senegal, Malagasy and Sierra Leone
(24)FOX, Hazel, The Settlement of Dispute by Peaceful Means
and the Observance of International Law, African Attitude,
~, Volume 3, 1966-71, p.402
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the rest of the African states, therefore, have not yet
adhered to the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea.
Accordingly, if their practice is examined, one may find
that a certain number of them have in fact, deviated from
the provisions enshrined in-these Conventions. The majority
of African states have unilaterally declared exclusive
fishery zones extending beyond the twelve miles now
generally accepted under customary international law(2S).
Some of these states claimed over one hundred miles
exclusive fishery zones but none of these states are able
to enforce these limits effectively. Consequently, it
is more likely that the declaration is probably an expression
of disapproval against well-equipped foreign fleets that are
fishing extensively off the West African coast. The attitude
of African states in respect of the continental shelf is
of immediate importance, but they maintain that it is
worthwhile to pursue the effort of self-interest as an
official position in respect of it. The Vienna Convention
on Immunities and Privileges (1961) and the Law of Treaties
(1968) were ratified by only a few African states, but
in practice, most of them are largely in conformity with
the rules enshrined in these instruments(26). Thus,
it appears that the attitude of African states is in
general, favourably disposed towards treaties as a source of
(25)Rembe, Nasila, Ope Cit, pp.90-97
(26) .PanhUYB, H.F. van et al., Ope Cit, p.156
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international law. It has already been mentioned that
their independent status enables African states to participate
on an equal footing with the established states in the treaty-
making process. These treaties have proved to be an
effective means for codification and progressive development
of international law. In spite of the fact that the process
of negotiating and ratifying these treaties, as well as
achieving universal consensus, is frequently very slow. On
the matter of unanimity, the African states have tended to
oppose the unanimity doctrine of the admissibility and
maintain reservations on multilateral conventions(27). In
this connection, the African approach tends to show a,
preference for the Pan-American approach •••••under which the
reserving state becomes a party to the treaty with respect
to the other parties that do not object to the reservation(28) ••
As far as treaties concluded before indepe~dence are concerned,
the African states have tended towards a pragmatic approach.
They refused to accept those treaties which represent burdens
inherited from the colonial period which are inconsistent with
the promotion of their aspirations and prevent the
realization of national interests. The justification which
has been given for the refusal is that a vital change of
circumstances has occurred in the object of the treaty, or
that the reason for specific contractual obligations has
(27)O'Connell. D.P., State Succession in Hunicipal Law and
International Law, University Press, Cambridge, 1967, pp.134-136
(28)Okoye, Felix Chuks, Ope Cit, p.191
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disappeared upon independence, or the traditional rule
of a clean slate in matters of state succession to treaties
has been invoked(29).
Regarding multilateral treaties on international
rules established by their predecessors, the African
states have generally accepted such treaties upon the
principles of devolution(30): The reason for this
approach seems to be that the African states regard multi-
lateral treaties as the primary means for the legal
expression of the views of states on matters of inter-
national interest. Furthermore, they believe that the
proportional contribution of multilateral treaties to the
content of the international legal system is enormous. It
would also open the door for the area of traditional inter-
national law to be reshaped to reflect the present reality
on the global scene. It should be noted that multilateral
treaties occupy an important peripheral status in the
legal system of international law. It might be argued
that multilateral treaties have transformed traditional
international law beyond recognition. This could be
illustrated by the wide range of multilateral treaties
establishing organisations of international competence
and concern, thus expanding the scope of international law.
In spite of these facts, the reality, however, is that
multilateral treaties are still playing a secondary role
(29)nelupis, Ingrid, International Law and the Independent
States, The University Press, Glasgow, 1974, pp.195-200
(30)Okoye. Felix Chuks, Ope Cit, p.191
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to the contribution of the international legal system. It
should be noted that the language of many treaties makes
it difficult to determine the precise obligations they
impose. In this connection, the need to achieve an
acceptable formula between the advocating and opposing
negotiators usually leads to a confusion of general terms
which does not establish a precise legal application. For
this reason, it has been argued that the provision of the
UN Human Rights Declaration might be void because of
uncertainty(31).
African states have endeavoured since the attainment
of their independence, to increase the living standards of
their peoples through rapid industrialization and modern-
ization of their agricultural systems. In doing so, they
seek to acquire capital from external and internal sources.
As far as the ~nternal sources are concerned, African
states have recourse to nationalization and expropriation
of private property. Under these circumstances, foreign
investments and large holdings have become vulnerable to
nationalization and expropriation(32). In this connection,
international law provides rules governing states'
responsibilities for the treatment of aliens, both as
regards individuals and property, within their jurisdiction.
Thus, in case of expropriation and, nationalization, inter-
national rules require the payment of adequate compensation.
(31)
Panhuys, H.F. van et al., .Ope Cit, p.247
(32)Expropriation means compulsory acquisition ,of private
property by a certain government for public purposes in
time of peace on payment of compensation.
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As far as African states in general are concerned, they
are very critical of these rules concerning the treatment
of aliens and their property., They maintain that they
have the right to expropriate, subject only to their
liability under municipal law to make compensation.
Moreover, they assert that the rules of international Law
and treaties which no longer correspond to current require-
ments cannot be invoked. This attitude was initially
adopted by Latin American states which maintained that the
alien is entitled only to equality of treatment with the
national(33). It is worthwhile mentioning that the
previous colonial administration had granted extensive
economic and political concessions to their nationals on
a basis of inequality with the indigenous population of
the colonies. Consequently, faced with such a situation,
African states inevitably had recourse to measures of
nationalization and expropriation of foreign property as
an initial step t.owar-dsan equitable redistribution of
national resources. The first relevant case occurred in
Africa with the nationalization by Egypt of the Universal
Company of the Haritime Canal on July 26th, 1956(34).
(33)Leech, Noyes, E. et al., Cases and ltIaterialson the
International Legal System, The Foundation Press, New York,
l21l, pp.586-587
(34)The Egyptian Government issued a presidential decree
nationalizing the Company which was largely O\\'nedby the
British and French citizens. The decree stated that holders
would be compensated in conformity \"iththe value of the
share in the Paris Stock Exchange on July 25th, 1956, the day
before the nationalization.
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Such measures of expropriation are not usually accompanied
by the payment of what in traditional terms would be
considered adequate compensation(35). African states
argue that the rules of state resp~nsibility should be
rooted in the recognition of the inherent right .of
peoples to own and develop their own national resources
which are enshrined in the UN General Assembly Resolution
626 of December 21st, 1952(36). Accordingly, any foreign
intervention to prevent such measures of expropriation and
nationalization would be inconsistent with the principles
'of sovereign independence and equality of states. It
should be noted that this approach of the African states
is now formally included in the 1962 UN General Assembly
Resolution on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources(37). Paragraph I of said Resolution provides
that •••••the right of peoples and nations to permanent
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must
be exercised in the interest of their national development
and of the well-being of the people of the state concerned(38) ••
It should be noted that the inalienable right of all states
to their natural resources is qualified by Paragraph 8 which
provides that •••••foreign investment agreements freely
entered into by or between sovereign states shall be observed
(35)The Egyptian Government and the Suez Stockholders signed
an agreement on July 13th, 1956 which provided for a payment
by the Egyptian Government of 28,300,000/00 Egyptian pounds
and also surrendered all external assets of the Company to
the Stockholders.
(36)Panhuysa H.F. van et a1., Ope Cit, p.293
(37)~ p.293
(38)Ibid p.294
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in good faith in accordance with rules in force in the
state taking such measures in the exercise of its
sovereignty and in accordance with International Law,n
and Paragraph 4 which provides that •••••Nationalization,
expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds
or reasons of public utility, security or the national
interest which are recognised as overriding purely individual
or private interests both domestic and foreign. In such
cases, the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation(39).n
The above-mentioned resolution met the approach of African
states that adequate compensation should be assessed by
the standard which an African state deems appropriate for
its own nationals and as determined in conformity with
municipal law(40). In this connection, the African states
tend to look at appropriate compensation in terms of capital
investment by a foreign enterprise and the economic revenue
(39)
Ibid p.294
(40)
The African representatives who took part in the
deliberation, voted for the resolution with the exception
of Ghana which abstained from voting.
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which that enterprise has already gained from its investment,
the attitude of developed states is to see how many years
the concession still has to run and to assess the annual
expectation of profit. In consequence of this calculation,
appropriate compensation should reflect the loss of expected
future profit(41). It is thus clear that African states
which are very critical of international standards of adequate
compensation do observe some obligation under international
law to pay an appropriate compensation for expropriated
foreign investments(42). It is clearly understood that
all African states are in need of foreign capital in order
(41) '.For instance an enterpr1se had invested £800/00 million.
The concession had already run for ten years and over·.
that period the enterprise had made profits of £200/00
million over and above this investment. The African states
would look at the past record and would maintain that the
enterprise had already been amply compensated for its
investment. The African states would not accept any argument
that there were still another ten years to run before the
termination of the concession and that the expected annual
profit was calculated at the rate of £10/00 million,
according to which the enterprise was entitled to a £100/00
million compensation.
(42)
This African approach is illustrated by the stand of
the Congolese Government in its action in 1967 against the
Union Miniere du Hant Katanga. The Congolese Government
ordered the transformation of assets and concession of
Union Miniere to a new nationalized Congolese enterprise.
After protracted negotiations between the Congolese
Government and the Societe Generale des Minerais de Belgique,
it was agreed that the latter would be responsible for
mining and marketing operations for the new nationalized
Congolese enterprise. Thereupon, the.Congolese Government
agreed to pay appropriate compensation as determined in
conformity with its municipal law.
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to carry out development programmes and that they therefore
frequently declare their willingness to deal with foreign
investments in conformity with international rules and
standards. In spite of these facts, African states have
exhibited a far greater restraint in the treatment of
foreign investments than the Latin American states did, however,
it is true that the African states are not willing to
agree to the requirements of compensation as a widely
accepted multilateral agreement. The UN Economic
Commission for Africa in its report on the Investment
Laws and Regulations, concluded that the subject was much
more complicated because of the diverse systems of law in
operation throughout the continent(43). Anglophone
countries are very ambiguous and have no unified law or
policy relating to investments. The Francophone countries,
on the other hand, are guided by reasonably coherent principle,
law and policy related to investments. It is worthwhile
mentioning that the situation in these African English-
speaking states has now been improved by the introduction
of municipal acts in these states through the lines of
Tanzanian Foreign Investments Acts of 1963(44). According
to this Act, foreign investments which have been approved
by the Tanzanian Government are legally guaranteed and in
the event of nationalization, full and fair compensation
shall be paid. Furthermore, warranties are given by
(43)Fox,
(44)Ibid...........
Hazel, Ope Cit, p.401
p.401
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these municipal acts to allow the reasonable repatriation
of capital and profits. It should also be noted that most
of the African states have concluded bilateral treaties with
the capital exporting states, guaranteeing fair and equitable
treatment to foreign investors(45). In this connection,
Switzerland has been first in negotiating bilateral treaties
with African states whereby they agree to submit investment
disputes to international procedures for peaceful settlement(46).
Concerning the treatment of aliens residing within the
territories of African states, they are also critical of the
international rules relating to this subject. It must be
pointed out that African states might not even be able to
accord the protection of these international rules and
standards to their own nationals. They cannot, therefore,
accept responsibility for the effects of programmes of
political, economic and social reforms which may apply to
aliens resident in their territories. Consequently, African
states are not willing to permit injury to aliens to be
adjudicated by international tribunals. They argue that
progress in these reforms would be adversely affected if
each case of injury to aliens were taken to international
tribunals. They believe that municipal courts should have
exclusive competence in these matters. Under these
circumstances, many aliens have been deported or expelled
by African states involving substantial material losses
for the affected aliens. The majority of African states,
(45)Gooding, M.A.J., Investment'Problems of Africa, ~,
1968-1969, Africa Research Ltd., Exeter 1969, p.756 passim.
(46)~, Volume III No.6, November 1964, pp.1124-1127
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however, are willing to grant equality of treatment to
aliens. The gross abuse of the rights of aliens by
African states is usually due to the sharp political
sensitivity-and the arrogant behaviour of the aliens in
question. The protection of the status of aliens in
African states is in principle guaranteed by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which is enshrined in the OAU
Charter(47).
The conclusion from what has been discussed above,
must be that the African states increasingly follow
national interest in their conduct in international affairs.
There is no wholesale rejection of the established principles
of international law on their part, but they do increasingly
consult the rules of international law before formulating
their national policy. This certainly indicates that
they are committed by the letter of their constitutions
to respect and to observe their obligations under inter-
national law. The principles of international law are
taught in African states, and there is no noticeable
tendency among students to regard international law as
a product of European civilization. The practice of
African states is not completely different from that of
others and, in some instances, they have even gone further
by adopting constitutional provisions stressing legality
and respect for the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. The OAU was established as a regional
(47)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedure, Article II(e),
Ope Cit, p.l0
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organisation within the framework of the UN Charter for
the purpose. of maintaining peace and security in the
.African continent. Accordingly, African states are
-great champions of ~ ~ international law based upon
the principles of the UN Charter. They are supporters
of a strong UN because it acts as a shield for them
against the might of the super powers and assists them
in the promotion of their interests.
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THE AFRICAN ATTITUDE TO\~ARDSPEACEFUL SETTLE~ffiNTOF
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
It has already b~en mentioned that African states on
attaining independence, are endeavouring to reject some of
the traditional principles of international law and its
peaceful procedures for the settlement of disputes.
Despite this fact, African states are keen to develop an
effective machinery for the peaceful solution of disputes.
They regard the intractable boundary and border disputes
among themselves, and other forms of international disputes,
as threatening their political independence, and all striving
for social and economic development. Therefore, for all of
them, security, stability and settlement of disputes by
peaceful means are in separately linked processes of social,
economic and political development. Under these circumstances,
and in recognition of this fundamental principle, African
states have provided in Article 3(4) of the OAU Charter for
the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation,
conciliation or'arbitration(I). Once again, the OAU
Protocol on mediation, conciliation and arbitration provides
that in the case of arbitration, the arbitral tribunal shall
decide the case in conformity with treaties concluded
between the parties, the principles of international law
in general, the OAU Charter, the UN Charter and, if the
parties agree, ~ aequo et ~(2). It should also be
.(l)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Op. Cit, pp.l0-11
(2)Protocol of the CMCA, DAU Charter and Rules of Procedures,
Op. Cit, p.59
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mentioned that African states are interested in the
establishment of an African.Court of Justice, although
it should be noted that in ~pite of the tendencies
towards peaceful procedure~, the attitude of African
states towards judicial settlement is less certain.
They have shown a marked preference to the settlement
of regional disputes by means of mediation and conciliation.
This technique is usually carried out under the aegis of an
African head of state and outside the institutional machinery
established under the OAU Protocol of ~lediation, Conciliation
and Arbitration.
African states, on the attainment of.independence,
have become members of the UN, by which they undertake to
bring about peaceful settlement of international disputes
in conformity with Article 33(1) of the UN Charter(3).
According to Article 93(1) of the UN Charter, all the UN
member states are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice(4). It should be noted that
African states(S) which participated in the San Francisco
(3)panhuys. H.F. van et al., Ope Cit, p.33
(S)Liberia and Egypt
~ Subsequently the Ghanaian delegate at the UN stated that
"••••the granting of compulsory jurisdiction to the ICJ over
all matter within the field of international law would enhance
the prestige and obligatory nature of international law and
could do more than anything else to make that law progressive."
Lt was further stated that "••••if it were possible to enforce
international law against all nations in all cases, many of
the present difficulties conrronting the world would be
obviated." (Krishana. Maya, Ope Cit, pp.231-232)
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Conference of the UN were in favour of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court. Despite this fact, for the
time being, the attitude of African states towards the
ICJ as a means for the judicial settlement of international
disputes is apparently sceptical. Thus, it wouLd seem to be
an indirect manifestation of the rebellion of the African
states against the present system of international law.
Nevertheless, this is a clear indication that the African
approach does not question the whole system. The general
attitude of African states towards the ICJ does not basically
differ from that of the other member states of the UN.
Nevertheless, this is an insufficient ground on which to
assess the attitude of any state towards the Court. There
are a number of indications to assess a state's attitude
towards the Court. One would be the degree to which a
state ~as actually used the Court's procedures. In this
connection, African states have actually brought cases of
contention before the Court. In the case of Northern
Cameroon, the Republic of Cameroon challenged the manner
in which the UK had implemented its Trusteeship Agreement
over the territory concerned(6). Southern and Northern
'< Cameroonswere both administered under the l-Iandates
System of the League of Nations and under the UN Trustee-
ship System. The Northern Cameroon was administered by
the UK as part of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria
(6) Case Concernin~ the Northern Cameroon.
!22J, ICJ Report, p.17
January 11th,
;
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until the latter's attainment of independence in 1960(7).
The UN General Assembly resolution called for the granting
of independence to Northern Cameroon(8). Accordingly,
the UK conducted a plebiscite under the UN auspices. This
resulted in a majority of the electorate choosing unification
with Nigeria(9). The Republic of Cameroon felt displeased
with the consequences of the plebiscite in the North.
Having failed to persuade the UN General Assembly that the
plebiscite held in Northern Cameroon was incompatible with
the principle of justice, the Republic sought to use the
legal means of redress by taking the matter to the ICJ.
Unfortunately there were no grounds for the aforesaid
argument, since the Trusteeship Agreement had been validly
terminated by the resolution of the UN General Assembly.
Accordingly, the Court decided that no international treaty
or agreement existed upon which it could pronounce its
judgement(10). Hence, the Court, by a majority of ten
to five found that .•••••it cannot adjudicate upon the
merits of the claim of the Federal Republic of the
Cameroon(11).. Obviously African states could scarcely
be expected to appreciate these niceties. They have,
therefore, apparently drawn the conclusion that the
( 7)Fox, Hazel, Ope Cit,p.392
( 8)Resolution No. 1608{xv), April 21st. 1961
( 9)Case Concerning the Northern Cameroon, January 16th. 1963,
1963 ICJ Report, p.22
(lO)Ibid p.38
(11)Ibid 38p•............
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European states are in possession of intangible procedural
advantages which make it advisable for the African states
to shun the ICJ. Once again, the Court·s decision in the
second phase of the South West Africa Case served to
confirm the apparent validity of the African conclusion
about the Court. The application of proceedings against
South Africa was brought by Ethiopia and Liberia who
satisfied the legal requirements of being original members
of the League of Nations which had granted the Mand abe
over South l'lestAfrica (Namibia) (12) • Yet once again, the
African states were defeated by legal technical points.
The results of the South West Africa Case have created total
disenchantment amongst the African states \dth the ICJ.
It should be noted that the ICJ is considered by both the
so-called radical African states, as well as by moderates,
as the International Western Court of Justice. There is
absolute conviction that the Court is determined to give
legal protection to the colonial and imperial interests
of South Africa. Consequently, African states have
intensified their demands for reforms of the ICJ methods
of appointing its judges, their geographical and legal
background. As to the composition of the Court, a
development had already occurred. Instead of the four
Latin American judges who previously sat on the bench of
the Court, there are now two Latin American, two African
and three Asian judges(13).
(12)South ''lestAfrica ~Case (2nd Phase), 1966, ICJ Report, ,p.15
(13)Shihata, Ibrahim F., The Attitude of New States Toward
the ICJ, dIQ, Volume 19, ~, p.220
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Concerning acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction under
Article 36(2)(14)of the Statu~e, a number of African
states(1S> have made declaration under the optional clause
of the Statute accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the
ICJ(16)_ Nevertheless, these states have registered
substantial reservations to their declaration of unlimited
duration. Thus, the declarations of Sudan, Liberia,
Gambia, Malawi, Kenya and Botswana excluded disputes where
the parties. have agreed to resort to other means of peaceful
settlement than the ICJ. The declarations of Kenya and
Gambia have also excluded disputes between themselves and
other members of the Commonwealth, as well as disputes
which by international law fall exclusively within their
domestic jurisdiction. Such matters shall be determined
by the declaring state itself. Somalia's declaration
excludes disputes with states that have not accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court before a given period
bf one Calendar year prior to the submission of its
application to the ICJ. It is thus only Nigeria and
Uganda that have signed the declarations without any
reservations(17). The reservations of the other African
states have in general, followed the pattern of those of
other states, particularly the UK and France.
(14)Panhuys, H.Fe van et al., Ope Cit, p.612
(lS)Gambia, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan,
Uganda, Egypt and Botswana have made declarations under
Article 36(2) of the Statute of the ICJ.
(16)Shihata. Ibrahim, Ope Cit, pp.208-210
(17)Ibid p.210
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Thus, it is the practice of certain states to insert
compromisory clauses into treaties to which they have
become a party and there are a number of African states
that are parties to bilateral treaties with compromisory
clauses conferring compulsory jur.isdiction upon the ICJ(18).
Nevertheless, the approach of the majority of African
states in general, relating to multilateral treaties with
compromisory clauses, is unfavourable at this stage of
their development. Those African states which are
party to multilateral treaties with compromisory clauses
have acceded to such treaties. The reason for accepting
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ arose from their
accession to these treaties. For instance, on March 27th,
1962, Upper Volta acceded to the Revised General Act
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes(19),
without registering reservations concerning the compromisory
clause.
-A number of African states have acceded, without
reservation to the compromisory clause to the Convention
on Privileges and Immunities of the UN(20). Certain African
states have ratified or acceded to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide(21).
It should be noted that Article 9 of the aforesaid
Convention confers upon the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction(22).
Most African states ratified or acceded to the said
(18)Ibid pp.210-211
(19)Ibid p. 211
(20)Ibid p. 211
(21)Ibid p. 211
(22)Bloonfield. Louis M. & Fitzgerald F. Gerald, Crime
Against Internationally Protected Persons: Prevention and
Punishment. An Analysis of the UN Conventions, Praeger
Publishers, London, 1975, p.161
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Convention and made no reservation to Article 9 except
Morocco and Algeria who inserted reservation on the
aforesaid article(23). A number of African states are
signatories(24) to the Optional Protocol concerning the
compulsory settlement of disputes of April 18th 1961,
concerning Acquisition of Nationality. Also, three
African states(26) have signed the Optional Protocol of
Signature of April 29th, 1958 concerning the compulsory
settlement of disputes arising out of the application of•
any convention on the Law of the Sea(27). Moreover, a number
of African states have accepted recourse to compulsory
arbitration provided for in a number of multilateral
treaties to which they acceded. The factual assessment of
the attitude of African states towards the ICJ would,
therefore, indicate there is a reluctance of these states
towards the invocation of the peaceful procedures of the
Court. Presumably, this reluctance is the product of the
disappointment due to the handling of the South West Africa
Case (second phase) in the course of which the ICJ dealt
with superficial procedural matters, ignoring the substantial
legal issues. The Court thus destroyed its reputation
(23)Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville),
Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast,
Liberia and Upper Volta.
(24)Shihata, Ibrahim F., Op. Cit, p.211
(2S)Okoye, Felix Chuks, Op. Cit, pp.206-207
(26)Ghana, Liberia and Madagascar
(27)Shihata, Ibrahim F., Ope Cit, p.212
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as a progressive international organ of justice among nations.
African states argue that the ICJ applies unquestioningly
colonial aspects of certain parts of the traditional principles
of international law. Therefore, African states shy away
from the compul.sory jurisdiction of the ICJ.o They believe
that the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction might imply
acceptance of the substantive rules of the traditional
principles of international law. From this point, it would
appear that a progressive development of the traditional
principles of international law would require to reflect the
present reality on a global scale of the new system of inter-
national relations. It is extremely difficult for the
developing nations, no less than for the developed nations, to.
be enthusiastic about a judicial system of compulsory juris-
diction. In any event, the Africans distrust the traditional
principles of international law and this distrust has been
transported to the regional level. Because of this, they have
not yet developed a regional judicial organ which is capable
of settling regional disputes. Moreover, the judicial
settlement is lengthy and costly and only wealthy and
developed states can afford it(28). Under these circumstances,
African states endeavour to settle their regional disputes
-at the level of diplomatic negotiations in close line with
their tastes and traditions. It should be noted that this
(28)Ghali. Boutros, The League of Arab States and the OAU,
The OAU after Ten Years! Comparative Perspectives, Edited
by El-Ayouty, Yassin, Praeger Publishers, New York,
!2,ll, p.52
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practice by the OAU departs from the nature of procedures
envisaged in the framework of the OAU Charter and the
Protocol of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration(29).
The OAU Charter specifies that all regional disputes
~.,
-between member states shall be brought before the OAU to
be referred to the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation
and Arbitration(30). Unfortunately, the Commission's
forum for the pacific settlement of regional disputes was
abandoned upon its establishment. The African states avoid
the more formal institutionalized mode of peaceful settle-
ment, including procedures enshrined in the OAU Protocol of
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. They are in
favour of ad hoc informal responses to individual conflicts
by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and the
Council of Ministers. Despite the fact that this method
is often incompatible with the recognised international
procedure of peaceful settlement. The OAU Assembly of
Heads of State usually recommend recourse to mediation by an
individual or a group of heads of state or to an ad hoc body
established by it or the Council of Ministers rather than to
the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.
The OAU has extended an important contribution to the African
procedure of peaceful settlement by providing a forum of direct
negotiations between states in disputes.
Thus, ad hoc technique has been used by the OAU which
,
~(29)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Article 19, Ope Cit, p.IS
(30)Protocol of the CHCA, Article 19, OAU Charter and Rules
of Procedures, Ope Cit, p.S6
- 138 -
could only be classified under conciliation rather than
mediation, in the broad sense of urging the states in
dispute to negotiate a peaceful settlement, and to recommend
specific measures, such as a ceasefire or cessation of
propaganda in order to reduce the level of hostilities.
Nevertheless, the OAU has often had recourse to the
process of mediation whereby a third party makes non-
binding proposals for settlement to states in dispute(32).
Consequently, the conclusion which could be drawn from
this analysis is that OAU was neither designated nor was
it intended by its founders to become involved in inter-
state conflicts. Accordingly, Article 3(2) of the OAU
Charter enshrined the principle of non-interference in the
domestic affairs of member states. This appears, on the
face of it to bar intervention in domestic conflicts of
(32)During the Second Congo C~isis of 1964, the Council'
of Ministers adopted a resolution on September 10th,
1964 appealing to the Government of the Democratic
Republic of Congo to stop immediately the recruitment
of mercenaries and to expel them as soon as possible,
in order to facilitate an African settlement. The
resolution also established an ad hoc commission
consisting of Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea,
Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and
Upper Volta under the Chairmanship of the Prime
Minister of Kenya. The Commission was entrusted with
finding an African solution to the Congo crisis as well
as promoting national reconciliation.
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member states by other members acting either individually or
collectively, through the OAU. Nevertheless, the practice of
the OAU is inconsistent with the aforesaid principle since the
OAU is involved in a number of attempts of settling domestic
In fact, within the OAU structure, member
states participate in the various organs of collective action
and equally share in the decision-making process. Thus,
the Charter does bar any single African state or number of
states from playing the role of leader by heavily emphasising
the principle of absolute equality. However, if the leader-
ship of a state or of certain states in a regional organisation
is open to doubt, the member states that are in dispute could
afford to reject the settlement and resort to the UN(34). In
this connection, the record of the Organisation of American
States demonstrates that the leadership of the United States
of America is totally unchallengeable. Therefore, the member
states always settle their regional disputes within the system
of the Organisation of American States and never reach the UN(3S).
(33)For instance, in the case of the Tanganyikan army mutiny
of 1964, an extraordinary session of the Council of ~tinisters
was convened at the express invitation of the state concerned.
Efforts by the OAU to assist the Congo (Kinshasa) in settling
the problem of the mercenaries during the third Congo crisis
of 1967-68 enjoyed the tacit consent and co-operation of the
Congolese government. In the case of the second Congo crisis
of 1964, Congolese consent to an OAU role was grudging and
Congolese co-operation was sporadic. The African efforts to
intervene in the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-70 through the
medium of the OAU encountered stiff opposition from the Federal
Government of Nigeria which argued that the dispute was strictly
an internal affair.
(34)In October, 1963, fighting broke out on the Algerian-Moroccan
border. As a result of an initiative of the OAU, a ceasefire
was organised, a conciliatory committee was set up to investigate
the problem. The Committee achieved little progress in the
settlement of the ,frontier disputes. In 1966, the fighting was
renewed after Algeria's nationalization of the iron mines in
the disputed area. The Committee was reconvened in March 1967
but no settlement was achieved. Consequently, ~lorocco appealed
to the UN against the armament policy of Algeria.
(3S)Ghali, Boutros, Ope Cit, pp.52-53
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TIlE OAU'S EFFECTIVENESS AT REGIONAL COLLECTIVE DEFE1~CE
At the Addis Ababa Summit Conference of 1963, African
leaders reached consensus regarding the awareness of various
security concerns. The~ discerned the possibility of
entrusting an inclusive African regional organisation ,'lith
this important and urgent task. This stemmed from the
consideration of potential security problems such as
internal disruption, border disputes and allegations of
subversive activities by neighbouring states(l).
It also took into account the existence of threats of
extra-regional aggression and the need for collective action,
in order to counter such threats with a regional, collective,
self-defence system(2). This is related to the organisation's
(1)According to information by the post-Nkrumah government
of Ghana, the Nkrumah government had supported and trained
political dissidents from other independent African states,
where policies and ideologies of these states did not
coincide ,~ith those of the Nkrumah regime. Ghana's
implication in the 1963 Togo coup had directly led to the
invocation of·the fifth principle in the OAU Charter. This
principle provides for •••••unreserved condemnation in all
its forms of political assassination as well as subversive
activities on the part of a neighbouring state or any
other state."
(2)
At the Addis Ababa Summit Conference of 1963, Nkrumah
circulated a plan for the establishment of a central
political organisation consisting of an upper house of two
members per state and a lower house representing the African
population, to formulate a common foreign policy, a
continental plan for. a joint defence system, economic and
industrial development, a common currency, a monetary zone
and a central bank of issue. This proposal was rejected.
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role of collective response to external aggression or threats
of aggression by third parties against any member state or
in case of action being taken against the remaining colonial
holdings(3). Accordingly, Article 2 and 3 of the OAU
Charter make it clear that the OAU is intended to assist
member states, in both peaceful settlement of regional
disputes between member states and the countering of an
external act of aggression or threats of aggression against
any of its member states(4). It should be emphasized that
one of the main purposes for which the African states
established the OAU was to defend their sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence.
Consequently, the African leaders agreed that co-operation
for defence and security was necessary. Despite that,
the provisions concerning collective defence which are
found within the framework of the OAU Charter are weak and
ambiguous when compared with those of the League of Arab
States and the Organisation of American States. Article 4
of the 19S0 Arab Collective Security Pact provides that
••••• the contracting states agreed to co-operate in
consolidating and co-ordinating their armed forces and
participate, each in accordance with its resources and
needs, in the preparation of their individual and collective
means of defence and repulsion of armed aggression(S)."
(3)A Committee of Liberation was set up with its headquarters
at Dar-es-Salaam, supported by a voluntary fund. The fund
was to supply the necessary practical and financial aid to
the various African national liberation movements.
(4)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedure, Ope Cit, pp.l0-11"
(S)Bakhashab, Omar, Ope Cit, p.62
- 142 -
Article 5 of the Charter of the Organisation of American
States provides that "••••an act of aggression against one
American State is an act of aggression against all other
American States(6).a In addition, collective responses
to external aggression or threat of aggression are
detailed in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance(7). The OAU was not able to agree on a similar
or equivalent treaty for its member states because of
considerable differences in outlook regarding the question
of defence and security displayed at the Addis Ababa Summit
Conference of 1963. This was mainly the result of geo-
political currents running through the African continent
at the time of the'establishment of the OAU. All the
African states were the residue of the colonial experience.
The French-speaking African states desired to retain their
close links and especially their defence security relations
with their former colonial master. The Anglophones were
mostly members of the Commonwealth of Nations, and
therefore, motivated in an opposite direction to the
Francophones in defence and security matters. The position
of the Arab States in Africa was more confused for three
reasons: Firstly, the Arab States are more sharply
differentiated from each other. The Maghrib Arab States
preferred not to align themselves too closely with Egypt,
whilst being themselves divided by the different defence
and security policies pursued by Horocco, Algeria, Tunisia
and Libya(8). Secondly, the collective security system
(6)Whiteman, J.farjorie,M., 1!!&, Volume 5, .!.2.2.3., p.l0S0
(7)Ibid p.l0S2
(B)Mazrui, Ali A., Black Africa and the Arabs, ~, Volume 53
1974-75, pp.727-730
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of the Arab League has tended to impose different priorities
from those of most African states. Thirdly, the colonial
experience in Africa has created a dividing line between the
Arab States of North Africa and the black African states which
produced and maintained a psychological barrier. lVhilst the
independent African states are refusing to accept the Sahara
as a political barrier, they are nevertheless, anxious not
to become too closely involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict(9).
For this reason, the Arab African states were understandably
upset by black Africa's refusal to identify themselves with
their stand on external threats by third states. This
tension within the OAU was partly resolved after the 1967
War(10) when the black African states moved slightly
closer to the Egyptian position over the demand for the
restoration of the occupied Arab territories(11).
( 9)For instance, at independence every single state in black
Africa established diplomatic and economic relations with
Israel. They sought, at first successfully, to avoid
becoming entangled in the ~addle East conflict particularly
over the issue of Israel and the Palestinians.
(10)African Research Bulletin, Volume V, No.9, October 15th,
~, pp.1171 et seq.
(11)At the OAU Assembly meeting in Algeria in September 1968,
the heads of state voted on a resolution which was passed by
36 votes to nil with 2 abstentions, to demand ••••the withdrawal
of foreign troops from all Arab territories occupied since June
5th, 1967 in accordance with the resolution adopted by the
UN Security Council on November 22nd, 1967.· According to
Conference sources, Lesotho and Swaziland were the two countries
which abstained. The resolution appealed to OAU member states
to ensure the strict application of the Security Council's
resolution. In the preceding debate, the heads of state
heard a statement on the ME situation by the then UAR Foreign
Minister, Mr. Mahmoud Riad. Despite pleas from Mr. Riad and
other Arab delegates, the meeting declined to agree to an
outright condemnation of Israeli aggression. It should be noted
that the Ivory Coast, Dahomey and other countries receiving
substantial Israeli economic aid were the main instrument in
blocking endorsement of the condemnation adopted at that
meeting.
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There was also considerably more expression of concern
about the possibility of interference of one African state
in the internal affairs of another, rather than with the
threats of aggression by an extra-regional third party.
The African l~~ders believed that external aggression or
threat of aggression was unlikely as long as they maintained
good relations with their former colonial masters and
depended upon them for their defence and security. The
more immediate concern to the OAU founders was the threats
faced from other more powerful African states. This was
exemplified by allegations of Ghana's involvement in the
coup in Togo(12) and ~forocco's claim to Mauritania(13).
Under these circumstances, the OAU Charter says very little
about specialised institutions for collective security
concerns. At the Summit Conference of 1963, the Ghanaian
delegation proposed the establishment of a common defence
system with an African High Command to ensure the stability
and security of Africa(14). On the other hand,. the
Ethiopian draft charter proposed the establishment of a more
(12)The first crisis was the coup d'etat in Togo which
occurred even before the OAU was established. The new regime
in Togo was prevented from participating in the Addis Ababa
Summit Conference of 1963, because of the opposition of a
number of states. The Nkrumah regime extended facilities
to freedom fighters from Nigeria, Togo, Niger, Cameroon,
Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Congo-Kinshasa and
Burundi. These states, therefore, took the lead in raising
the problems before the Summit Conference in Addis Ababa in
1963.
(13)Morocco considered ~fauritania part of its Kingdom and
opposed Mauritania's participation at the Addis Ababa
Summit Conference of 1963. .
(14)Okoye. Felix Chuks, Ope Cit, p.125
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moderate defence board consisting of the Chiefs of Staff
of member states. This board was to be only a consultative
body, making recommendations to the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government(~5). Yet even this aroused little
support as some states mistrusted the intentions of others,
in addition to being unwilling to share military information
within the framework of a regional collective security
defence. At last the only specialised defence institution
. (16)that was set up was a Defence Commission ,one of five
specialised commissions, accountable to the Council of
Ministers(17). The OAU Charter was deliberately leaving
the door open for a detailed plan to be worked out at some
future date. It is, however, notable that the Defence
Commission was convened only twice during the first sixteen
months following the establishment of the OAU(18) and these
meetings demonstrated the difficulties of reaching any
(15)
~fayers, David, An Analysis of OAU's Effectiveness at
Regional Collective Defense, The OAU after Ten Years:
Comparative Perspectives, Edited by El-Ayouty, Yassin,
Praeger Publishers, New York, !21i, p.120
(16)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Article 20(3),
Op. Cit, p.15
(17)These Commissions were located in member states on the
basis of Africa's five regions. The Defence Commission was
located in Accra, Ghana. The rules provide that the member-
ship of each Commission consists of the appropriate ministers
or plenipotentiaries designated by the governments of member
states.
(18)t-Iayers,David, Op. Cit, p.120
- 140 -
concerted action even on the most marginal security issues. The
first meeting of the Defence Commission was initially charged
with the task of defining its competence and purposes. The
proposal for the establishment of permanent machinery was
at once rejected by the majority of the African defence
ministers. The only item on the agenda agreed upon was that
the competence of the Commission was confined to that of an
organ of consultation. It was also charged with the
preparation of plans and recommendations for the collective
or self-defence of the member states when they faced
external acts of aggression or threats of agg~ession(19).
The general African unwillingness to institutionalize a
regional defence system for the continent seems to continue.
In 1971, the Defence Commission's proposal to establish an
entirely voluntary African defence organisation which would
not have compromised national security(20) was worked out in
(19)
. .!E.!.!! p. 120
(20)The main proposals provided for (1) the creation of
a'regional defence system comprising one or several units
of national armed forces from states in the various regional
sectors linked by bilateral or multilateral defence agree-
ments. (2) The military commands of each of these defence
systems would take the name of regions or sectors. The
Executive Secretariat would be under a Chief of Staff, a
deputy and representatives of the national armies of the
states concerned. The office of military defence advisers
within the OAU General Secretariat would not only co-ordinate
all questions concerning the security of member states, but
also be responsible for the gathering of military information
and intelligence likely to interest the OAU Liberation
Committee. This office would comprise a military adviser
with the rank of Brigadir appointed for three years, a
deputy with the rank of Colonel, appointed for two-and-a-half
.years and three officers with the rank of Major, appointed for
two years. The latter would be appointed by the OAU Summit
on recommendations from the Defence Commission Bureau.
(3) The creation of a permanent Defence Committee which
would meet every six months or when called into session by
the Chairman of the Bureau. This permanent Committee would
comprise Bureau members, the Military Adviser in the
Secretariat, the OAU Secretary General and the Executive
Secretary of the Liberation Committee.
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some detail by the representatives of tllirty-one African
states. This too was rejected by the supreme organ of
the OAU, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government(21).
The OAU and the League of Arab States, unlike most other
regional security organisations, do not include any major
powers among their member states. This may be the ideal
model for the African states whose primary concern seems
to be the avoidance of involvement of super powers in their
regional security. For this reason, the OAU was not
prepared in 1967 and 1973 to assist its member state
(Egypt) against external aggression by a third state.
The Israeli occupation of the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula,
extra-regional intervention in Angola and the invasion of
Guinea presented the OAU with three cases of external
aggression(22). In all of these instances, African
reactions were limited and indecisive. In spite of the
indecisiveness of the OAU, there was widespread concern
about the invasion of Guinea and the extra-regional .
intervention in Angola. The Guinean Government received
innumerable messages of support and solidarity from all
OAU member states, in addition to the total participation
of all OAU members at the emergency meeting of the Council
of Ministers held in Lagos, Nigeria in October 1970, to
debate the aggression against Guinea. Resolutions
condemning Portugal and promising assistance to Guinea were
unanimouslyadopted(23). Similarly, African states
(21)Cervenka. Zdenek. et al., The OAU in 1971, ~, 1972-73,
Annual Survey and Document, Rex Collings, London 1972, pp.A47-ASS
(22)Mayer. David, Ope Cit, p.121
(23) .
ACR, 1970-71, Rex Collings, London 1971, pp.C56-C57
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demonstrated more concern with the extra-regional inter-
vention in Angola. The Assembly of Heads of State and
Government hel.d an emergency summit in Addis Ababa in
.January 1970. In addition to this extraordinary session,
the Assembly requested its bureau to maintain a constant
follow up on the situation in Angola. All resolutions
condemning foreign involvement in the internal affairs
of Angola were adopted unanimously(24), but the Israeli
occupation of the Sinai was received very differently from
the two above-mentioned cases. The African concern for
the victim (the original member) was one of indifference.
It is worthwhile to mention that before the outbreak of
the .June 1967 War, a number of African states maintained
friendly relations with Israel. In addition, these states
maintained an official policy of silence and abstention
in the UN organs, and also cast pro-Israel votes there(2S).
For this reason, the Council of Ministers' meetings during
the 1967 and 1973 Wars reflected the general unwillingness to
commit the OAU to a clear-cut position on declaring for action
on behalf of Egypt(26). In consequence of the prevailing
stance of the black African states, the Arab League
threatened to impose upon them an oil embargo in case of
constant refusal to identify themselves with the cause
of an OAU member state(27). Under these circumstances,
(24).I1ili!p.CS
(2S)Legum, Colin, The OAU: Success or Failure, ~, Volume 51,
~' pp.208-211
2 Mazuri, Ali A., Op. Cit, p.739
(27)Legum, Colin, Ope Cit, p.213
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the Summit meeting of the Assembly of Heads of State took
place at Addis Ababa in September 1968 and adopted a
resolution on the ~m conflict. This resulted in an
unprecedented involvement by the OAU in the Arab-Israeli
conflict(28). As of that date, the OAU went beyond the
realm of the previous passive attitude by declaring its·
condemnation of Israel's occupation of a part of the
territory of a member state, namely Egypt. At the same time
it sought to exert direct pressure aimed at the achievement
of a durable and just peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict(29).
By condemning aggression, the OAU's attitude to extra-
regional aggression against Egypt led, especially after the
October War of 1973, to a dramatic change in African-Israeli
relations. All the African states belonging to the OAU,
with the exception of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and
Malawi, severed diplomatic relations with Israel(30). Despite
this attitude, developments in Africa in the past two decades
made that continent the obvious arena of extra-regional inter-
vention by foreign powers, particularly the two super powers.
The ability of these super powers to respond rapidly anywhere
in Africa, coupled with the material weakness of the African
states, thus negate the proposition of effective collective
security. They also lack the logistic capabilities
to transport men and weapons to neighbours who may be in need.
(28)Gitelson. Susan Aurelia, The OAU ~assions and Middle
East Conflict, ~, Volume 2Z, 1973, p.413
(29}EI-Ayouty, Yassin, The OAU and the Arab-Israeli Conflict:
A Case of Mediation that Failed, The OAU after Ten Years:
Comparative Perspective, Edited by the Writer, Praeger
Publishers, New York, ~, p.188
(30)Legum, Colin, Ope Cit, p.211 .
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African railroads do not form a continuous network and air
transport capacities are extremely limited. The two super
powers can deliver the required military resources quickly to
potential trouble spots. The advanced technology, in addition
to the enormous resources available to the super powers, may
completely outweigh the advantage of proximity. This was
clearly evident in the USA's assistance to the Congo and
the extensive Soviet aid to Ethiopia and Angola.
Consequently, the debates in OAU organs showed a clear
and growing concern with extra-regional intervention in
the continent(31). In the Horn, OAU norms were clearly
on the Ethiopian side in defending the territorial integrity
of an African state. In Shaba the same ·norms dictated
support for the government of Zaire(32). At the
AI-Khartoum Summit Conference in August 1978, the African
leaders expressed their acute awareness of the increasing
extra-regional intervention to which the African states
were being subjected by international rivalries for
influence(33). They discerned that their relative
weakness was an important contributory factor in the
creation and maintenance of the present situation. Many
African leaders acknowledged that responsibility for what
(31)Ottaway, David, US Policy Eclipse, JIA, Volume 58,
1971-80, pp.650-658
(32 Young, Crawford, The Unending Crisis, d1A, Volume 57,
1978-79, p.169
(33)Trofimenko, Henry, The Third World and the US-Soviet
Competition - A Soviet View, JIA, Volume 57, 1978-79,
pp.l021-1040
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had been occurring in the continent lay with the Afric.:ms
themselves. This is particularly so, owing to their
growing reliance on external defence systems for their
own security(34). African leaders are sharply divided
over whet.her-the external aggression or threats of
aggression come from the 'vest or the East. Recently, a
growing tendency to take Soviet military involvement in
the continent more seriously than in the past two decades,
was discernible. It should be noted that African states
seem to have divided into nmoderates· and "radicals."
The former are critical of Soviet extra-regional involve-
merrt, while the latter are critical of l'lesternextra-
regional involvement. The attitude of those in the
pro-Soviet camp is that in every case where the Soviet
Union was actively involved in the continent, it had been
invited to assist legitimate African governments and bona
fide liberation movements in fighting against imperialism,
whilst every instance of Western intervention was in
support of reactionary regimes and against the liberation
movements. The views of the middle groups of largely
non-committed nations is unreserved condemnation
.in all its forms of external intervention.
This group saw the mercenary-led attacks in Benin and
the Comero Islands and the extra-regional intervention
by certain European powers in Central Africa, as extra-
regional aggression and any idea of justification was
unacceptable(35).
(34)Ottaway, ~avid, Op. Cit, p.638
(35)~ p.658
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From this analysis one could calculate
that the existence of a regional organisation incapable
of collective regional defence, increases the probability
of extra-regional involvements by the global powers. In
a number of instances mentioned above, the OAU did not
prove an effective machinery for collective defence
against extra-regional acts, or threats of aggression
against its member states. For this reason, the OAU
member states became increasingly dependent upon the
super powers for their defence and security. The
lack of mutual trust between the OAU member states has
contributed to the extremely limited nature of collective
defence arrangements. So far, it is very difficult to
award any credit for contributions made by ,the OAU to
assist members who have been victims of aggression. It
seems that the OAU will-also be unable to increase the
security of its member states in case of any future
aggression, or even in case of internal disruption(36).
In addition to the lack of military co-operation by
African states, one also has to consider the general
shortage of resources available by the majority of the
smaller states. As stated earlier, the Francophone states have
maintained security relations with their former colonial
masters and regard such defence co-operation as the basis
of their national security. These states believe
(36)
The Guardian, Thursday January 21st, 1982, p.5
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that the maintenance of such treaties with the former
colonial power seem to be considerably better defence
systems than the development of regional collective
defence within the OAU system. In addition, the smaller
African states are reluctant to join any regional
collective defence pact within the OAU system, fearing
that this might lead to a diminution of their total
control over their national armed forces, and would
eventually, involve the sharing of military secrets.
The smaller African states also believe that they may
be threatened by neighbouring states rather than by
extra-regional aggression or threats of aggression.
Thus, the lack of a strong community identification
has increasingly jeopardized efforts at instituting a
regional collective security system within the OAU
structure. All these factors have militated against
a successful institutionalisation of a regional collective
security s'ystemby the OAU.
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I
THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERHINATION
The concept of self-determination is bound up with
the history of the ndoctrine of popular sovereignty"
expounded by the -French Revolution~ in the eighteenth
century(1). This arose from the democratic ideal of
equality which constituted a threat to the legitimacy
of the then established order(2). The principle1s
corollary was that territorial transfers between sovereign
states should not be implemented unless the people
affected agreed to such arrangements. The principle
encountered strong opposition from the then European
powers which at the Congress of Vienna rejected the
consent of the people as a basis for reshaping the map
of Europe after the Napoleonic Wars(3). But, the
principle did appear subsequently in the course of
national movements of unification in Italy and Germany
in the nineteenth century in which plebiscites played a
large role in settling territorial disputes(4). This
(1) The following quotation is extracted from the Declaration
o·fthe French Revolution of 1789: IIIn the name of the French
people the National Assembly declares that it will give help
and support to all peoples wanting to recover their freedom.
Therefore, the Assembly considers the French authorities
responsible for giving orders to grant all means of assistance
to those peoples and to protect and compensate the citizens
who might be injured during their fight for the case of
Liberty.- (Delupis, Ingrid, International Law and the
Independent State, The University Press, Glasgow 1974, p.6).
(2)Sureda, Rigo, A., The Evolution of the Right of Self-
Determination: A Study of UN Practice, A.W. Sijthoff,
Leiden 1973, p.17
(3)~ p.20
(4)Whiteman, Marjorie M., DIL, Volume 15, 122l, p.39
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process was again halted by the European powers in consequence
of territorial annexation carried out by force(s). The
effect of such actions was that self-determination did not
again come to the fore until the Firs~ World War(6). It is
notable that the GreatWars had taken place between empires
and the promise of self-determination became a factor of
great strategic value. The Allied Nations were initially
reluctant to appeal to this principle fearing the effect
on the nationalities forming part of the then Russian
Empire(7). This obstacle, however, disappeared in
consequence of the Russian Revolution whose leaders were
enthusiastic exponents of the principle of self-determination
in its early phases(8). The most important element led to
the deviant approach by the allies and the entrance of the
USA into the War, on condition that the principle of self-
determination would constitute the framework within which
international relations would be conducted atter the War(9).
Despite commitments to the principle of self-determination
given by the allied nations, difficulties and limitations
became apparent in the application of it to the nationalities
of the Central Empires(IO). Therefore, at the Peace
(s)Prussia annexed Hanover and Hesse in 1866, Schleswig in
1867 and Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 by force
(6)Ott, David H., Palestine in Perspective, Quartet Books,
London, ~, p.IOl
(7)Sureda, Rigo A., Ope Cit, p.20
(8)Ibid p.20-
(9)Ott, David-H., Ope Cit,·p.l0l
(10~id p.177-
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Conference of 1919, historical claims, economic needs and
strategic arguments prevailed and the principle was not
included in the Covenant of the League of Nations(11).
A compromise solution was devised, namely the "Mandates
System- which committed member states to a policy of
non-annexation and reflected the idea of an unspecified
future date for self-determination. According to Article 22
of the League of Nations Covenant, the mandated territories
were subjected to a process of international supervision by
which the peoples of the concerned territories were to be
guided towards self-government(12). Thus, this process
constituted a form of partial recognition of self-
determination where full statehood was not achieved. The
concept of self-determination has gained widespread
acceptance and recognition since the establishment of the
UN and the inclusion of this principle in its 1945
Constitutional Charter which provides a basis for friendly
relations among nations. According to Article I of the
UN Charter which deals with the purposes of the UN,
paragraph (2) provides for the development of "••••friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and to
take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal
peace(13)." ~loreover, Article 55 provides that
(11)Windass. G.S., Power Politics and Ideals, The Principle
of Self-Determination ~,Volume3 1966-71, pp.177-~86
(12)Le al Conse Presence
of South Africa in1&d, pp.28-32
(13)Panhuys. II.F. van et al., Ope Cit, p.25
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"••••with a view to the creation of conditions of stability
and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the UN
shall promote: (a) higher standards of living, full employ-
ment and conditions of economic and social progress and
developmentJ (b) solution of international economic, social,
health and related problems and international cultural and
educational co-operation and (c) universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedom for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion(14).n
In addition to these two Articles, Chapters 11, 12 and 13
deal with the administration of non-self-governing
territories which have been subjected to a process of UN
Trusteeship by which the peoples of the concerned territories
shall be guided towards the principle of self-determination(lS).
Subsequently, the UN General Assembly entrusted ECOSOC in
1948 with the task of preparing'recommendations on human
rights including civil and political freedoms(16). It was
agreed that civil and political freedom and other aspects of
human rights are inter-connected and inter-dependent and
could therefore not be divided easily into different categories.
(14)Ibid pp.36-37
(1S)
Higgins, Roselyn, The Development of International Law
through the Political Organs of the UN, Oxford University
Press, London, ~, pp.91-106
(16)
Schwelb, Egon, Some Aspects of the International
Covenants on Human Rights of December 1966. Edited bX
Eide Asbjorn and Schon August, International Protection
of Human Rights, Almguict & Wiksell, Stockholm, ~,
pp.104-10S
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They are all equally important as human rights cannot
survive without civil and political rights. Accordingly,
the Commission on Human Rights submitted two draft Covenants
in 1954, one on civil and political rights and another on
economic, social and cultural r!ghts(17). In both draft
Covenants, the Commission had included a typical article
on self-determination which reads as follows:
0(1) •••• a11 peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development. (2) The states, parties to the present
Covenant including those having responsibility for the
administration of non-self-governing and Trust territories,
shall promote the realisation of the right of self-
determination and shall respect that right in conformity with
the provisions of the Charter of the UN. (3) All peoples may
for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth
and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising
out of international economic co-operation based upon the
principle of mutual benefit and international Law, In no
case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence(18)." It is clear that the above-mentioned
paragraphs deal with different aspects of self-determination
of states and citizens. It should be noted that the last
paragraph which deals with self-determination over natural
(17)~ pp.l06-114
(18)
Panhuys, H.F. van et al., Ope Cit, pp.252-253
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resources was strongly opposed by the United States delegation
on the grounds that this aspect of self-determination might
endanger the American investments in different areas around
the world(19). Thus, self-determination enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in paragraphs (1) and
(2) provides not only for the attainment of political
independence, liberation from foreign domination and
constant freedom from foreign interference, but also
provides that internal self-determination must be ensured.
These provisions of the UN Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights have been supplemented by a
number of the UN General Assembly declarations on self-
determination and other related matters. The first
historical declaration in this respect which has had much
impact on the evolution of self-determination, the
Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples was adopted by the Resolution 1514(xv) of
1960(20). Subsequently, the General Assembly set up
a special committee entrusted with the task of making
recommendations and suggestions on the implementation of
the 1960 Declaration. This had a great impact on the
administering powers and led to the granting of self-
determination to some dependent territories(21). The
(19)
Delupis. Ingrid, Ope Cit, p.12
(20)Panhuys. H.P. van et al., ,Ope Cit, pp.290-291
(21)
Franck lor. Thomas, The Stealing of the Sahara, .&!.!L.,
Volume 70, !212, pp.699-700
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Committee has also assumed the task of receiving petitions
and has in the meantime held hearings with petitioners
from non-self-governing territories(22). This practice
constituted an important departure from the former role
contemplated by the UN Charter. In the above-mentioned
Declaration, the UN General Assembly has clearly expressed
its conviction that, in circumstances involving colonial
and alien domination and racist regimes, peoples have an
inherent right to struggle with all necessary means at
their disposal against colonial domination in the exercise
of their right to self-determination. It should be noted
that prior to 1960, the UN General Assembly satisfied
itself with exhorting member states to use their influence
with certain colonial powers to accede to the majority
demands that self-determination be granted to peoples of
dependent territories under their domination(23). This
approach could be identified in the 1960 Resolution
(22)
Ibid pp.707-709
(23)
Under the auspices of the UN the people of British
Togoland and the British Cameroon were allowed to
exercise their right to self-determination by means of
plebiscites. Subsequently, by virtue of the Evian
Agreement of }.larch18th, 1962, the people of Algeria
did the same in a referendum held on July 1st, 1962.
In a number of African colonies, elections or other
forms of popular consultation took place prior to
their attainment of independence.
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- concerning African territories under Portuguese administration
in which the Assembly called upon UN member states to use
all their influence to induce the Portuguese Government to
carry out tE.eobligation incumbent upon it under Chapter ~I
of the UN Charter(24). By 1965 the UN General Assembly,
however, adopted a different attitude. In all resolutions
subsequently passed, it called upon all UN member states to
extend moral and material aid to the national liberation
movements. The implication of such calls appear to
authorise intervention by third states in the domestic
jurisdiction of a colonial power by extending support,
including military aid, to national liberation movements.
This could imply that the employment of interventionary
force in such situations did not violate the principles .
prohibiting the use of force and non-intervention within
the domestic jurisdiction of the colonial power. The
second declaration, which has greatly strengthened the
acceptance of the principle of self-determination, is the
UN Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and co-operation among states in accordance
with the UN Charter which was adopted by Resolution 2625(xxv)
on October 24th, 1970(25). The 1970 Declaration dealt
with both the external and internal aspects of self-
determination and maintained the right to remain free from
(24)Krishnan, Maya, African States Practice Relatin£ to
Certain Issues of International ~aw, IYBIA, Volume XIV,
!22i, p.199
(25) .Brown11e, Ian, Ope Cit, p.32
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foreign domination and the right of the citizens to elect
a government representing the whole people of a country.
In addition, the UN takes a firm stance against secessionist
self-determination which reads as follows: .....Nothing in
the foregoing paragraphs'shall be construed as authorising
or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair
totally or in part the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign independent states, conducting themselves
in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above ••••Every state
shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total
disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity
of any other state or country(26).11 In respect of external
self-determination, the Declaration called upon all states
to extend political and material support to the colonial
peoples in their struggle for political independence and
self-determination. Whilst in respect of internal self-
determination, the Declaration only called upon states to
abstain from actions of any kind which might influence the
domestic decisions of other states. In this connection,
this last aspect of self-determination is also enshrined
in the principle of non-intervention in the domestic
jurisdiction of other states and the prohibition of the
use of force(27). It is also covered implicitly in the
(26)Ibl.·d 39p.
(27)wright. Quincy, International Law and the UN,
Publishing House, London, 1960, pp.64-68
Asian
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1955 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in
the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their
Independence' and Sovereignty(28). These Declarations are
meant to have general applicability and deviation from them
in a state's international conduct, must be justified under
an exceptional recognised doctrine such as self-defence and
humanitarian interv~ntion, or circumstances involving
colonial and alien domination and racist regimes, against
which the colonial peoples have an inherent right to
struggle, with all necessary means at their disposal and
receive political and material support from any state(29).
This last special self-defence has clearly been recognised
in a considerable number of UN resolutions which bestow
legitimacy on the struggle of the colonial peoples seeking
self-determination. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile
m~ntioning that the principle of self-determination still
lacks general acceptance and agreement on the nature and
content of the concept which constitutes a part of
customary international law(30). Due to these circumstances,
(28)Panhuys, H.F. van et al., Ope Cit, pp.188-189
(29)The African delegation sought to bring the policy of
Apartheid, pursued by the South African Government, within
the purview of the right of self-determination. The
African delegations at the UN agreed that South Africa is
a colonial state and that the tide of colonial liberation
could not be stopped at the borders of South Africa.
Similarly, they demanded rule by the non-white majority
in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) on the basis of the peoples' right
to self-determination. Oonsequently, the African stand
on self-determination is mainly aimed at the termination
of lvestern colonial domination and the minority'regimes
in South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).
~ (30)Lyall, F.A., A Working Paper, Extended to the
Conference of the Scottish Group ,of International Lawyers
Glasgow 1978, pp.3-4
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self-determination has been considered a concept of political
rather than legal character. Horeover, it has
been claimed that Article 1(2) of the UN Charter refers to
the relationship between states and therefore, self-
determination of peoples really refers to a right of
state(31). Furthermore, since self-determination,
enshrined in the UN General Assembly's resolutions which
constitutes declaration, is it not legally binding on
its own merits? Nevertheless, the UN General Assembly's
resolutions reflect the attitude of a majority of states
on international matters. Thereupon, the weight of the
General Assembly's resolutions are paramount as they
reflect the conduct of an overwhelming majority of states.
In such cases, a resolution does not contribute to
international law-making which the Assembly is not competent
to do. Therefore, it is the states themselves who are the
legislators of the underlying rule. In any event, it is
evident in the UN practice, which has undeniably changed
over the past thirty years, that the right of self-
determination is being regarded as a true legal principle.
Confirmation of this conclusion is to be found in the ICJ's
advisory opinion expounded in the case of Western Sahara.
This stated that a norm of international law has emerged
which applies the concept of self-determination as a legal
principle and not as a political one to colonial territories(32).
(3~)Delupis, Ingrid, Ope Cit, p.14
(32) .Western Sahara Advisory Opinion of October 16th, 197~,
ICJ Report, p.32
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THE OAUIS REACTION TO AFRICAN SECESSIONIST SELF-DETER}IINATION
It has already been mentioned that the UN has taken
an unequivocal stand against the continuance of colonial
domination and has constantly supported the struggles of
colonial peoples for self-determination. On the other
hand, there has never been an equivalent endorsement of
the right to secede by the UN. In principle, any
proposal for the international recognition of secession
as a legitimate exercise to self-determination in certain
circumstances, will obviously encounter fierce objection
from sovereign states(I). As a matter of fact, when an
entity has received recognition as an independent state /
by other states of the world community, it is inconceivable
to allow a part of its population and territory to secede
from it(2). The immediate consequence of secession will
(I)RecOgnition of the principle of the right of secession
found expression for the first time in one of the resolutions
of the First All-African Peoples Conference which took place
at Accra in 1958. It denounced the artificial frontiers
drawn by imperialist powers to divide the people of Africa,
particularly those which cut across ethnic groups at an early
date. The resolution also called upon the independent African
states to support a permanent solution to this problem based
upon the wishes of the people. It also found expression in
the joint communique issued by President Nkrumah of Ghana
and Osman of Somalia in 1961 which stressed the imperative
need to call upon the principle of self-determination as a
means of removing the artificial colonial frontiers which
were drawn without respect to ethnic, cultural or economic
links. The invocation of the principle of secessionist
self-determination was in fact intended as the justification
of Ghana's claim to Togo and parts of the Ivory Coast and
Somalia's claim to French-Somaliland and parts of Ethiopia
and Kenya. Subsequently, President Nkrumah of Ghana who had
expounded the proposal of ·United States of African seemed
to have abandoned his pr.evious stand on the right of ethnic
groups to secessionist self-determination.
(2)Buchheit. Lee e., Secession, "The Legitimacy of Self-
Determination, New Haven, ~, p.27
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diminish the unified states' wealth, resources and power,
thereby lowering its stamina, defensive capability and
potential international influence. In addition to this,
the establishment. of a new state may place an enemy on
the new constricted borders. The other possibility is
that the seceding province might establish an alliance
with a traditionally antagonistic neighbouring state in
order to safeguard its security(3). Moreover, secessionist
self-determination could result in a multiplicity of small
squabbling states, particularly in regions where tribal or
clannish divisions are still prevalent(4). In fact,
many such smaller units might lack a viable economic basis,
a strong political structure and adequate military defence.
Once the right to secessionist self-determination is admitted,
there can be no end to this process which could conceivably
be carried on until each clan within a society constitutes
an entity entitled to self-determination. Such entities
would not be able to fulfil their international duties
and obligations(5) for reasons mentioned above. In any
(3)AS in the case of the secession of Bangladesh which
led to the establishment of an alliance with India in
order to safeguard its security from Pakistani endeavours
to regain sovereignty on Bengal territory (previously
East Pakistan). It is notable that India and Pakistan
are traditionally antagonistic neighbours.
(4)Krishnan, Maya, Ope Cit, pp.207-208
(5) Karefa-Smart. John, Ope Cit, p.773
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event, secessionist self-determination has usually been
pursued in consequence of an awareness of the wealth of the,
province vis-a-vis the remaining state in the belief that it
could do much better on its own than ~y sharing its resources
with the larger unified state(6). The secession of Katanga
from the Congo and of Biafra from Nigeria are evidence of the
temptation Cor a wealthy province to abandon the less fortunate
provinces(7). The reaction of the UN and the OAU to the
situation in the Congo and in Diafra was an obvious lack of
sympathy for such secessionist self-determination which is
thoroughly in conflict with the principle of the territorial
integrity of established states envisaged in the Charters
of both organisations(8). It should be noted that as a
(6) Buchheit. Lee C., Ope Cit, p.87
(7)!E!2 p.89
(8) U-Thant, the then UN Secretary General, at a press
conference in Accra and Dakar on 9th January 1970 stated
that n •••• self-determination of the people does not imply
self-determination of a section of a population of a
particular member state. What is evident for the
consideration of the UN is the simple basic principle of
the Charter. When a state applies to be a member of the
UN and when the UN accepts that member, then the
implication is that the rest of the membership of the UN
recognise the territorial integrity, independence and
sovereignty of this particular state. You will recall
that the UN spent over $500 million in the Congo
primarily to prevent the secession of Katanga from the
Congo. So far as the question of secession of a
particular member state is concerned, the UN's attitude
is unequivocal. As an international organisation the UN
has never accepted and does not accept and I do not
believe it will ever accept the principle of secession
of a part o( its member states.n (Quoted from
Buchheit. Lee C., Ope Cit, pp.~7-88).
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consequence of the UN involvement in the Congo crisis
in order to maintain the Congo's territorial integrity,
the General Assembly set up a special committee in 1963
to study the principle of secessionist se1f-determination(9).
Accordingly, the UN member states were invited to submit a
written statement to the UN Secretary General on views and
suggestions they might have, regarding the principle of
secessionist self-determination(lO). The committee was also
given the task of discussing and debating the content of the
principles of equal rights and self-determination with
frequent reference to secessionist self-determination.
In the event, some member states, particularly the
Communist bloc, favoured explicit recognition of a right
to secession, while the majority of states did not
recognise secession as a legitimate aspect of self-
determination. The consensus among the majority was that
the scope of self-determination should be limited to cases
of colonialism and peaceful secession, agreed upon without
an automatic resort to military measures(11). In this
(9)
1h!2 p.89
(10)
British statements devoted the whole of its argument
on self-determination and did not choose to remark on the
other principles to be included in the declaration. The
statement re-affirmed the UK's often repeated belief that
self-determination is a political principle and not a
legal one. The French statement argued that it was at
least doubtful whether the right of secession existed
as part of the lex lata.
(11)
Delupis, Ingrid, Ope Cit, pp.15-16
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connection, there were historical precedents of states
accepting secession of parts of territory(12). This,
however, occurred in cases where the process of unification
had been accomplished by a prev~ous voluntary union or
federation of territories having some degree of autonomy(13).
It should be noted that it is a popular practice in such
constitutional arrangements to include provisions concerning
secessionist self-determination which have usually been
surrounded by heavy limitations(14). Strong opposition
to secessionist self-determination has come from recently
independent states that emerged from the process of
colonial self-determination with borders determined by a
colonial power in the past century. These borders were
bequeathed to the independent state at the end of the
colonial period(1S). In this respect, secessionist
self-determination could result in a disastrous reassertion
(12)senegal seceded from the Mali federation in 1960.
The justification presented by the Government of Senegal
was that the legality of its action was based on the
argument that the federation was composed of sovereign
states. Consequently, each sovereign retains an implied
right to secede from any kind of association it enters,
at its \dll. In 1961 Syria seceded from the UAR.
Egypt agreed to accept the result amicably.
(13)Whiteman, Harjorie, Digest of International La\\',
Volume 5, !22J, p.39
(14) .Buchhe1t, Lee C., Ope Cit, p.99
(15) Krishnan, J.laya, Ope Cit, pp.208-209
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of ancient tribal, linguistic or religious divisions.
There have been fears of this kind of assertion erupting
in different areas around the world and particularly in
the African continent. It is obvious that firm opposition
to such a principle has been reflected in both internal
African state structure and in African policies advocated
before international forums(16). The OAU Charter
expresses the determination of the signatories to safeguard
and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of African states(17).
In addition, each OAU member state declares its adherence,
in Article 3 of the OAU Charter, to the principle of
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
each state(18). These commitments have been reiterated
in subsequent OAU resolutions which have proclaimed that
the borders of African states on the day of their
independence, constitute a tangible reality and member
states were pledged to respect these frontiers(19). The
emphasis on respect for territorial integrity became
quite clear in the 1964 Resolution concerning the Biafran
secessionist movement in which all OAU member states
(16)Brownlie, Ian, Basic Documents on African Affairs,
The Clarendon Press, Oxford 1971, p.360
(17)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Ope Cit, p.9
(18)Ibid pp.l0-ll
(19), Brownlie, Tan, Ope Cit, p.360
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bluntly condemned such movement as "Balkanisation,,(20)
in the African continent(21). Simultaneously, they
asserted that self-determination is the right of the
majority within an accepted political unit. Consequently,
there can be no such thing as self-determination for the
indigenous minorities living within the political unit
of OAU member states(22). It would seem that the right
of self-determination does not mean the freedom of every
self-distinguishing ethno-cultural group to secede from
an established African state. The OAU attitude towards
secessionist self-determination is inherently incompatible
with the goal of ftAfrican Unity.u The break-away attempts
in the African continent were denounced in part for this
reason. Despite the firm stance against secessionist
self-determination, it is simultaneously declared that
such matters are within the domestic jurisdiction of
member states and thus, interference from outside is
precluded(23). Thus, the non-interference in matters
within the domestic jurisdiction of OAU member states
has been regarded as excluding any active mediative role
(20)
Balkanisation when used in this context, is not limited
to the process of the disintegration of an independent state
into smaller autonomous entities. It includes any
constitutional or political scheme such as federation or
local self-government which in any way impairs the
political authority of the central government.
(21)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.364
(22)!2!!! p.364
(23)Ibid p.364
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for the organisation in connection with the secessionist
movements. Accordingly, Article 3(2) of the OAU Charter
provides that •••••the member states in pursuit of the
purposes stated in Article 2 solemnly affirm and declare
their adherence to the following principle, •••• non-
interference in the internal affairs of states(24) ••
It appears that while this provision imposes an obligation
upon OAU member states, this obligation does not apply
to the OAU itself or to any body acting on its behalf.
As a matter of clarification, the UN Charter makes a
distinction between obligations imposed upon member
states and those imposed on the UN itself. According
to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter •••••nothing contained
in the present Charter shall authorise the UN to intervene
in matters which ~re essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state(25).. Accordingly, the OAU
provisions of non-interference in matters within the
domestic jurisdiction is less restrictive than the UN
provisions. Nevertheless, the UN has usually asserted
jurisdiction over extremely wide areas, including that
of human rights(26). In spite of the broad role given
to the OAU in this respect, the latter lacking the will
to act, has chosen to interpret Article 3(2) of its
(24)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Ope Cit, pp.l0-ll
(25) 6Panhuys, H.F. van et al., Ope Cit, p.2
(26)Akinyami, Bolji, The OAU and the Concept of Non-Interference
in Internal Affairs of Member States, BYBIL, Volume 46,
1972-73, pp.396-398
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Charter restrictively in favour of an inactive role. The
non-interference provision construed in absolute terms
excludes any active mediative role in secessionist
conflicts. The OAU is severely handicapped in its
mediative role by interpreting the non-interference
provision of its Charter in absolute terms which prevent
her from dealing with threats to peace and security
arising from secessionist movements in the African
continent. In contrast, the provisions of the UN
Charter maintain that non-interference in matters which
are essentially within domestic jurisdiction are not
operative in situations that might constitute a threat
to international peace or a breach of international
security. Consequently, the UN has been able to take
up issues such as the apartheid policies of South Africa
and to act in the Congo crisis, as well as in other
situations which would probably be regarded as falling
exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of UN
member states(27). The OAU regards a war of secession
as a matter falling within the domestic jurisdiction
of its member states and has adopted a passive attitude
. (28)inconsistent with the provisions of its Charter •
(27)Emerson Re~ort, Self-Determination, ~, Volume 65,!iZ!, pp.466-4 7
(28) The OAU Resolution on the Nigerian civil war adopted
in September 1967 states ••••Recognising that situation
as an internal affair, the solution of which is primarily
the responsibility of Nigerians themselves ••••
(Brownlie, Ian, Op. Cit, p.363). See also OAU Charter
Article II para.l, sub-para.e and Article III para.3.
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Admittedly, internal situations which constitute a threat
to peace and security of the region have generally been
considered as exceptional to the principle of non-
intervention by relevant international regional
organisations. The.idea had taken root that matters
of prima facie domestic jurisdiction may be of international
concern in certain circumstances. The concept of inter-
national concern broadened thus would include a breach or
threat to international peace and security. Accordingly,
the OAU may be well advised to adopt this concept of
international concern as a cornerstone of its policy towards
African regional peace and security in order to prevent
extra-regional intervention in future African conflicts.
As a matter of fact, a war within a state, resulting from
a power struggle between two or more factions in order to
control the machinery of government, is~he classic form
of civil war(29) but intervention by third parties to an
(29)The first crisis was the coup d'etat in Togo which
occurred before the establishment of the OAU. However,
at the inaugural conference of the OAU, the new regime
in Togo was prevented from attending the conference
because of the opposition of a number of member states.
\ihen a coup d'etat occurred in Ghana in 1966, the next
OAU Summit witnessed an attempt to deny participatory
legitimacy to the new regime. When this failed, a
number of member states refused to take part in the
proceedings. The situation was different after the
coup in Uganda. The new regime and the previous one
sent delegations to the 1971 sixteenth session of the
OAU Council of Ministers held in Addis Ababa. A number of
delegations supported the delegation representing the
deposed regime while other delegations supported the
delegation of the new regime. Neither was seated and
the conference broke up without debating any item on
the agenda. The conclusion which could be drawn from
this seems to be that no definite interference could be
seen that involved the OAU and that these changes fell
exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of member
states.
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extent that might upset the balance between the internal
protagonist factions takes the conflict out of purely
domestic jurisdiction. The situation ceases to be an
internal matter(30). The war of secession usually
involves two governments in de facto control of
substantial parts of their national territory and
population in which the battle lines are geographically
demarcated. Therefore, the OAU would not be able to
settle African regional disputes if it considers conflicts
that pose a substantial danger of extra-regional inter-
vention as internal matters falling within the domestic
jurisdiction of its member states. The Biafran secession
was not an internal matter because Biafra1s secessionist
self-determination was inspired by outsiders(31).
Nevertheless, it was considered an internal matter by the
Nigerian government and the OAU accepted this interpretation.
Yet it was not an internal matter because it ceased to be
within the domestic jurisdiction when extra-regional
intervention became involved in the fuelling of the
conflict(32). It would thus appear that domestic conflict
ceases to be an internal matter when third parties are
involved to such an extent as to upset the equilibrium
between the internal protagonist factions and determine
the outcome(33). By pursuing a policy of non-interference
(30)Komann, Onyeonoro, Secession and the Right of Self-
Determination on OAU Dilemma, ~, Volume 12, ~, p.372
(31)Ibid p.372
(32)~, Robert, The Relevance of Theories, I~ternal Violence
for the Control of Intervention, Edited by Hoore, Nortan
John,Law and Civil War in the Hodern World, The University
Press, London 1974, pp.72-78
(33)Young, Oran R., Systemic Business of Intervention, Edited
by }'Ioore,Nortan John, Law on Civil \'larin l-IodernWorld,
The University Press, London 1974, pp.116-117
- 176 -
in such issues, the OAU is in effect, facilitating the
outcome of African regional disputes being determined by
the will of extra-regional powers. In this respect, it
is desirable to draw attention to Article 2(3) of the
OAU Charter through which the organisation'pledges,
affirmatively and actively, to defend the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of its
member states(34). Legally, the OAU at the behest of
its member states is under an obligation to intervene to
suppress an internal secessionist movement. ?-loreover,
this obligation of the OAU is reinforced in the Cairo
Resolution of 1964 which adopted the principle of
territorial status quo. This legally obliges its
participation in any settlement of African regional disputes
whose terms might involve the break-up of a member state.
Unfortunately, the role assumed by the OAU in such issues
produced only verbal condemnation of secessionist self-
determination and the despatching of a consultative
mission of Heads of State and Government to the head of
the victim state assuring him of the OAU's stand on the
territorial integrity, unity and peace and security of his
country(3S). The 'OAU's commitment to the absolute
(34)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Ope Cit, p.10
(3S)The OAU Resolution on the Nigerian civil war adopted
September 14th, 1967. Quoting "••••Resolves to send a
consultative mission of 6 Heads of State (Cameroon,
Congo_ Kinshasa, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia and Niger) to
the Head of the Federal Government in Nigeria to assure
him of the Assembly's desire for the territorial unity
. and peace of Nigeria •••• "
(Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.364)
on
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preservation of the principle of territorial status quo would
make sense only if it were combined with serious endeavours to
prevent the conflict from threatening the peace and security
of the continent. In any event, the problem of secessionist
self-determination could be substantially solved by adequate
safeguards providing for the human rights and security of
minorities in African states(36). The OAU needs to develop
institutional machinery to wh Lch both member states and
individuals would have access, somewhat along the lines of
the "European Human Rights Commission." Such machinery
does not need to have enforcement powers but must have
investigative powers and the right to pUblicise its findings
in case its recommendations "are not accepted. At the same
time, OAU member states must contain constitutional provisions
that provide for equal protection by the law and equal
_opportunities for all citizens, without regard to their
ethnic, religious, regional or linguistic backgrounds.
In addition, the OAU should have the task of determining and
communicating to its member states those critical situations
in which minority groups face severe denial of human rights.
Finally, the OAU should also establish an African Court of
Justice along the lines of the "European Court of Justice.u
(36 )
In the Aland Islands dispute, the League of Nations
established a Commission to make recommendation to the Council
of the League of Nations, that the people of 'the Islands
did not have the right to secede from Finland on grounds of
self-determination. In spite of the fact, a referendum
showed a near unanimous desire on the part of the islanders
to associate with Sweden. The islanders are all of Swedish
origin and Swedish is their mother tongue. Nevertheless,
the Commission recommended that the islanders should remain
under Finnish sovereignty but that their Swedish tradition
and language should be safeguarded by certain guarantees for
the human rights, security of minorities and limited autonomy.
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THE CONCEPT OF AFRICAN BOUNDARIES
African borders are unique in their artificial
character but they do not greatly differ fro~ international
- borders elsewhere on the globe, in the sense that they are
designed to 'divide landscapes that are otherwise often
indistinguishable. In this respect, there is probably no
great difference between international borders in the African
continent and international borders on other continents.
Therefore, the description of African borders as artificial
in the sense that they were drawn with total disregard to
local conditions, is not accurate, despite the fact
consideration and attention given to local circumstances
were insufficient. A considerable number of African colonial
borders took shape gradually and by stages and endeavours
were made by colonial demarcation commissions to take certain
local features into account, and to introduce change and
amendments over the years(1). The delimitation was sometimes
influenced by requirements of the respective colonial powers
such as their concern with administrative convenience,
communications and access to certain areas or trade routes(2).
(1)For instance, the separation of some 5000 square kilometres
from Tanganyika and their incorporation into Ruanda in 1923.
The original delimitation of borders between Tanganyika and
Ruanda was drawn in 1919. The separation did take place ,
in such a way as to facilitate the construction of a railway
linking Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Uganda through British-held
territories.
(2)The original border between Tanganyika and Ruanda was drawn
in 1919. Subsequently, the Cape-to-Cairo scheme required the
partitioning of the Kingdom of Ruanda be twe en Great Britain
and Belgium. The population protested strongly. As a result,
the issue was placed before the League of Nations Permanent
Mandates Commission whose Chairman reported to the Council of
the League that the new border was hardly justifiable from
the point of view of the well-being, political order, stability
and economic development of the concerned region.
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On other occasions and to some minor extent, the local
African chiefs played a part in the partition of the
continent. They indirectly influenced the pattern of
partition and the shape of existing border~ through
alliances and treaties(3) concluded with the European
The fact is that the African chiefs often
signed treaties they did not understand. Nevertheless, some
of them did refuse to conclude treaties, or signed them only
after pressures or persuasion. However, it cannot be
assumed that the meaning of the obligation was generally
beyond the comprehension of African chiefs. On the other
hand, there were occasions where African chiefs, in conflicts
·with their rival African neighbours, considered such treaties
and alliances useful and serving their interests. At the
same time, the European powers too often used such treaties
(3)ThUS, the agreement of 1890 between Britain and France
delimited their respective spheres on the Niger.~he
agreement provided that the British sphere would include
all that fairly belonged to the Kingdom of Sokofo with
which the Royal Niger Company claimed a treaty. Another
instance is the border between Zambia and Angola. It was
defined by an Anglo-Portuguese treaty in 1891 which
provided that the border would follow the Western boundary
of the Borotse Kingdom with whom Great Britain had a treaty.
lllienthe two states disagreed about the westward extent of
that Kingdom's territories, the matter was submitted to the
arbitration of the King of Italy. The arbitrator's award
was based upon an assessment of the territorial extent of
the effective jurisdiction of the Borotse ruler.
(4)Touval. Saadia, The Boundary Politics of Independent
Africa, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 12Z1, p.S
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to support and confirm their territorial claims in
negotiations with rival European powers. Under these
circumstances, in colonial Africa, the ultimate decision
on the allocation of territories and the delimitation of
borders, was always taken and implemented by European
powers(S). Thus,the image of the "passiven Africa has
been superseded by the "naive" African who often participated
indirectly in the allocation of territories and the making
of boundaries. Hence African boundaries are mostly those
of the colonial period in which the internal administration
and constitutional arrangements of the former colonial
powers have been of decisive influence(6). Subsequently,
the European powers concluded a series of bilateral treaties
aimed at delimiting their respective possessions(7). It
should be noted that a high proportion of African
independence movements have accepted the sub-divisions of
the colonial administrations. This principle of continuity
has been regarded as one of the principles of state succession
in international law(8). As a matter of fact, African states
(S)Brownlie. Ian, African Boundaries, Hurst & Company,
London !..2l!l
(6)Zartman. William, The Politics of Boundaries in North
and ''lestAfrica, JMAS, Volume 3, .!..2..Q.i, p.IS S
(7)For instance, a treaty was concluded in 1890 between
Great Britain and France delimiting their respective
spheres on the Niger. A treaty was also concluded in
1891 between Great Britain and Portugal delimiting their
respective spheres of control. Another treaty was
concluded in 1923 between Great Britain and Belgium for
the adjustment of borders in order to incorporate Ruanda
into Belgian-held territory.
(8)'fuiteman. J>farjorie,Digest of International Law,
Volume 2, ~, pp.754-765
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have, since the achievement of independence, maintained the
principle of the continuity of colonial boundaries. They
thus subscribe at the same time to a compound of two principles.
Firstly, the principle of pan-Africanism which grew ~p in the
first half of this century as part of anti-colonialism1s
ideology and a reaction to various economic and social reforms
in the African continent(9). The strongest version of this
outlook was expounded vigorously by Nkrumah, who demanded
as the immediate objective, the political union of the whole
African continent(10). A considerable number of African
states, especially the Francophonic regimes, favoured gradual
political integration but they stressed the need for
solidarity and functional co-operation aiming at unity of
action in international affairs. This was one of the
reasons for the establishment of the OAU in 1963 which it
was hoped, would provide the basis for the co-ordination of
the policies of the independent states of Africa in the
world of diplomacy at large, and particularly in the face
of the continued apartheid policies of South Africa(ll).
The problem of borders received no explicit reference in
the OAU Charter adopted at the 1963 Addis Ababa Conference,
nor in any of the Conference resolutions. Probably,opinion
(9)The All-African People's Conference took place in Accra
in 1958 and called for a general adjustment of borders,
particularly those which cut across ethnic groups,and
divided people of.the same stock.
(10)Okoye, Felix Chuks, Ope Cit, p.125
(11)A Short History of the OAU, Ope Cit, pp.11-12
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on this matter was too sharply divided. The emphasis
lias upon the equality, sovereignty and territorial
integrity of member states, which is clearly set forth
and included in the OAU Charter(12). The preamble to
the OAU Charter affirms that the determination to
safeguard and consolidate the independence, as well as
to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence, is among the purposes of the
OAU. This is defined in Article 2 and among the
principles in Article 3 which provides that the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state
be respected(13). Secondly, as a corollary of the
acceptance of the above-mentioned principles, the
African states postponed political integration as an
immediate objective. Accordingly, they maintained
the status quo and accepted-them faute de mieux(14).
(12)
OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Ope Cit, p.9-11
(13)
Ibid pp.9-11
(14)
Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.9
- 183 -
In consequence of this phenomenon, the key development was
the 1964 Resolution adopted at the first OAU Summit
Conference which took place in Cairo in July 1964(15).
In the course of this Summit, the OAU was called under
urgent and dramatic circumstances to intervene in the
Algerian-J.loroccan border disputes and in the Somali-
Ethiopian and Kenyan border disputes. Both conflicts were
scheduled for further consideration at the Cairo first
Summit Conference(16). In addition, a new border dispute
between Ghana and Upper Volta was placed on the agenda of
the Summit Conference. At the same time, a fourth border
dispute between Dahomey and Niger was not referred to the
OAU. Nevertheless, it did contribute to the feeling that
border disputes had come to plague inter-state relations
in the African continent(17). Under these circumstances,
(15)
n •••• the Assembly of Heads of State and Government
meeting in its first ordinary session in Cairo, UAR, from
17th to 21st July 1964. Concerned that border problems
constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissension.
Conscious of the existence of extra-African manoeuvres
aimed at dividing African states. Considering further
that the borders of African states on the day of their
independence constitute a tangible reality. Recalling
the establishment in the course of the second ordinary
session of the Council. of the Conunittee of Eleven charged
with studying further measures for strengthening African
unity. Recognising the imperative necessity of settling
by peaceful means and within a strictly African framework,
all disputes between African states. Recalling further
that all member states have pledged under Article VI of
the Charter of the OAU scrupulously to respect all
principles laid down in paragraph (3) of Article III of
the Charter of the OAU. (1) Solemnly reaffirms the strict
respect by all member states of the organisation for the
principle laid down in paragraph (3) of Article III of the
Charter of the OAU. (2) Solemnly declares that all member
states pledge themselves to respect the borders existing
on their achievement of national independence •••• n
(16)Wild. Patricia Berko, The OAU and the Algerian-~loroccan
Border Conflict, JIO, Volume 20, 122&, p.25
(17) ,Touval, Saadia, Ope Cit, pp.8s-86
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a considerable number of African states maintained that the
prevailing events would seriously impede pan-African solidarity.
Consequently, an initiative was taken to have the OAU affirm
explicitly and mor~ strongly, the principle already enshrined
in its Charter concerning the preservation of the territorial
status quo(18). lfuen the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government convened, it had on its agenda the item proposed
by the Tanzanian Government wh Lch called for the debate on
"''laysand Heans" which was meant to avoid border disputes
among the OAU member states(19). The preamble to the
resultant resolution declares that "••••border problems
constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissension(20).u
The African states were extremely concerned that African
regional disputes, particularly border and boundary conflicts, .
were fuelled by outsiders and could lead to a constant
eruption of such disputes. Therefore, the African leaders
in the first session of the OAU Assembly at Cairo in 1964,
adopted the so-called Cairo Resolution which stated that
"••••the borders of African states on the day of their
(21) "independence constitute a tangible reality.... •
Despite its legal force, the Resolution has suffered from
several weaknesses. One was that Somalia, a state most
(18)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.10
(19)Touval, Saadia, Ope Cit, p.86
(20)BrOlmlie. Ian, Ope Cit, p.360
(21)!!2ll p.361
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directly concerned, simultaneously declared that it did
not feel bound by the resolution in consequence of her
non-participation in the Cairo Summit Conference of
1964(22). Other weaknesses were inherent in the text of
this resolution. By virtue of the resolution, member states
pledged themselves to respect borders existing on their
achievement of national independence. Under these terms,
Ethiopia and J.loroccocould presumably claim territories
that had been their own at their independence, prior to the
colonial partition at the end of the nineteenth century.
This has been the essence of previous Moroccan claims to
Mauritania and presently to Western Sahara(23). There
were also no provisions in the resolution that might
assist in settling border conflicts arising from different
interpretations of treaties defining borders(24). Added to
this, was the weakness of the absence of any provisions in
-the resolution concerning the questions of secession
and self-determination(2S). The meagre support given
(22)The Somali position declared on the eve of the Conference
was reflected in a message despatched from the then Somali
President Osman to the late Egyptian President Nasser, who
was host to the Summit. Osman stated that he was prevented
by a government crisis from participating in the Cairo
Summit. He requested Nasser to ensure that legitimate
Somali interest not be adversely affected by the introduction
of the Cairo resolution on African borders. He also
declared that the Somali Republic would not regard itself
bound by this resolution.
(23)Shaw. Malcolm, The Western Sahara Case, BYBIL,
Volume 49, 1978, pp.120-121
(24)~, 1968-69, Africa Research Ltd., Exeter 1962,
pp.623-625
(2S)Komann, Onyenoro S., Secession and the Rie:ht of
Self-Determination: An OAU Dilemma, JMAS, Volume 12,llU, p.359
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by certain African states to secessionist movements in
Southern Sudan, Biafra and Congo is evidence of the
commitment of the majority of African states to the
preservation of existing borders(26). Thus, when
issues concerning bo~ders arose in the debates of OAU
forums, the latter adhered rigidly to the principle of
status quo and inapplicability of self-determination in
these cases. The attitude behind this firm stance is
clear enough. If colonial alignments were discarded,
alternative alignments would have to be agreed upon and
such a process of redefinition would create confusion, and
could become a threat to the peace and security of the
African continent. Even if the principle on such revision
was to be agreed upon, there would be considerable
difficulties in applying the principle to ethnic and tribal
complexities of African societies. It is also notable
that the resolution as such probably has no binding effects
as far as international law is concerned. Nevertheless,
the status quo may coincide with the hitherto, generally
acceptable argument that frontiers do not lapse when
deco10nisation takes p1ace(27). In this event, the
resolution based upon a rule of regional customary inter-
national law is binding on'those African states which have
unilaterally declared their acceptance of the principle of '
(26)
Ibid p.355
(27)EI-Ayouty, Tassin, Op. Cit, pp.53-63
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the status quo as at the time of independence. Howe ver-,
Morocco and Somalia did not accept the Cairo Resolution
of 1964 taking the position that the r~solution only
applied to future border disputes in the African continent.
This argument may be justifiable in that the upholding of
the principle of status quo means also that border disputes
existing at the time of decolonialisaton are part of the
status quo which is acceptable for better or worse. It is
worthwhile mentioning that the Latin American states
adopted the principle of auti possidetisQ which is -essentially
similar to the principle of status quo adopted by African
states(28). By the principle of Puti possidetisU the
Latin American states succeeding the Spanish Empire were
presumed to possess the parcels of territory represented
by the former administrative divisions of that empire. In this
respect, the principle of continuity has bee~ applied
in border conflicts between Asian states(29). The experience
of Latin American and Asian states abundantly confirms both
the good sense of the principle and its inevitable
consequence. It is, however, clear that the Cairo
Resolution is in line with the principle of self-determination
which is generally considered a legal principle that stems
from the principles of the UN Charter(30). It is clearly
(28)~tunkman, A.L.W., Adjudication and Adjustment, International
Judicial Decision and the Settlement of Territorial and
Boundary Disputes, BYBIL, Volume 46, 1972- 73 pp.27-46
(29)lv.hiteman,Marjorie, Digest of International Law,
Volume 2, !2Ql, pp.1086-1088
(30)Panhuys, M.F. van et al., Ope Cit,pp. 26-27
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understood that only a minority of African border conflicts
have an ethnic or irredentist basis. There have been two
types of border disputes in the first category - those
between Somalia and her neighbouring states, and two in
the second category, between Morocco and her neighbours.
The Somali border conflicts with her neighbouring states
essentially involve the question of ethnic nationalism.
The Somali claims to portions of Ethiopia and Kenya are
based on the right of a nation-state to encompass all
Somali - inhabited territories. The claim is supported
by legal arguments based upon securing an opportunity to
exercise the right to self-determination of the people
concerned(31). In contrast, ~lorocco based her claims
to Mauritania and presently to the lvestern Sahara, upon
historical rights. She argued that the territories
concerned were once part of the Kingdom of Horocco which
were detached from it as a consequence of the colonial
partition(32). Both states sought initially to gain
their aims by peaceful endeavours, but having failed to
obtain satisfactory remedies, they had recourse to the
military option. Morocco fought a brief war with Algeria
in 1963 over the possession of certain frontier regions,
hoping that military pressure could induce Algeria to enter
into previously promised negotiations(33). She has also
(31)
Touval, Saadia, Africa's Frontier, Reactions to a
Colonial Legacy, JIA, Volume 42, 1966, p.645
(32)Shaw, Malcolm, Ope Cit, pp.118-121
(33)Hassouna, Hussein, Ope Cit, pp.212-213
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been conducting a war since 1976 in the Western
Sahara and is suffering grave economic hardships
as a result of this policy of irredentism(34).
Somali and Ethiopian forces clashed in a series
of wars which broke out as a result of escalation
of guerrilla incidents in the Horn of Africa.
Certainly both Horocco and Somalia remain committed
to their objectives and have pursued the military
option rather than turning to the means of peaceful
settlement by direct negotiation or of political
mediation by an African state or a group of African
states. Third party mediation may take the form
of actually proposing compromise solutions and this
process is generally regarded as conciliation(35).
The role of mediation or conciliation may be carried
out by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and
Government (36) .' 'Disputes which have a technical
shape and a legal character may be submitted by the
(34)
Bakhashab, Omar, Ope Cit, p.88
(35)
. Fox, Hazel, International Disputes, Europa Publication,
London, 1972, (Report of a Study Group of the David Davies
Memorial Institute of International Studies, Europa
Publication, London, !2l1, p.95)
(36)
Lusaka Uanifesto on Southern Africa, Published by the
Division of Press and Information, OAU General Secretariat,
Addis Ababa, ~, p.9
- 190 -
parties or the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and
Government to the OAU Commission of ~~diation,
Conciliation and Arbitration. _ It may set up an
African ad hoc Court of Arbitration which must be
given jurisdiction by means of a special agreement
for the particular purpose of settling the issues
in dispute in conformity with the principles of
internationallaw(37). Boundary conflicts are
in most cases disputes, either about legal rights
as such, or about the application of principles
or the provisions of legal instruments. Therefore,
the introduction of claims based on historical
factors and/or ethnic affinities, are not susceptible
to settlement ~ccording to recognised principles.
They can only be dealt with by means of compromise
or by the imposition of regional sanctions upon the
state concerned which refuses to comply with the
regional decision of the majority. ?olitical
procedures for the adjustment of territories may
include the use of plebiscites under the auspices
of the OAU(38).
(37)
lveissberg, Guenter, Maps as Evidence in International
Boundary Dispute: A Reappraisal, ~, Volume 57,
122l, pp.781-803
(38)For instance, in 1959, the UN General Assembly
recommended separate plebiscites in the Northern and
Southern sections of the Trust-Territory of the
Cameroons, both under British administration. The
plebiscites were held in 1961. The Northern section
favoured joining the Federation of Nigeria and the
Southern section voted in favour of joining the
Cameroon Republic.
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CHAPTER III:
APPLICATION OF THE OAU SYSTEM FOR REGIONAL DISPUTES
SECTION A: BORDER AND BOU~~ARY DISPUTES INVOLVING
OAU HEr-mERSTATES
THE ALGERIAN-NOROCCAN BORDER DISPUTE 1963
HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND LEGAL CONSIDERATION OF THE BOUNDARY
CONFLICT
The OAU, which was established in ?tIay1963, was
confronted by its first African regional dispute almost
immediately. The border dispute which led to a military
confrontation between Algeria and Morocco was inherited
from the era of French colonial administration(1).
Prior to the French colonisation of Algeria in 1830, no
fixed boundaries existed between the different territories
in North Africa, all of which constituted a part of the
Muslim state (Dar-el~Islam), an entity which had been
established in the seventh century(2). As far as the
concept of international boundaries is concerned, the
Islamic concept regarding confines of territory is
irrelevant to the areas controlled and inhabited by
Muslim communities (Dar-el-Islam)(3). Thus, the original
(1)Ryner. Anthony S., }.Iorocco'sInternational Boundaries,
A Factual Background, ~, Volume 1, ~,p.3lS -
(2)Asad, ~fuhammad, The Principles of State and Government
in Islam, University of California Press, Los Angeles,
1961, pp.69-80
(3)Hamidallah. ltluhammad,Huslim Conduct of State,
She Huhammad Ashraf, Lahore, Pakistan, .!.2..Q.J, pp.83-89
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Muslim states recognised no fixed international boundaries
between their communities of Muslim Believers(4). Against
this historical background, French-ruled Algeria had been
in continuous boundary dispute with the sovereign Moroccan
state at that time(S). This led France to the conclusion
that delimitations of the border with Morocco were necessary.
Consequently, France concluded a boundary treaty with
~Iorocco at Tangier in 184S which stated ambiguously that
the boundary of the Turkish provincial administration be
maintained as it had been when Algeria was a province
within the Ottoman Empire(6). Despite the Tangier treaty
(4)!slam believes in the universality of the divine call with
which the Prophet was commissioned. With the downfall of
the Ummaiyads, Spain became independent of the East. Later,
during the decadence of the Abbasid Empire, its provincial
governors became hereditary and virually independent. They
could wage war, make peace or conclude treaties without
reference to the Caliph and administer all their internal,
as well as external affairs at their own will. They exercised
full independence with the exception that there were no
international boundaries between these states and that they
recited the name of the Caliph of Baghdad in the Friday
sermons in cathedral mosques.
(S>Morocco was at that time a recognised sovereign independent
state. In 1912, France and Morocco concluded a treaty which
established a French protectorate over Morocco. Nevertheless,
the treaty did not clarify the administrative boundaries of
the protectorate. Subsequently, the French government
established an administrative frontier by ministerial decree
in 1912, known as the ·Yarnier Line" between Teniet-el-Sassi
and the town of Figuig. The course of the "Yarnier Line" had
also been changed several times. For instance, its 1912
version left most of the Hammada du Guir in Algeria. While
its 1914 version pushed the border up to the eastern rim of
Hammada, when the French government decreased the limits of
the Cercle du Colomb-Bechar. By 19S0, most of the French
maps showed the "Yarnier LineR back in the west though not
in the original course. ~Wild, Patricia Berko, Ope Cit, pp.19-20)
(6) Reyner, Anthony S., Ope Cit, p.316
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of 1845, the boundary conflict continued, which again led the
French to conclude that a more definite delimitation was
necessary(7). Thus, France and }'Ioroccoconcluded the treaty
of Lalla-Marnin which defined, in great detail, approximately
100 miles of boundary from the Mediterranean Coast to the
peak of Teniet-el-Sassi in the Atlas mountains. As far as
delimitation is concerned, the boundary follows specified
natural watercourses and connects fixed geographical features.
In the case of the desert south and south-west of Teniet-el-
Sassi, the treaty delimited the French-Algerian-Moroccan
sovereignties by reference to specific tribes inhabiting the
Sahara region. Therefore, the border treaty of 1846
established in fact, a frontier zone instead of a fixed
boundary line. The treaty was supplemented by a list of
tribes under French-Algerian or Moroccan jurisdiction as well
as a detailed geographical description of the Sahara region
which was fairly densely inhabited by farmers, and sparsely
populated by sheep-raising nomads.' The French authority
subsequently extended the Algerian jurisdiction southward
into the Sahara region ~hich was inhabited by tribes from
Morocco(9). Consequently, difficulties arose from the
unresolved border which were further complicated by the
inconsistency of shifting the location of the administrative
boundary line. Eventually, the French government concluded
(7)Touval, Saadia, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa,
Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1972, pp.180-181
(8)Brownlie, Ian, African Boundaries, A Legal and Diplomatic
Encyclopaedia, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1979, p.58
(9)Hassouna, Hussein, The League of Arab States and Regional
Disputes, Ocean Publications Inc., New York, ~, pp.211-212
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that a more clearly defined frontier become once more necessary.
Thereupon, a protocol was signed in Paris in 1901 which extended
the border between Algeria and Morocc~ from Teniet-el-Sassi to
the Hammada du Guir(10), which was reinforced by the establish-
-ment of military and customs posts along the limited area of
territory controlled by French-Algeria and Morocco. This de-
limitation was also conducted with reference to tribal consider-
ations rather than reference to geographical features. Owing to
difficulties in maintaining Saharan outposts, the French govern-
ment concluded the 1902 agreement with Morocco. This abrogated
the provisions of the 1901 protocol which provided for guard and
customs posts south of Teniet-el-Sassi, except at Figuig in
l-!orocco(II), in addition, the return of the old frontier
and also established areas of joint authority along the border,
which resulted in an extension of Algeria(12). Accordingly,
the border problem remained the same as under the 1845 treaty,
reflecting the French belief in the nineteenth century, that
the Sahara region south and south-west of Teniet-el-Sassi was
uninhabited and that therefore, no border was necessary(13).
(10)nrownlie. Ian, Ope Cit, p.59
(11)In 1938 a French military administrator in ~lorocco, General
Trinquet, proposed a new boundary which would have placed much
of the Sahara region within Morocco. The proposed plan was
rejected by the French government. The "Trinquet Line" became
subsequently the basis of Horoccan territorial claims against
Algeria.
(12)The J.Ioroccanthesis was that the nineteenth century Sherifian
Empire was dismembered by colonial conquest. In 1900 the French
annexed parts to Algeria and French 'iest Africa. Spain acted
similarly. .
(13)\fuen J.loroccoachieved independence in 1956 , its border ,,,ith
the French-ruled Algeria remained only partially defined as it
had been since 1845. The boundary dispute was further complicated
by the discovery of large amounts of oil and mineral resources
in the Sahara. \fuilst large quantities of oil and mineral
resources have been discovered in the Algerian sector of the
Sahara, concessions granted by the ~loroccan government to oil
companies have not yet led to the discovery of oil in its
sector.
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Thus, when Morocco achieved independence in 1956, it had
claimed repeatedly that no clearly defined frontier had
been agreed upon with French-ruled Algeria in many areas(14).
Furthermore, the unresolved boundary issue had also been
complicated by the inconsistency of French official maps
which often failed to define whether certain localities
were in Algeria or in Morocco(15). Thus, when.Horocco
regained her independence, a joint frontier commission
was set up with a mandate to solve the dispute over the
undefined border areas(16). Owing to the establishment
of the Algerian Provisional Government in 1958, Horocco
however, withdre,,,from the joint frontier commission,
taking the view that this government was the legitimate
authority to deal with the question of Algerian borders(17)
and decided to await the independence of Algeria(18) before
a conclusive delimitation of the common border, which had
clearly become ~ecessary, after the discovery of large
quantities of oil and mineral resources in the Sahara.
(14)Zartman, William, The Politics of Boundary in North
West Africa, JMAS, Volume 3, !2£i, p.163
(15)Wild, Patricia Berko, The OAU and the Altrerian-?-Ioroccan
Border Conflict, International Organisation, Volume 20,
1966, pp.19-20
(16)Touval, Saadia, Ope Cit, p.181
(17)These negotiations were gradually abandoned. On the one
hand, the French refused to offer concessions; on the other
hand, ~Iorocco came under Algerian criticism for co-operating
with the French in order to partition Algeria.
(18)Touval, Saadia, Op. Cit, pp.181-182
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In July 1961, the Horoccan and Algerian Provisional Government
concluded a secret agreement which provided that the
territorial problems created by the unilateral delimitation
~mposed by the French government, would be settled through
mutual negotiations between the governments of }Iorocco and
independent Algeria(19).· The proposed negotiations over
the frontier, however, never took place, owing to the
involvement of political as well as economic considerations
which complicated the border disputes. Subsequently, the
agreement was immediately shelved when Morocco advocated
an irredentist policy which claimed a historical frontier
which included the Western Sahara as well as the Senegal
. (20)r1ver • This policy was based on the thesis that the
Sherifian Kingdom had been dismembered by colonial
conquest since 1900(21). France had occupied the core
as a protectorate while Spain acted similarly(22).
(19)Andemicael, Berhanykum, The OAU and the UN, Africana
Publishing Company, New York, !iZ2, p.50
(20)only a few months after Moroccan independence was gained,
a new and striking declaration of nationalism was formulated
which was published in July 1956 on the front page of the
Istaglal Party Daily ftAl-Alam.· This declaration supplemented
by a map of Greater Morocco, commented on the economic import-
ance of mineral resources in the Sahara. This irredentist
policy had been advocated since 1948 by Allal-al-Fassi, who
lived in exile in Cairo from 1948 until l-Ioroccanindependence.
He argued that for reasons of geography, history and inter-
national law, the natural frontier of l-loroccanSahara should
end where Mauritania meets Senegal. During 1957, the other
Moroccan political parties also accepted territorial expansion
as their aim but irredentism remained more or less unofficial,
until Spain rejected l-IoroccoIs request for the immediate
return of Ifran and Tatwan.
(21)Zartman, William, Op. Cit, p.163
(22)Ryner, Anthony S., Op. Cit, pp.313-314
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It also alleged that despite these facts, the Moroccan
people continued to consider themselves subjects of Morocco
and members of the ~Iuslim community which was headed by
the Sultan of Morocco. Thus, the question of uncertain
territorial frontiers became excessively important in
Moroccan policy. While Moroccan political parties had
been advocating the irredentist policy, nevertheless this
policy remained more or less unofficial until, under
pressure, the King officially adopted it(23). This naturally
affected Morocco's relations with Algeria, particularly
because of the uncertain boundary between both countries.
Under these circumstances, Morocco announced in February
1958 a territorial claim to Mauritania and protested
against French exploitation of the Sahara(24). In addition
(23)It should be noted that the official adoption of irredentist
policy may be explained by reference to domestic political
problems. The national solidarity that had existed during
the struggle for independence had gradually been replaced by
a factional struggle among political parties and by violence
that erupted throughout the country. It could, therefore, be
assumed that the purpose for the official adoption was to
blur political differences and to stimulate patriotic feeling.
This irredentist posture mutually constituted a menace to the
whole of North Africa and consequently to the isolation of
Morocco.
(24)The French government established in 1957 the common
organisation of the Sahara Region (OCRS) in order to
promote just exploitation of the economic resources of the
Sahara. The OCRS originally included Mauritania, the
Sahara region of Algeria, Mali, Niger and Chad. The OCRS's
statute was revised in 1959 and 1960, following the achieve-
ment of independence of the territories of French West and
Equitorial Africa. In 1962, Algeria achieved independence
by the Evian Agreement which abolished the OCRS and replaced
it by a joint Franco-Algerian Sahara Organisation. This
Organisation was charged with the exploitation of oil and
mineral resources of the Algerian Sahara, with equal
financial support from France and Algeria.
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to the irredentist policy, the frontier issue was complicated
by ideological differences. Thus, while a revolutionary
socialist regime came into power in Algeria upon achieving
independence in 1962, a traditional monarchy existed in
Morocco. Consequently, differences were based upon the
adoption of a policy of economic liberation by Algeria
whilst most of the former colonial lands in Morocco were
still owned by foreigners. Nevertheless, many ~loroccans
were tempted by the Algerian approach, while profound
sympathy linked the left-wing opposition in Morocco to the
Algerian regime. Eventually, economic considerations such
as the discovery of a large amount of oil and mineral resources
in the disputed areas of the Sahara,· contributed to the
aggravation of the boundary issue(2S). This background
eventually led to the outbreak of hostilities following
Algeria~s accession to independence in July 1962(26).
The boundary crisis developed over a number of border
areas, as well as over military and customs posts which
were claimed by each state to be within its jurisdiction.
Under these circumstances, Moroccans were expelled from the
Algerian side while Algerians faced the same fate in Morocco.
Algerian troops occupied the town of Ghija in Moroccan
terri tory, whilst ltloroccantroops were massed along the
frontiers. The Moroccan troops attempted to occupy Tindorf
but withdrew when they discerned that Algerian troops were
firmly in control of the town(27). Algeria claimed that
(2S}African Contemporary Record 1968-69, pp.86-87
(26)Okoye, Felix Chuks, International Law and the New African
States, Sweet & Maxwell, London,!21!, p.147
(27)Wild, Patricia Berko, Ope Cit, p.23
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these parts of the Algerian territory had been forcibly
occupied by ~loroccan troops immediately after the departure
of the French contingents. At the same time, Morocco
claimed that these areas were Moroccan and their inhabitants
had on various occasions expressed their allegiance to the
Moroccan Monarch(28). Soon after the outbreak of hostilities,
the foreign ministers of the two countries held a meeting
on October 5th, 1963 at Oujda in Morocco, where they discussed
the fighting on their borders(29). They agreed that mutual
understanding had been achieved and that relations between
the two countries would be normalised. Subsequently,
relations improved between the two countries following a
visit by the Horoccan Monarch to Algeria in Harch 1963(30).
The leaders of the two countries agreed, in principle, that
the J-loroccantroops would be withdrawn from the border and
that a joint border commission would be established, due to
meet at Tlemcen, Algeria, to examine the border dispute.
Unfortunately, during the 1963 summer,. a series of incidents
occurred in the disputed territory(31). Simultaneously,
each country alleged that a number of its nationals living
(28) It should be noted that it was reported during the
referendum on Algerian independence held in July 1962, that
inhabitants of Tindorf had marked their ballot "Yes· for
Algerian Independence, but maintained that they were Moroccans.
Accordingly, Moroccan troops endeavoured to occupy Tindorf
several days after the referendum, but withdrew when they
noticed that Algerian troops were firmly in control of the
region.
(29)Wild, Patricia Berko, Ope Cit, p.24
(30) .Hassouna. Husse1n, Ope Cit, p.213
(31).Th!!! p.214
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on the other side of the frontier had unjustifiably been
expelled. In addition to charges of incursions into
their respective territories, as well as allegations of
massing troops along the border, were made by both govern-
ments. Furthermore, Algeria alleged that ~lorocco was
encouraging an Algerian dissident movement in the disputed
areas(32). Under these circumstances, skirmishes
threatened to escalate into a full scale war, particularly
because of advances by Moroccan troops who occupied the
two disputed border posts of Hassi-Beida and Tinjoub.
These two posts were situated in areas of strategic
importance located within the Algerian sector of the former
French administrative frontier as shown on the French maps
issued in 1948(33). Negotiations for a ceasefire and
withdrawal of forces were held at Marrakesh on October 15th,
1963, but proved to be a complete failure, unable to reach
a mutually acceptable solution(34). Subsequently, fighting
·recurred intermittently and'the Algerian forces failed to
regain control of Hassi-Beida and Tinjoub. As a consequence,
they attacked Figuig in Moroccan territory and occupied
it(35). On the other hand, the Moroccans on their second
front in Southern Algeria drove towards Tinjouchy and
Tindorf(36). Against this background of open warfare
(32)Wild, Patricia Berko, Ope Cit, p.25
(33)~ p.24
(34) .Hassouna, Husse1n, Ope Cit, p.214
(35)~ p.214
(36)~ p.214
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between Algeria and Morocco and the inability of the
two countries to conclude a ceasefire agreement, a
number of attempts at mediation by third parties were
made. Offers began pouring into Algeria and Rabat.
It should be mentioned that both Algeria and l-Iorocco
discerned that they could not hope to benefit from a
protracted war(37). Therefore it became obvious to
both that it was necessary to achieve gains from the
efforts of peaceful settlement. Algeria intended to
secure the withdrawal of Horoccan troops from the
positions they occupied, and at the same time to gain
recognition of the boundary held by France, prior to
its independence in 1962, as the legitimate border with
the Kingdom of Horocco. Moroccan intentions, on the
other hand, were to secure Algeria's entrance into the
promised negotiations concerning Moroccan territorial
claims.
Morocco had much greater difficulties securing
support for its territorial claims against Algeria,
than for its Mauritania claims. '~en the war
erupted, Algeria could again draw on the wide inter-
national sympathy which it had won during the
struggle for independence.
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ATTEHPTS AT NEDIATION BY THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES
Following the failure of ceasefire negotiations between
Algeria and Horocco in mid-October 1963, efforts at mediation
of the conflict were simultaneously undertaken by the OAU and
the League of Arab States. The League endeavoured to bring
about a peaceful settlement to the conflict between two of
its member states. It reminded the states involved in the
conflict of the provisions enshrined in the Pact concerning the
peaceful settlement of disputes between member states. It
called upon them to settle their dispute within the League's
machinery(38). The League's Council held an emergency meeting
(38)The most notable among the efforts at mediation by the
League of Arab States and the OAU, were those undertaken by
President Habib Bourgaiba of Tunisia and by President Gamal
Abdul-Nasser of the UAR. Prior to the failure of ceasefire
negotiations between Algeria and l>Iorocco,President Bourguiba
addressed the disputants, urging them to agree to a cease-
fire. He issued a second appeal on October 21st 1963.
Nevertheless, his attempts to convoke a meeting of North
African foreign ministers in Tunisia failed. It is possible
that President Bourguiba's mediation efforts were doomed to
failure at the outset by the fact that relations between
Algeria and Tunisia had been strained since December 1962.
President Bourguiba had accused the Algerian government
of harbouring the Tunisian of a plot against
his life. As far as President Nasser's initiative is
concerned, he extended an initiative to the government of
Algeria, Horocco, Tunisia and Libya for a North African
Summit Conference in order to discuss the Algerian-Moroccan
border conflict. At the same time, President Nasser
deplored the aggression committed against Algeria. The
obvious bias of President Nasser in favour of Algeria was
given a concrete expression by Egyptian military assistance.
This clearly excluded mediation of the dispute by the UAR.
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upon the Secretary General's personal initiative in which
all member states participated, including the two parties
to the dispute. The Moroccan delegate expressed
satisfaction with the Council's meeting which enabled the
League to consider the dangerous situation along the
Algerian-Moroccan border. The Algerian delegate questioned
the procedure by which the Council's meeting had been
summoned. According to the provisiorsof the League's Pact,
the Council had to be convened at the request of the parties
to the dispute or of another member state(39). Notwithstanding,
the Algerian delegate welcomed the spirit in which the Council
had been convened. As far as the League1s initiative was
concerned, the Council raised the question as to whether it,
the Council, could act as an organ of mediation or as one of
arbitration between the parties in dispute. The consensus
among the member states was that the Council, at this stage,
was merely carrying out a mediatory role in attempting to
bring hostilities to an end. The Arab League mission was
also to provide a platform for the examination of the dispute
and offer possibilities to the concerned parties to clarify
their positions(40). After a series of deliberations,
the League's Council adopted a draft resolution calling upon
the member states in dispute to withdraw their armed forces
to the positions they had occupied prior to the outbreak of
hostilities without prejudice .to the border issue(41).
(39)The Arab League Pact, Published by the Information
Division of the League General Secretariat, Cairo 1972, p.14
(40)Okoye, Felix Chuks, Ope Cit, p.147
(41) .Hassouna, Hussein, Ope Cit, p.216
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It also established a Mediation Commission, consisting of
representatives of Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia(42)
and the League's Secretary General, with a mandate to
bring about a mutually acceptable solution to the
Algerian-Moroccan border dispute. Furthermore, the
resolution called upon the two member states in dispute
to halt urgently all press and radio campaigns against
each other and to extend all necessary facilities in
order to enable the commission to carry out its task
in an appropriate way(43). The League's mission
initially visited Algeria on October 22nd, 1963 where
it had a series of official meetings with Algerian
authorities, at which the mission had stressed the
necessity to settle the dispute by peaceful means
within the League's framework. The Algerian government
on their part expressed appreciation for the steps taken
by the League Council. Furthermore, they declared their
readiness, immediately to implement the League Council's
resolution on condition that the Moroccan government
would be prepared to do likewise(44). Subsequently,
the mission visited Morocco on October 23rd, 1963
where it also held a number of official meetings with
(42)~ p.215
(43)Ibid p.211
(44)Ibid pp.211-218
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the Moroccan authorities and was later received by the
King in Marrakesh. The Moroccan authorities had apparently
some misgivings about the League1s attitude which was said
to be sympathetic towards Algeria(45). However, consensus
was eventually reached with the approval of the two member
states in dispute and a draft agreement was prepared by the
League1s mission which embodied the following points:-
(1) A ceasefire would come into effect on October 26th
1963 at zero hour.
(2) The Algerian and Moroccan troops were to withdraw
to the positions they occupied prior to the outbreak of
hostilities, without prejudice to the agreed negotiations
concerning the border problem.
(3) Direct negotiation between the member states in dispute
would take place as soon as possible in order to discuss
the border conflict with the League offering of forum,
as well as whatever necessary assistance. The Arab League
invited the two member states in dispute to respond
positively to an invitation to attend the meeting of Heads
of North African states scheduled to take place at Tripoli,
Libya in the near future.
(4) An immediate halt of all radio and press campaigns
in order to facilitate the League's endeavours at mediation(46).
(4S)The ground for the Moroccan misgivings was due to the
fact that the League Council had proceeded with the
examination of the dispute prior to the arrival of the
official Moroccan delegation. Despite the fact that the
League was well aware that the Moroccan delegation, headed
by the ~linister of Justice, was en route to Cairo to join
in the Council's deliberations.
(46)Hassouna. Hussein, Ope Cit, pp.216-217
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Surprisingly, however, while the League mission was still
engaged in urging the authorities of the two member states
to approve the provisions of the draft treaty, it was
announced that the heads of state of ~Iorocco and Algeria
had agreed to a Summit Conference in Bamako on October 26th
1963, which had been proposed by the OAU through the good
offices of the Emperor of Ethiopia and the President of
Mali. Consequently, the League mission decided that its
efforts had come to a complete standstill. Therefore, the
League mission informed the authorities of the two member
states that it regarded holding such a meeting at Bamako
as inconsistent with the aims of the League's mediation,
and expressed hope for an immediate success of the Summit
meeting in bringing about a mutually acceptable solution
to the border conflict(47).
(47)
African Contemporary Record, 1968-69, p.90
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THE OAU'S ROLE IN ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL SETTLE~ffiNT
It has already been mentioned that efforts at
mediation of the conflict by the League of Arab States
were met with misgivings by Morocco. This doomed the
League initiative to failure from the onset as most of the
League's member states were perceived by Morocco to be
sympathetic to Algeria. In this atmosphere, the personal
initiative of the Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Salassie and
of the Malian President, Modiba Keita, were successful(48).
It should be noted that the provisional Secretariat of the
OAU had been entrusted to the Ethiopian government. The
Emperor's personal initiative was, therefore, strengthened,
since he continued his efforts both in his personal capacity
and also on behalf of the OAU. The Bamako Summit meeting
marked a turning point in the evolution of the OAU's role
in achieving an African peaceful settlement to the
Algerian-Moroccan. border dispute. Prior to the Bamako
Summit meeting, a fundamental legal issue had arisen as to
whether the dispute should be submitted to the UN or to the
OAU. On the one hand, Morocco had.claimed its right to
submit the dispute to the UN(49), since it had reservations
about the provisions of the OAU Charter concerning the
maintenance of the imposed colonial boundaries in Africa(SO).
(48)Hassouna,'Hussein, Ope Cit, p.218
(49) .Okoye, Felix Chuks, Ope C1t, p.148
(SO)Morocco did not participate in the Ministerial and Summit
Conference which established the OAU, objecting to
Mauritanian participation which was claimed by Morocco. It
did not sign the OAU Charter until September 1963, and then
recorded reservations on the question of boundaries.
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Moreover, Norocco's absence at the founding conference of
the OAU in Addis Ababa resulted in her diplomatic isolation
in Africa(51). However, the Moroccan reluctance to
seek an African settlement of the dispute had made the
Algerian position very strong. The OAU Charter provides
that member states undertake to settle all disputes among
themselves by peaceful means within the OAU machinery(52).
Morocco also recorded reservations concerning the 1964
Cairo resolution of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State,
which adopted the principle that the territorial status
quo on the day of independence constituted a tangible
reality(S3). Therefore, the Moroccan position was not
likely to gain support at the OAU forum. The strength
of Algeria's case was also based on the principle of
uti possidetis, coupled with the general sympathy gained
through the war for national liberation so recently
conducted(54). The African members of the OAU also
recognised the utter incompatibility of Moroccan irredentism
with the principles of the OAU Charter. On the other hand,
Algeria had from the onset, agreed that it was within the
competence of the OAU to deal with the dispute. It would
appear that Morocco had not found sufficient support
among the permanent members of the UN Security Council(55)'
(51)wolfers, ~fichael,Politics in the OAU, Methuen & Co. Ltd.,
London, ~, pp.3-4
(52)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Article III(21,
pp.l0-1l
(53)Browniie, Ian, Ope cii, pp.360-361
(54)Wolfers. ~lichael,Ope 'Cit,p.4
(55)Bowett, D.A., The UN and Peaceful Settlement, Report of
a Study Group of the David Davis Memorial Institute of
International Studies, Europa Publications, London, 1970
.180-182 ----,
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against Algeria's assertion that the appropriate machinery
of the OAU had not yet been exhausted(56). Here it should
be noted, that the dispute was endowed with a dual
~egional and international character, insofar as the part~es
to it were both members of the two organisations. lIence,
it might be argued that the non-intervention of the UN
stemmed from the fact that the dispute was between parties
to regional arrangements. Therefore, the UN Security
Council in conformity with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter,
had to encourage the peaceful settlement of the,dispute
through existing regional arrangements(57). This fact
in itself and loloroccansatisfaction with the African
mediatory team, had influenced her to accept the OAU's
jurisdiction. The conservative inclination of the
Ethiopian Emperor probably encouraged J.loroccoto do so.
It was notable that relations between l-Ioroccoand Mali
had cooled considerablY'since the withdrawal of Mali from
the common front against l-Iauritania. Nevertheless, Mali's
past association with Morocco apparently encouraged her
to assume that its argument against the existing Sahara
(56) . .This practice had been used 1n the Guatemalan compla1nt
of 1954 against the United States in which the USA argued
that the UN Security Council had no jurisdiction to discuss
the Guatemalan complaint until Guatemala had exhausted the
corresponding machinery of the OAS. The USA succeeded
to the extent that the motion to put the Guatemalan complaint
on the agenda of the UN Security Council failed to receive
the necessary seven affirmative votes.
(57)Bowett, D.W., Ope Cit, p.189-192
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boundaries imposed by France would meet with sympathy(58).
Against this background, the leaders of Algeria and
Morocco accepted, on October 26th 1963, an invitation from
the Halian President to hold a Sununit meeting at Bamako
with the Ethiopian Emperor. The Bamako Summit meeting
was held on October 29th and 30th, 1963 and at its
conclusion the four heads of state signed an agreement
providing for the following points:-
(1) An immediate end of hostilities, to come into
force on November 2nd, 1963 at zero hour;
(2) the establishment of a ceasefire commission
consisting of Algerian, Ethiopian, Halian and Moroccan
military officers, which wou.Ld define a demilitarised
zone, as well as supervise security and military
neutrality in the aforesaid zone;
(3) an it~ediate extraordinary meeting of the
OAU Council of Hinisters to be held at Addis Ababa in
order to set up an ad hoc commission with a mandate
to examine the border dispute, as well as to bring
about a mutually acceptable solution;
(4) all press and radio campaigns to cease on
November 1st, 1963. Strict observation of the principles
of non-interference in each other's internal affairs and
of peaceful settlement of all African disputes within an
African framework as envisaged by the OAU Charter(S9).
(S8)Algeria could find reason to feel satisfied with the
mediating team. The Halian President had recently proclaimed
support for the principle of status quo in addition to Malian
withdrawal from the Moroccan common front against l-iauritania,·
as well as terminating its dispute with the latter state.
~Iali was also seeking Algerian co-operation in its efforts co
control the nomadic dissidents, whilst the Ethiopian position
was of strong opposition to the redrawing of African borders.
(S9)Berhanykum, Andemicael, Op. Cit, p.Sl
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It should be noted that in spite of the contribution
of the Bamako Summit to the maintenance of peace,
hostilities between Algeria and Horocco continued
sporadically, even after the signing of the agreement.
Unfortunately, each side accusing the ot~er of violation,
thus.Horoccan authorities announced an Algerian attack
on Figuig and declared that its troops would not be with-
drawn from Hassi-Beida and Tinjoub. The Algerian
authorities simultaneously announced that the Moroccan
troops had attacked Beni-Oueif on Algerian territory.
At the same time, Algeria reiterated its position that
its troops would engage Horoccan troops in battle only
in case of legitimate self-defence. Accordingly, Algerian
troops had approached Figuig in consequence of Noroccan
incursions near Tindouf(60). In addition to these
skirmishes, it would appear that there was a mutual
misunderstanding among the two states in dispute, as to
the provisions of the Bamako agreement. .Algerian
authori ties assumed that the l-foroccans would evacuate
Hassi-Beida, as well as Tinjoub, while Moroccan
authorities asserted that these frontier posts were
Moroccan and Horoccan troops would not be withdrawn
from J.loroccan territory. Under these circumstances,
any success of the Bamako cease fire commission in
establishing a demilitarised zone, was a highly difficult
task, thus, conditions contributed towards resumption of
(60) Hassouna, Hussein, Ope Cit, p.220
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hostilities in the disputed areas. Thus, Morocco again pressed for
a UN hearing. It notified the UN Secretary General of the most
recent hostilities but it did not officially request a meeting
of the UN Security Council(61), after discouragement of such a
course by some permanent members, who urged Horocco to abide
by the Bamako agreement(62), and hoped that the conflict ,~ould
be settled by peaceful means within the OAU's context. An
extraordinary meeting of the OAU Council was held in Addis Ababa
on November 15th, 1963. This meeting had been convoked after
two-thirds of the member states had accepted the Bamako
proposal(64).
(61):t-tayer,David, The OAU Conflict :t-Ianagement,JIO, Volume 20,
1966, p.354
(62)The request of the UN Security Council's permanent members
to Morocco to abide by the Bamako agreement was made to prevent
an East-West confrontation over the Algerian-Moroccan conflict.
The East-'iest attitudes to the Algerian-Moroccan dispute were
unlike the ltIoroccan-Hauritanianconflict. In the latter, the
Eastern bloc powers supported the Moroccan thesis, while the -
West recognised Mauritania's sovereignty. But in the Algerian-
Moroccan conflict, both the United States and the Soviet Union
formally adhered to neutrality and refrained from taking
positions on the merits of this dispute. The \vestwas
irritated by Algeria's flirtation with the East, but anxious
not to strain relations any further. On the other hand, the
East accepted the official Algerian thesis that the war was a
Western attempt to dismember Algerian territorial integrity.
(63) .The meeting was addressed by the Eth10pian Emperor who
welcomed the fact that an African dispute was about to be
settled through the OAU machinery. The Emperor also stated
that the African Heads of State and Government had agreed to
the peaceful settlement of border disputes within the OAU
machinery when they had ratified the OAU Charter.
(64)Lyon. Peter, Regional Organisation and Frontier Disputes,
The International Regulation of Frontier Disputes, Edited by
Evan Luard, Thames & Hudson, London, !2ZQ, pp.131-132.
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The legal basis of the Council meeting was Article XII(2)
of the OAU Charter which provides that "••••the Council
of ~linisters shall meet in an extraordinary session upon
the request of a member state and the approval of two-
thirds of all member states(6S).n On the eve of the.
meeting, the Noroccan delegation apparently feared that
the outcome would be incompatible with Horoccan interests(66).
The Council of ~linisters quickly dissipated any fear that
it might deal unfairly with Morocco when it decided to
adopt the Bamako agreement as the basis of its deliberation.
The Council invited the Algerian and ~Ioroccan delegates to
present their respective cases. Initially, }wrocco stated
that it had well-founded territorial claims based upon a
number of treaties, including the 1961 agreement with the
then Provisional Algerian Government, in addition to the
claim that the boundaries in the disputed areas were not
merely ill-defined but were, in fact, non-existent.
Algeria, on the other hand, based its territorial claim
on the principle of the status quo. This principle was
enshrined in the OAU Charter, as well as, the principle
of territorial integrity and all OAU member states had
pledged themselves to observe it scrupulously. Moreover,
the boundary near Tindouf, object of Moroccan claims,
was clearly defined. Only the combat areas near
(6S)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Article XII(2),
Ope Cit, p.13
(66)The Morocc~n Foreign Hinister, en route to the meeting,
stated that the Moroccan Government accepted the OAU forum
in order to avert war with Algeria. He also expressed the
hope that t.heJ.loroccancase would meet with reasonable
understanding, in spite of the anti-1>Ioroccanbias of most
African states.
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Hassi-Beida and Tinjoub lay along an undefined frontier.
The Algerian delegate stressed the imperative necessity
to settle the aforesaid undefined frontier by peaceful
means within a strictly OAU framework(67). It should be
noted that most other member states refrained from
deliberating substances of the issue involved in the
border dispute. Eventually, the Council adopted a
resolution on November 18th, 1963, in whdch it reaffirmed
the determination of the OAU member states always to seek
pacific settlement to their differences, within OAU
institutions(68). In this respect, the Council confined
itself to the task assigned to it by the Bemako
agreement(69). It had established an"ad hoc commission(70)
with a mandate to bring about a mutually acceptable
solution to the border conflict. The Council designated
Ethiopia,the Ivory Coast, Hali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan
and Tanganyika to serve on the ad hoc commission. As far
(67)Touval, Saadia, Ope Cit,pp.257-259
(68)LYOn. Peter, Ope Cit, p.32
(69)The Moroccan delegation considered the Council's
acceptance of the Bemako agreement as a victory for
Morocco. In addition, the establishment of an ad hoc
commission for the purpose of settling the border dispute
meant support for the Horoccan thesis that no boundary
existed in the disputed areas. Horeover, the l-loroccans
discerned that their fears with respect to OAU inter-
vention had been unfounded. Therefore, they were greatly
reassured as to the possibility of achieving a mutually
acceptable solution to the conflict.
(70)The commission of Hediation, Conciliation and
Arbitration foreseen in Article XIX of the OAU Charter,'
had not yet been established at that time. Therefore,
the Council decided to set up the ad hoc commission
foreseen in the provision of the Bemako agreement to
function as the projected commission.
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as the terms of reference were concerned, it was agreed
that the mandate of the ad hoc commission should conform
to the provisions of the Bemako agreement. Consequently,
-the OAU ad hoc commission and the ceasefire commission
had parallel' functions. Concerning this, the commission
of Hcdiation, Conciliation and Arbitration, foreseen in
Article XIX of the OAU Charter, had not yet been
established and it had been agreed that the ad hoc
commission was to function as the projected commission of
Hediation, Conciliation and Arbitration as it was proposed
to function in future(71). According to the Bemako
agreement, the OAU Council of ~Iinisters was .requested to
set up a ~Iediation commission in order to wor-k out a
peaceful settlement to the Algerian-Horoccan border
dispute. In the meantime, the Bemako ceasefire Commission
would continue to fulfil a peace-keeping function(72).
It should be noted that the peace-keeping function of
the Bemako cease fire commission was undermined by the
persistence of sporadic hostilities along the Algerian-
Moroccan frontiers. In spite of this fact, the commission
succeeded in maintaining a ceasefire, but had not been
able to establish a demilitarised zone. Thus, Algerian
troops remained entrenched in the vicinity of Figuig,
whilst the Horoccans persisted in their objection to
evacuate Hassi-Beida and Tinjoub. It appeared, therefore,
(71)Wild. Patricia Berko, Ope Cit, p.32
(72)Ibid Ope Cit, p.31
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that the task of establishing a demilitarised zone
would have to be taken up by the OAU ad hoc commission,
since the latter was responsible to effect a mutually
acceptable solution to the conflict. The OAU ad hoc
commission, however, rejected the idea at its first
meeting on December 2nd, 1963, held in Abidjan, Ivory
It decided that its first duties were to
determine the basic causes of the border dispute and to
submit a concrete proposal to the parties in dispute
for its definitive settlement. The commission met for
a second time on January 23rd, 1964 at Bemako where it
accepted documents presented by the two member states
in dispute and also presided over an exchange of
documents between the disputants(74). By early February,
1964, there had been a slight improvement in relations
between the concerned states. Accordingly, diplomatic
relations were resumed, but the exchange of ambassadors
had been postponed at the behest of Algeria(7S) •. The
ceasefire commission had been successful in achieving
a ceasefire, as well as in establishing a demilitarised
zone. This relative success of the ceasefire commission
gave the OAU considerable credit as a regional organisation
(73)The meeting was addressed by the President of the Ivory
Coast, who advised the OAU ad hoc commission to accord
priority to the task of maintaining peace and security
along the Algerian-Moroccan frontiers.
(74)A1geria had made the resumption of diplomatic relations
dependent upon the evacuation of Moroccan troops from
Hassi-Beida and Tinjoub, in addition to a Moroccan warrant
of proper treatment for Algerian citizens residing in
Morocco. Algerian troops were not to be withdrawn from
the vicinity of Figuig until the above conditions were
satisfied.
(7S)Wild. Patricia Berko, Ope Cit, pp.32-33
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capable of maintaining peace and security in the
continent. With the task of establishing a demilitarised
zone accomplished, the ceasefire commission was dissolved in
April 1964 by mutual agreement of the states concerned(76).
It did not·continue to supervise observance of the de-
militarised zone as originally envisaged .in the Bemako
agreement. Presumably, this dissolution was made possible
by the progress of direct negotiations between the Algerian-
Moroccan leaders at Cairo in 1964 at the Arab League Summit
Conference(77). Subsequently, the Algerian and Moroccan
governments simultaneously announced that they had signed
an agreement on February 20th, 1964 which provided for
the termination of the dispute as well as for resumption
of diplomatic relations(78). Moreover, they agreed
that Algerian troops were to be withdrawn from Figuig
while the Moroccans would withdraw to the positions
which they occupied before October 1st, 1963. Furthermore,
the strategic highlands near Figuig would be demilitarised
and a no-manls-Iand would be established along the border.
Nevertheless, its exact delimitation was not made public.
The fate of the Tindouf region was to be settled by the
OAU ad hoc commission. As far as the OAU efforts at
(76)Hassouna, Hussein, Ope Cit, pp.222-223
(77)The border conflict was not officially discussed at
the Arab League Summit Conference. The meeting only
provided the opportunity for a series of private
negotiations on the issue between Algerian and Moroccan
leaders.
(78) .Hassouna. Hussein, Ope Cit, p.222
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mediation were concerned, conclusion of the February 20th,
1964 agreement had been facilitated by the Bemako cease-
fire commission, as well as by the OAU ad hoc commission.
The Algerian-}!oroccan aut~orities expressed satisfaction
with the OAU effortsat mediation and revealed that the
agreement had been signed in the presence of the Bemako
ceasefire commission(79). Under these circumstances,
the OAU ad hoc commission set up a joint committee at
ambassadorial level which was due to meet on May 29th,
On the eve of the committee's scheduled
meeting at Bemako, it was announced that the two
member states in dispute had agreed upon the following
points:-
••••(1) free passage of persons and property
between the two countries would be resumed;
(2) as of June 8th, nationals of the two
countries, who had been expelled from either country
during the hostilities of Autumn 1963, would return
to their previous domiciles;
(3) the victims of the events of Autumn
1963 would be compensated;
(4) the property of victims would be returned;
(5) all necessary assistance would be granted
to the victims so that they might resume their normal
activities and
(6) all restrictions placed by the governments
of either country on the liberty of nationals 9f the
other country would be lifted •••(81).
(79)Ibid pp.222-223
(80)1~ildJPatricia Berko, Qp. Cit, p.33
(81)Ibl.°dOpe Cit, p.33
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The OAU committee continued its regular meetings. It
met in Algeria on October 20th, 1964, thereafter in Rabat.
After these meetings the committee announced that it was
awaiting the final observations of_the disputants, before
submitting its final recommendation to the states concerned,
as well as to the OAU ad hoc commission. Under these
circumstances, it seemed that progress on the settlement
of the border dispute would best be achieved through
bilateral negotiations between Algeria and Morocco.
Accordingly, the OAU ad hoc commission decided to adjourn
its efforts at mediation for an indefinite time.
The Algerian and Horoccan leaders had privately agreed
at the sixth session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State
and Government in September 1968, not to appear as
disputants before the Assembly(82). Consequently, the
Algerian President paid an official visit to Horocco on
January 11th, 1969 where a treaty of solidarity and
co-operation was signed(83). It provided for the
establishment of a number of joint commissions of
experts that would meet regularly in order to implement
the provisions of the treaty. The two leaders met
again at Tlemcen, Algeria on J.lay27th, 1970 where they
agreed to settle the remaining outstanding points of
the border dispute between their countries(84).
(82)Africa Contemporary Record 1968-69. pp.618-625
(83)~ Ope Cit, p.69
(84)Africa Contemporary Record 1969-70, pp. B7-B8
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Horeover, they decided to establish a joint conunission
with a mandate to demarcate the border over the disputed
areas from Figuig to Tindouf. They also created an
Algerian-J.loroccan organisation in ord_er to study the
possibility of joint exploitation of mineral resources
in the Tindouf area(8S). Two years later, at the tenth
session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and
Government which took place in Rabat, l-Iorocco,the
Algerian-l>loroccan leaders concluded two agreements
on the border dispute and its related issues(86).
According to the first agreement, the Tindouf area
would remain part of Algeria, thereby the frontier line
would follow the de facto border inherited from the
French colonial administration. The second agreement
-dealt with the joint exploitation of mineral resources
in the Tindouf area, despite the fact that the area
had hitherto been exploited only by Algeria.
(85)
1£!2 Ope Cit, p. B7
(86)
Hassouna. Hussein, Ope Cit, p.228
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ASSESSr.tENT OF THE OAU EFFORTS AT ~tEDIATION IN THE
FIRST ISSUE
It would appear that this border dispute represented
the OAU first issue between two member states. The
dispute also gave rise to a protracted and complex series
of attempts at mediation by various quarters, in an
attempt to bring about a cessation of hostilities, as
well as a mutually acceptable solution to the border
dispute. The procedures.resorted to included direct
negotiations between the two states in dispute, as well
as offers of mediation from a number of Arab and African
heads of state. In addition to this, there were
efforts at mediation by the League of Arab states, since
the disputants belonged to both regional organisations.
As a matter of fact, it might be argued that the non-
intervention of the UN stemmed from the fact that the
dispute was between parties to regional arrangements.
In such a situation, the UN should initially, encourage
the peaceful settlement of the dispute through regional
arrangements, in conformity with Article 52(3) of the
UN Charter, which provides that •••••the Security Council
shall encourage the development of pacifi"c settlement
of local disputes through such regional arrangements
or by such regional agencies, either on the initiative
of the states concerned or by reference from the Security
Council(87).. At the same time, the continuation of
(87)Goodrich, Leland M. et al., Charter of the UN,
Commentary and Documents, Columbia University Press,
New York, 1969, pp.686-687
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armed conflict over a period of time constitutes a breach
of international peace and security in .the terms of
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter(88). Nevertheless, the
competence conferred upon the UN Security Council under
the Charter would have been determined by the provisions
of Chapter VII rather than of Chapter VIII(89). The
non-intervention of the UN could be explained by the
desire to exclude any extra-regional powers which might
result in involvement in the "cold war.n The absence
of a big power confrontation in the dispute resulted in
keeping the UN out of the scene.
As far as consideration of the dispute was concerned,
the parties to the dispute preferred a settlement within
the framework of the OAU rather than the League.
A comparison of the provisions of the League's draft
agreement and the Bameko agreement might lead to the
conclusion that these differences would have accounted
for the rejection of the League draft agreement. These
differences arose from the fundamental difference, of
which the Bameko agreement was the consequence, of direct
negotiation between the leaders of the two states in
dispute. The League draft agreement had formulated
prior to the holding of a meeting. Accordingly, the two
states opted for an OAU settlement rather than that of
the League and this probably stemmed from their preference
for the procedure and not from preference for the provisions
(88)~ pp.334-353
(89)nowett, n.w., Ope Cit, pp.189-192
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Moreover, the identity of the mediators seemed to have
been an important factor, favouring a settlement of the
dispute through the OAU. In this respect, the settle-
ment of African border disputes was of particular concern
to Ethiopia with parts of its territory the object of
territorial claims by Somalia. Therefore, Ethiopia"had a
special interest in taking the initiative to mediate in the
dispute, especially after the OAU headquarters being located
in the Ethiopian capital and the Ethiopian government had
been entrusted to run the Provisional Secretariat. Moreover,
states have a higher respect for the personal integrity of
a head of state than for an organ of international organisation,
on the grounds that representatives to such institutions, would
tend to reflect the policies of their various states. Further-
more, the territorial disputes between the OAU member states
received such attention from the African heads of state
at the founding Addis Ababa Summit Conference of 1963.
Consequently, explicit reference to the border conflicts
was placed in the OAU Charter(90). In this respect,
a pledge has been given by each member state to respect
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other
members(91). Accordingly, the OAU accepted the principle
of uti possidetis in the Assembly's resolution of 1964,
which stated that •••••the borders of African states on the
day of their independence constitute a tangible reality(92) ••
(90)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Article II{c)
Ope Cit, p.l0
(91)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Article III{J)Ope Cit, p.l1
(92)Brownliea Ian, Q2. Cit, pp.360-361
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As far as the mediating role was concerned, it
would be difficult to subscribe to the view that the
OAU was successful in handling the dispute. Nevertheless,
to the OAU should go the credit of co~tributing to the
achievement of an agreement between the states in dispute
and the settling of their differences within the OAU
framework. Horeover, by declaring its support for the
Bameko agreement, the OAU conferred its authority on
the observance of ~he terms of such an agreement.
Accordingly, the OAU brought the Bameko ceasefire
commission under its aegis which eventually succeeded
in bringing about a ceasefire, as well as, to define
a demilitarised zone. It should also be noted that the
OAU Council of ~linisters had dealt with the dispute
rather than the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and
Government. This development may indicate the
conclusion that the OAU Assembly functions as a
deliberative organ, whilst the OAU Council may have'
assumed the task of an executive one, with the authority
to take action in case of a breach of peace and security
in Africa. This conclusion should not be emphasised,
however, since the OAU Council consisted of ministers
appointed by the heads of state and the subsequent
approval by the latter of the Council's decisions(93).
Moreover, the procedure of convening an extraordinary
(93)OAU Cha~ter and Rules of 'Procedures, Article XII
Ope Cit, p.13
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session of the OAU Council in the Algerian-~roroccan border
dispute indicated another development which was not fore-
seen in the OAU Charter. According to Article XII(2)
of the OAU Charter which provides that "••••the Council of
Ministers shall meet at least twice a year. l\~en requested
by any member state and approved by two-thirds of all
member states, it shall meet in extraordinary session(94)."
In this connection, the extraordinary session of November
1963 was convened only after the two member states in the
dispute had signed their consent in the Bameko agreement
for such a session. It was notable that Algeria had
requested such an extraordinary meeting, but her request
had apparently been ignored. Moreover, the required consent
of two-thirds of all OAU member states may prove to be
a hindrance to the OAU's role in effecting peaceful
settlements to African regional disputes. It should also
be noted that the Algerian-~Ioroccan border dispute was
eventually settled by the process of direct negotiations
between the states concerned, as well as, assistance and
encouragement of the OAU. Consequently, the OAU adopted
the aforesaid procedure that substantive issues in any
African regional dispute be resolved through bilateral
negotiations rather than settling them itself. Nevertheless,
it may be assumed that the OAU should be an instrument
for the encouragement of such bilateral negotiation as
well· as for providing the forum where an agreement of
mutually acceptable solutions be ~oncluded between. the
member states in dispute.
(94)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Article XII(2)
Ope Cit, p.13
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THE SO}.1ALI-ETHIOPIANBORDER CONFLICT:
HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND LEGAL CONSIDERATION OF THE CONFLICT
The borders of the Horn of Africa were in a condition
of flux when the European po~ers commenced their colonisation
during the nineteenth century. Ethiopia was the only
existing state in the area at that time(l). The French,
the Italian and the British established stations along the
African coast of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, to
administer their colonies or protectorates in the region(2).
Between 1862 and 1885, France was active around the Gulf of
Tojura. It concluded a number of agreements with ~he
Sultans of Afar and Issa who agreed to alienate their
territories to the French government. In 1897 and 1898,
France also concluded two treaties, the first with the
British and the second with the Ethiopians, defining the
boundaries of her acquired territory(3). Between 1887
and 1896, Italy established protectorates over a large
sector of the African coast on the Indian Ocean in a
series of agreements concluded with the Sultans of Somali
tribes(4). In the meantime, Italy endeavoured to bring
Ethiopia into subjection(S), but Ethiopian efforts to
(I)Mariam,Mesfin Wolde. The Background of the Ethiop-
Somali_ Boundary Dispute, ~, Volume 2, 1964, p.196
(2)~ p.196
(3)Brownlie, Ian, African Boundaries, A Legal and Diplomatic
Encyclopaedia, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1979, p.7S3 & 769
(4)Ibid Ope Cit, pp.828-829
(S)In 1889 Italy and Ethiopia signed the Wachate Treaty.
Under it, Italy claimed Ethiopia as her protectorate, but the
treaty was abrogated by the Anglo-Italian Treaty of 1891
which defined their respective spheres and influence in
East Africa.
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maintain independence were successful. The outcome was
the need for frontier agreements which were concluded in
1908 and defined the boundary between Ethiopia and Italian
Somaliland(6). Nevertheless, the provisions ,of the treaty
proved impossible to apply, since the two parties had
adopted significantly different views of interpretation(7).
Between 1884 and 1886, Great Britain concluded a number of
agreements with the Sultans of Somali tribes along the
African coast of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden(8).
The first group of agreements signed in 1884 and 1885
provided for inter alia that the Sultans should permit
free access to British ships to the Somali coast(9).
These agreements also contained a covenant by the Sultans
of Somali tribes on behalf of themselves and their
successors that no portion of their territories should be
ceded or otherwise alienated to any fQreign power, except
the British government. The consequences of these
agreements were that a formal British protectorate was
eventually established in these territories. Nevertheless,
the precise extent of the protectorate was left uncertain
(6)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.827
(7)Mariam, Mesfin Wolde, Ope Cit, pp.197-198
(8) Brownlie, Ian, Op. Cit, p.827
(9) They also provided for assistance to be extended to
British ships in case of wrecking on the shores of their
territories and also to allow the appointment of British
agents within their domains.
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in consequence of the failure to produce written records
of the territories mentioned in the agreements which the
Somali tribes customarily inhabited, and which the Sultans
claimed to control(10}Therefor~, while the legality of
these agreements was never questioned, the scope of their
jurisdiction was in doubt from the outset. It was notable
that the territories of the protected Somali tribes ad-
joined Ethiopian territory and the grazing lands lay in
close proximity to areas over which the Ethiopian authority
claimed jurisdiction(II). In particular, a large section
of the Haud area and a portion later called the Reserved
area(12), which was inhabited by Somali tribes, but claimed
by Ethiopia as an integral part of its territory(13).
Despite the fact, the Ethiopian government no doubt took
advantage of unsettled status in the Horn and the adverse
consequence of the Anglo-Egyptian operation of 1897 in the
Sudan, and made excessive territorial claims against the
territories of the Somali tribes(14). The outcome of
these territorial claims was a treaty concluded in 1897
defining the frontier between Ethiopia and the British
Somaliland(IS). In this respect, the Sultans of the
(10)Brown. Latham D.J., The Ethiopian-Somaliland Frontier
Dispute, l£1Q, Volume 5, !ii2, pp.246-248
(11~lariam. Hesfin Wolde, Ope Cit, pp.198-208
(12)The term Reserved Area came into use after the liberation
of Ethiopia from the Italians in 1941, which thereafter,
received a formal sanction in the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty
of 1944.
(13~lariam. Nesfin Wolde, Ope Cit, p.211
(14)B~own. Latham D.J~, Ope Cit, p.249
(IS)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.821
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Somali tribes were neither represented or consulted, despite
the provisions which provided for the transfer of territories
in which their tribes habitually moved, in order to graze
their herds. It would appear that before the frontier
had been delimited by the Exchange of Notes, the British
government realised that certain of the Somali tribes
would be brought under Ethiopian jurisdiction by reason
of the territorial adjustment(16). It would also appear
that this would be contradictory to the British under-
taking in the 1884 and 1885 agreements with the Sultans
of the Somali tribes, which provided that no section of
their territories were to be ceded or alienated to any
foreign power, except to the British government(17). The
two principal territories concerned were the Haud and the
Reserved Area, which were the main grazing lands of the
Somali tribes. The territory of the Reserved Area lies
largely outside the Ogaden, but in deep close to the
Ethiopian frontier and adjacent to the boundary of French
Somaliland. The Haud territory lies partly in the British
Soma1i1and and partly in the Ogaden(18). Thus, these
territories were passed into Ethiopian jurisdiction in
conformity with the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1897(19).
It should be mentioned here, that the British undertakings
in the 1897 treaty were contradictory to their under-
takings in the previous agreements with the Sultans of the
(16)~ pp.843-851
(17)Brown, Latham D.J., Op. Cit, p.246
(18)~ pp.252-253
(19) .Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.827
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Somali tribes. Notwithstanding, the legal conclusion was
that the 1897 treaty was an international instrument,
whereas the 1884 and 1885 agreements were not, because the
1897 treaty had been concluded between two sovereign states
and was, .therefore, regarded as binding by virtue of its
supreme status in international law. Horeover, the 1884
and 1885 agreements with the Sultans of the Somali tribes
neither prescribed any definite territorial arrangements
nor intended to define the tribal territories. In contrast,
the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1897 was explicitly concluded
to delimit the frontier between Ethiopia and the British
protectorate. It might be argued that the protected
Somali Sultans had previously covenanted not to alienate'
their territories to any foreign powers, except to the
British government. Hence, it was not within the
competence of the British g~vernment to transfer these
Somali territories to Ethiopian jurisdiction. In this
respect, the creation of the Italian protectorate over
Ethiopia in 1935 did something to clarify the position of
these detached territories of the Somali tribes. Italy
separated the Ogaden region from the Ethiopian territory
and incorporated it into its Somaliland(20). It would
seem to suggest that Italy acted initially as the de facto
and subsequently as the de jure successor to Ethiopia.
However, when Ethiopia was liberated on January 31st, 1942
(20)
1>fariam,l-tesfinWalde, Ope Cit, pp.197-198
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by the British, a military pact was signed which provided
that the Ogaden territory incorporated into the former
Italian Somaliland should, during the currency of this accord,
remain under British military administration(21). Nevertheless,
the military pact neither questioned the Ethiopian sovereign
right over the Ogaden territory, nor did it modify the
recognition which Great Britain had previously accorded to
Ethiopia in 1897. Thus, the military pact of 1942 was a
temporary arrangement. It was superseded by a treaty
concluded in December 1944 by which Ethiopia agreed, for
the duration of the treaty, that the Ogaden should be
placed under British military administration(22). Thereupon,
this treaty extended the British military administration
in Ethiopian territory to the whole of the Ogaden(23).
Despite the British military administration, the treaty
recognised that the sovereignty of the entire designated
territory remained vested in Ethiopia(24). Hence, the British
military administration was thus a temporary arrangement.
Consequently, Ethiopia approached Great Britain in
conformity with the provisions of the 1944 treaty, for the
redemption olthe Ogaden to its own jurisdiction. In the
course of negotiations between Great Britain and Ethiopia
(21)noskyns. Catherine, Case Studies in_African Diplomacy 2,
The Ethiopian-Somali-Kenya Dispute 1960-61, Oxford University
Press, Dar-el-Salaam, Tanzania, .!.2&.2., p.9
(22)Brown. David J.t., Recent Development in the Ethiopian-
Somaliland Frontier Dispute, 1&1Q, Volume 10, !22!, pp.167-172
(23)The Ogaden was the main traditional grazing land of the
.Somali tribes which was transferred to Ethiopian jurisdiction
by the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1897.
(24)The 1944 treaty ~as made without prejudice to Ethiopian
sovereignty over the territory, and the British military
administration could, in fact, be terminated by either
party at three months' notice.
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the British endeavoured to effect changes in the conditions
laid down by the 1897 treaty(~5). They proposed the
possible exchange to Ethiopia, by which Great Britain would
grant Ethiopia direct access to the Red Sea while allowing
the British administration to remain permanently in charge
of the Ogaden. This proposal was rejected by Ethiopia(26).
Subsequently, attempts were made by Great Britain to lease
the Ogaden, or alternatively, to extend the status quo,
but these endeavours were also unsuccessful. Under these
circumstances, Ethiopia informed Great Britain that it
wished to resume the full exercise of her sovereignty in
the Ogaden region. Accordingly, the negotiations resulted
in the conclusion of the 1954 treaty(27) in London, which
(25)~~. Ernest Bevin, the then British Foreign Secretary,
proposed that the Ethiopian territories of the Ogaden
should be lumped together as a UN Trusteeship territory
under British administration. This proposal was initially
rejected by Ethiopia and, subsequently, by both the United
States and the Soviet Union at the Paris Conference.
(26)
The contemplated federation between Ethiopia and Eritrea
proposed at the UN by some permanent members, added the
coast of Eritrea to Ethiopian territory. Therefore, the
point of the British possible exchange, so far as the
Ethiopians were concerned, lost its significance.
(27)
The conclusion of this agreement had given rise to
widespread feeling among the Somalis who despatched a
delegation to meet the British Secretary of State for the
Colonies, in order to deliver a protest against the
Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1954. The delegation also
requested a postponement of the implementation of the
treaty. Nevertheless, the British Secretary informed the
delegation that his government had to honour her inter-
national obligations under international law, therefore,
compliance with the request would be in contradiction
with our international commitments.
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provided for the termination of British military adminis-
tration in the territories designated as the Haud and
Reserved Areas in the Ethiopian Ogaden region(28). The
1954 treaty also reaffirmed the position created by the
1897 treaty regarding the grazing rights with a number of
minor additions(29). Hence, the Ethiopian sovereignty over
the Haud and Reserved Areas established by the legal regime
of the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1897, had been formally
recognised once more. Despite the fact, those territories
were used predominantly by a number of British-protected
tribes from Somaliland. However, the guarantee of the
grazing rights envisaged in the 1897 treaty had been secured
once more by the 1954 treaty. Notwithstanding, circumstances
might arise which could lead to the complete loss of these
pastures. During the Second World War, Great Britain
maintained a military administration in the Italian Somali-
land and Italy renounced its title under the terms of the
Italian Peace 'Tre~ty of 1947(30). Subsequerrt.Ly, the
Allies agreed to place the former Italian Somaliland under
the UN Trusteeship, leading to eventual independence. In
this connection, Italy made a request to the UN to return
to Somalia as an administering power, under the supervision
(28)
Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p;843
(29)
For instance, the precise manner of exercising the rights
of migration, grazing and watering which had been regulated
for the benefit of the Somali tribes.
'(30)
Hoskyns, Catherine, Ope Cit, pp.9-10
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of the UN Trusteeship so that the proper development would
not be interrupted. This proposal received strong support
from the permanent members of the UN Security Council,
particularly from the United States and the Soviet Union(31).
To this effect, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution
endorsing the Italian request and also laid down the
general principles for settling the frontier problem
between Somalia, under the Italian administration, and
Ethiopia(32). The initial step in this direction was to
engage in direct negotiation between the two states in
dispute. This step should be followed by mediation and
arbitration in case.bilateral negotiations failed.
Nevertheless, the two parties had adopted significantly
different views of interpretation, thereby Somalia inherited
the boundary problem from Italy and Great Britain when it
became independent on July 1st, 1960, including in its new
borders, the former Italian Trust Territory and British
Somaliland(33). This unification also stimulated the ethnic
and territorial designs by a pan-Somali policy which were
suddenly equipped with an instrument potentially capable of
bringing them to fruition. To Somalia, therefore, the
dispute with Ethiopia is more than a question of title to
(31)
Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.821 and p.889
(32)
~iariam, ~Iesfin Wolde, Ope Cit, pp.208-216
(33)Lewis, I.M., Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism, ~,
Volume I No. 1-4, ~, pp.151-152
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some grazing lands. It is an issue involving the unification
of all Somali peoples under one flag and within one
territorial unit(34). Under these circumstances, the
emergence of Somalia in 1960 was a signal for territorial
dispute which became more inflamed. It would appear that
neither Somalia nor Ethiopia had been entirely satisfied with
the treaty arrangements of 1897 and 1954(35). On the one
hand, to the Ethiopians, the Somali tribes had often re-
presented a disorder in their territory during the annual
visit to the grazing lands(36). On the other hand, to the
Somalis, the 1897 treaty had surrendered to Ethiopia,
territory which long before the creation of the British
protectorate in Somaliland, was inhabited by Somali tribes.
Moreover, neither of these treaties were concluded with
the Sultans of the Somali tribes - they were not even
consulted(37). Thus, the Ethiopian government had announced
that as from the day of Somalia's independence, it would
regard the provisions of the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of
1954 relating to the grazing rights of Somali tribes,
as invalid(38). It would seem that Somalia could not
(34)The five-pointed stars on the Somali flag represent
the Northern and Southern regions of the present Republic
of Somalia, as well as the unredeemed Northern province of
Kenya, the Ogaden province of Ethiopia and Djibouti
(the former French Somaliland is now an independent sovereign
state). These three entities are largely Somali in
population.
(35)Lewis. I.M., Op Cit,
(36)]'Iariam.Mesfin 'Yolde, Ope Cit, pp.211-213
(37) D . °d J L 0 Cit 171 172Brown. aV1 •• , ~p~.~=-, pp. -
(38)~ Ope Cit, p.169
pp.152-154
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succeed to rights effecting the Ethiopian territory which
under the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1954, had been obtained
by Great Britain as sovereign over the former British
Somaliland. It would also appear from the Ethiopian
announcemen~ that the 1897 frontier delimitation was
capable·of surviving a succession of states in former
British Somaliland. Nevertheless, the grazing rights
were not capable of surviving the establishment of a
sucessor state without a fresh arrangement between the
successor state and Ethiopia. Accordingly, the position
assumed by Ethiopia was that it would prepare to respect
the grazing rights, provided that Somalia should likewise
respect the 1897 frontier delimitation. The Somali
position had been from the onset that it would not accept
the 1897 boundary, which allocated to Ethiopia, territory
that had for years been used by the Somali tribes(39).
Therefore, the dispute with Ethiopia was not a question of
title to some grazing rights, it was an issue which involved
title to large tracts of territory which had been recognised
by the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1897, as Ethiopian(40).
It should be noted that in the event of a succession of
states, not all rights and duties of the predecessor pass
(39)
OIConnell. O.P., State Succession in Municipal Law and
International Law, The University Press, Cambridge,12&1, p.283
(40)
It has already been mentioned that during the period
when Ethiopia was an Italian protectorate, the Italian
government adjusted the boundary.between Ethiopia and
Italian Somaliland. Thus, territory formerly within the
Ethiopian sovereignty but predominantly inhabited. by Somalis,
was added to the former Italian Somaliland. Presumably,
Somalia would today like to see a similar adjustment of
the border with Ethiopia.
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to the successor(41). Consequently, rights and obligations
which derive their effect from international treaties
between the predecessor and a third state, do not survive
the succession. The exception to this norm is to be found
where such rights and obligations possess description of -
a r'eal nature' or quality(42). Thus, real rights and
obligations are usually concerned with title to, or the use
of, territory such as the delimitation of frontiers or
rights of transit(43). Accordingly, they have territorial
quality which endows them with a degree of permanence
greater than those than those attached to rights and obligations
in rem(44). In this connection, rights in rem attach to
objects which bind all legal persons in relation to those
objects, but they do not possess the quality of permanence(4S).
Consequently, where the inhabitants of one territory are
permitted to exercise certain rights, in another territory
this would be judged on whether they are rights in rem, or
have been a real nature or quality. In this respect,
if rights are rights in rem, then they will remain in being
in spite of a change in the identity of sovereignty over
the territory, but fresh arrangements are required. Hence,
(41)
O'Connell, D.P., Ope Cit, pp.12-15
(42)
.!h.!!! pp.16-17
(43)
\fuiteman. J.rarjorie, Dip:est of International Law,
Volume 2, ~, pp.936-938
(44)
Okoye, Felix Chuks, Ope Cit, pp.95-100
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if the grazing rights established by the Anglo-Ethiopian
treaty of 1897 were to rank as rights in rem, they would
remain binding to the Ethiopian government despite the
change of sovereignty in former British Soma1iland, but
fresh arrangements between Somalia and Ethiopia were
required. It would also appear that if the frontier de-
limitation has established rights of a real nature or
quality, then Somalia would not be entitled to disregard
the frontier delimitation. Nevertheless, if anyone of
either Somalia or Ethiopia wishes to put an end to the
grazing rights or to the frontier delimitation, they were
able to do so, whatever the nature of the rights and
obligations, but had to be done by mutual consent.. It
would appear that it was the intention of the contracting
parties to the 1897 treaty to establish a permanent
settlement in relation to the frontier delimitation. This
intention could be in the fact that the 1897 treaty was
a boundary treaty. Horeover, the frontier delimitation
and the grazing rights concern lands and the use of title
to the land. The grazing rights allow the Somali tribes
to cross the Ethiopian border in order to enter the
grazing lands and make use of its resources. Therefore,
the grazing rights were necessary consequences of the
boundary settlements. This practice actually had been
conducted upon the occurrence of a state of succession in
Ethiopia after the Italian annexation in 1936(46). In this
(46)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.327
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respect, neither Great Britain nor Italy questioned the
legality of the general frontier delimitation set forth
by the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1897, but regarding the
grazing rights, the British government felt that it would
be necessary to negotiate a new treaty with the Italian
government. Consequently, a treaty was concluded, granting
grazing rights to Somali tribes, substantially similar to
those formerly enjoyed under the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty
of 1897(47). Ultimately, when the Ethiopian government
resumed control of its sovereignty, the British govern-
ment found it expedient to have the grazing rights re-
affirmed in the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1954(48). Despite
the British military administration that followed upon the
liberation of Ethiopia from the Italians, Great Britain
made no attempt to deny Ethiopian title to the territory
recognised as Ethiopian by the 1897 treaty(49). Accordingly,
the 1954 treaty which provided for the redemption of
Ethiopian administration, confirmed that the territory in
which the grazing rights were to be exercised by the
Somali tribes, had been Ethiopian(50). Therefore, when
the succession of states took place in relation to Ethiopian
territory, Great Britain, Italy and Ethiopia maintained
that the legal supposition that the boundary delimitation
of the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1897 was intended to be
(47)Ibid Ope Cit, p.889
(48)
Castagno, A.A.,' The Somali-Kenya Controversy: Implications
for the Future, J~~S, Volume 2, !22!, pp.169-170
(49)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit. p.888
(50)Ibid Ope Cit, p.889
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binding in perpetuity while the grazing rights envisaged
in the same treaty were intended to be rights of a less
enduring nature. Therefore, it would seem that the
frontier delimitation differs in nature and quality from
the grazing rights. It would also ,appear that Somalia
is legally bound to accept this frontier arrangement, but
is not necessarily entitled to insist on the observation
of the provisions relating to the grazing rights, unless
fresh arrangements are made with Ethiopia. At the same
time, Ethiopia is not legally bound in relation to Somalia
by the provisions of the 1897 and 1954 treaties relating
to grazing rights. Nevertheless, Ethiopia is not
completely at liberty to ignore an undertaking given to
the predecessor state. In any event, since independence
Somalia has refused to accept the 1897 frontier delimitation
between Ethiopia and the former British Somaliland. Against
this historical background, Somalia had conducted a
diplomatic 'and military campaign for revision of the de facto
frontier with Ethiopia(Sl). The purpose of these
campaigns was to unify the Somali people within a single
sovereign state. Eventually, when these campaigns failed,
the attitude changed to the argument that the people
concerned had the right to self-determination consistent
with the aims of the UN and the OAU(S2). The Ethiopian
attitude to Somali irredentist aspirations was apparent
(51)castagno, A.A., Somalia Goes Military, African Report,
Volume IS. No.2, February 1970, p.26
(52)Iloskyns, Catherine, Ope Cit, p.24
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in that Ethiopia was prepared to negotiate for peaceful
settlement to the border conflict so far as it is a
boundary issue, but strongly objected to the idea of self-
determination. It would appear that Ethiopia would not
entertain any proposition which would cause her to surrender
a considerable section of her territory. In fact,
Ethiopia is a very complex country with numerous religions
and linguistic groups, to which the idea of self-determination
would threaten to dismember not only Ethiopia, but other
African states which have religious and linguistic
minorities(53). Furthermore, Ethiopia has economic
and strategic considerations. The prospect of oil and
mineral resources in the Ogaden is obviously important.
Strategically, secession of the Ogaden region would remove
Ethiopia further away from the Red Sea and the Indian
Ocean. At the same time, this would bring Somalia
dangerously close to the Ethiopian highlands(S4). Therefore,
Somali irredentist aspirations are not simply a
territorial claim but a severe challenge to the principle
of status quo recognised by the OAU Charter(55). It would
seem that Ethiopia is willing to settle the border conflict
on the basis of existing international treaties concluded
between her on the one hand, and Great Britain and Italy
on the other(56). It has already been mentioned that
(53)African Research Bulletin, Volume 14, No.9, !2Z1,
pp.4556-4557
(S4)l-lariam.J.lesfin'\volde,Ope Cit, p.217
(55)cervenka, Zdenek, The Unfinished Quest for Unity,
Friedmann, London, 1977, pp.64-74
(56) .I-lar1am.J.tesfinWolde, Ope Cit, p.217
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Somalia from the outset, utterly refused to accept colonial
frontier arrangements on the grounds that such arrangements
had surrendered considerable Somali territories to
- Ethiopia and Kenya. Under these circumstances, Ethiopia
strengthened its military presence in the disputed areas
following Somalia's emergence as a united, independent state
on July 1st, 1960(51). Unfortunately, the end of 1960 was
marked by a series of incidents. The most serious one
occurred south of the de facto frontier(58). These incidents
occurred in consequence of the Ethiopian refusal to allow
the Somali tribes from the Republic to cross the border in
order to make use of the grazing rights(59). This led to
tribal skirmishes in the area, which were suppressed by
Ethiopian ground and air forces. This and other similar
incidents led Somalia to protest strongly to the Ethiopian
government and the situation was also brought to the UN
for consideration(60).
(51)
The Republic of Somalia has a very awkward shape,
roughly that of a reversed L. The Ogaden region of
Ethiopia forms a wedge between the former British and
Italian Somalilands. This shape makes communication
between the northern and southern regions of the
Republic a very difficult and expensive task.
(58)
Touval, Saadia, The Boundary Politics of Independent
Africa, Harvard University Press, ~1assachusetts, !211, p.216
(59)
Andemicael. Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.53
(60)
Touval, Saadia, Ope Cit, pp.216-211
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TIm SO~ULI-KENYAN BORDER CONFLICT:
HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND LEGAL CONSIDERATION OF THE CONFLICT
The boundary be twee n Somalia and Kenya is some
424_miles long(61). Between 1884 and 1897, Great Britain
securcd control over Somaliland and the East African
protectorates whd ch included the Somali-inhabited areas
of Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya(62).
The original delimitation between Italian Somaliland and
the British East African Protectorate (Kenya) was based
upon the Anglo-Italian treaty of 1891 which allocated the
sphere of influence to each power(63). However,
Great Britain and France had undertaken, in principle,
that in the event of their colonial territories being
increased in Africa at the expense of Germany, Italy in
return might claim some equitable compensation(64).
The outcome of this undertaking was the cession by Great
Britain of Jubaland, a part of Kenyan territory, to Italy
in 1925 by virtue of the Anglo-Italian treaty of 1924(65).
Nevertheless, Italy developed an expansionist strategy
(61)The area consists of a vast low plateau sloping from
a height of 2,000 feet east of Lake Rudolph towards· Lamu
on the Indian Ocean. The region is semi-desert, except
for the l>-Iarsakitmountain.
(62)The main reason why Great Britain extended her control
over Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District, was her
intention to provide a buffer between Italian Somaliland
and Ethiopia on one side, and her East African railway and
the white settlers in the highlands, on the other side.
(63)Brownlie. Ian, Op. Cit, p.889
(64)Ibid p.889
(65)Ibid p.889
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after occupying Ethiopia in 1935 to absorb the
Northern Frontier District into its Great Somalia scheme,
but was defeated in 1941, and Italian Somaliland was
administered by Great Britain until 1950(66). Subsequently,
it was relinquished to an Italian trusteeship administration
under UN supervision(67). Consequently, when the
succession of states took over, both Great Britain and Italy
maintained the legal supposition that the boundary de-
limitation of the Anglo-Italian treaties of 1891 and
1924 were intended to be binding in perpetuity. During
the Italian trusteeship, a Somali nationalist wave had
swept the Horn of Africa which was directed by the Somali
Youth League, established at ~logadishu in 1943. The SYL
established branches in the NFD of Kenya, the Ethiopian
region of the Ogaden and British and French Somaliland(68).
The cardinal aim of the SYL was to unify all Somali people
within a single, sovereign, independent Somali state. Under
these circumstances, the secessionist tendencies of the
Somali people in the NFD were intensified after the
unification of British and Italian Somaliland on July 1st,
The British colonial officials acknowledged
the separate identity of the Somali people in the NFD of
Kenya which is largely based upon religious, linguistic
(66)Castagno, A.A., Ope Cit, p.169
(67)Hoskyns, Catherine, Ope Cit, p.9
(68)Castagno, A.A., Ope Cit, p.173
(69)Ibid pp.181-182
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and cultural considerations. }loreover, they recognised the
uniqueness of the Somalis by establishing administrative
laws and techniques, different from those applied in the
Southern Pr~vinces of Kenya. In 1962, the NFD was
proclaimed a closed district in which local commissioners
were given exceptionally great powers(70). Subsequently,
the NFD was defined as a special district in which move-
ments of persons entering or leaving were restricted.
The Somalis in the NFD could not enter other Kenyan provinces
without special approval and, holders of visas to Kenya
were not entitled to visit the NFD without special
permission(71). The modern progressive techniques
applied elsewhere in Kenyan provinces were not developed
in the NFD, where a gap in economic and educational develop-
ment existed. Under these circumstances, the Somalis in
the NFD approached the Somali government to pass a motion
of support for self-determination of the people of the
NFD of Kenya. It was not until the 1962 London
constitutional Conference on Kenyan independence that
the Somali secessionist movement in the NFD received
official recognition from the Somali government(72). The
secessionist tendencies of the NFD were intensified shortly
after Kenyan authorities lifted the ban on the NFD political
parties. Immediately, two Somali parties were organised,
(70)
Lewis, I.M., Ope Cit, pp.155-158
(71) .
Castagno, A.A., Ope Cit, p.171
(72)
Hoskyns, Catherine, Ope Cit, pp.7-12
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the Northern Province People's Progressive Party and the
Northern Province Democratic Party(73). Both adopted
an irredentist stance and demanded secession from Kenya
and unificati~n with the Republic of Somalia. The two
parties, in a joint statement, requested the British
government to conduct a referendum in the NFD under UN
supervision, to decide the destiny of the Somalis in the
NFD of Kenya(74). This request was brought before the
Lancaster Constitutional Conference for Kenya's independence
in 1962. The NFD Somali delegation repeated their request
to the British government for a UN-sponsored plebiscite
and unity with Somalia(7S). The Somali government, through
her embassy in London, also requested from the British
government that the NFD issue be settled before Kenya's
accession to independence(76). The Kenyan delegation
categorically rejected the idea and the Ethiopian govern-
ment endeavoured to persuade the British government that
acquiescence to the Somali request would lead to'the
balkanisation of Africa(77). Under these circumstances,
the British government decided that it would appoint an
independent commission to ascertain public opinion in the
NFD regarding its future. The commission commenced its
investigation in the NFD in October 1962. The findings of
the commission confirmed that the vast majority of the
Somalis in the NFD desired secession from Kenya and unification
with Somalia(78). Despite this, the commission submitted
(73)castagno, A.A., Ope Cit, p.17S'
(74)Hoskyns, Catherine, Ope Cit, p.24
(75)Lewis. I.M., Ope Cit, p.1S6
(76)Castagno, A.A., Ope Cit, p.182
(77)Schwab, Peter, Cold War on the Horn of Africa, ~,
Volume 77, 1978, p.l0
(78)Lewis, I.M., Ope Cit, p.159
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a proposal to the British government for an administrative
division of the NFD. It proposed that the Somalis of
Garissa be organised in a newly-established seventh region,
while the Somalis of Isido be placed in the eastern
region(79). Subsequently, the constitutional arrangement
for Kenya, announced in ~Iarch 1963 by the British govern-
ment, provided for the creation of a new seventh region,
embracing the predominantly Somali area of the NFD(80).
This arrangement was interpreted as precluding the possibility
of subsequent Somali secession. Therefore, this was
received with anger and resentment by the Somalis of the
NFD and in Somalia. Indeed, the extent of popular feeling
in Somalia forced the Somali government to break off
diplomatic relations with Great Britain, and the Somalis
in the NFD refused to co-operate with the Kenyan authority(81).
This compromise was viewed by the Somalis as a further
injury in the long-standing tradition of British disregard
for Somali interests which commenced with the unfortunate
Anglo-Ethiopian. treaty of 1897. In response to the
circumstances, Somali nationalist movements began activities
aimed at secession of the NFD from Kenya and reintegration
of the region into the Republic of Somalia. Consequently,
riots and violence had swept the NFD since 1963, which
threatened Kenya's territorial integrity(82). The situation
deteriorated rapidly after the announcement of Soviet military
assistance to Somalia. In response to the Somalian armed
build-up, Kenya and Ethiopia concluded a mutual defence pact
in 1963 to counter the Somali military threat(83).
(79)castagno. A.A., Ope Cit, p.178 (80)~ Ope Cit, p.179
(81)Ibid Ope Cit, p.180 (82)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Op.Cit,p.53
(83)Castagnoz A.A., Ope Cit, p.181
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The third dispute that arose from Somali irredentist
THE FRENCH SOHALILAND (DJIBOUTI):
aspirations, was over French Somaliland. It is situated
between Ethiopia and Somalia and the ethnic composition of
Djibouti lends itself to interference by the country's
warring neighbours. The inhabitants are 35% Ethiopian,
ethnically Afars, and 55% Issa with ethnic ties with
Somalia(84). Ethiopia and Somalia had always laid claim
to the former French Somaliland. Ethiopia declared at
the height of the anti-colonialist upsurge in the former
French colony in 1966, that Djibouti was an integral part
of Ethiopia. However, Ethiopia informed the French
government that it preferred a continued French presence
in the disputed territory rather than see the strategic
enclave on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden fall into
Somali hands(85). On the other hand, the Somali claim
to French Somaliland was based on ethnic grounds in order
to forward Somali aspirations of Greater Somalia(8~).
Under these circumstances, Ethiopian and Somalian territorial
claims to French Somaliland led to a bitter row between
them in international and regional organisations. The
clashes commenced at the founding conference of the OAU
in 1963 when the Somali delegation demanded the right to
self-determination for ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia, Kenya
and French Somaliland(87). As far as French Somaliland
(84)New Africa, No.167, August 1981, p.31
.(85)Touval,Saadia, Ope Cit, p.226 •
(86)Hoskyns, Catherine, Op.Cit, p.9
(87)Touval, Saadia, Ope Cit, p.227
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was concerned, the OAU Liberation Committee placed the
question of French Somaliland on its agenda as an issue
of decolonisation(88). The OAU Liberation Committee was
_set up by the OAU Summit Conference, in order to co-ordinate
aid to liberation movements in colonial territories in
Africa(89). However, no action was taken by the OAU
Committee on the question of French Somaliland until 1965,
when a sub-committee was appointed to prepare a report on
the situation in the territory concerned. The sub-committee
visited Somalia and Ethiopia, but was refused permission to
enter French Somaliland. The liberation movements from
French Somaliland who were interviewed by the sub-committee
in Somalia, claimed that their aspiration was unification
with Somalia, while those in Ethiopia desired union with
Ethiopia(90). The OAU Liberation Committee, avoiding
involvement in the Somali-Ethiopian competition over the
territory, maintained that the future political status of
Djibouti should be decided by its people(91). The UN
Committee on Colonisation treated the issue on the same
lines as the OAU Liberation Committee(92). It should be
noted that the Ethiopia-Somali competition over French
Somaliland was greatly intensified in the wake of the
riots in 1966, during the visit of the French President
to the territory(93). Consequently, France pledged to
(88)Krishnan. Maya, Ope Cit, pp.212-213
(89)lh!£ Ope Cit, p.213
(90)Africa Contemporary Record 1968-62, pp.621-622
(91)Ibid p.622
(92)~enka. Zdenek, Ope Cit, pp.49-50
(93)Touval, Saadia, Ope Cit, p.227
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hold a referendum to decide the future of the territory.
In response to the existing circumstances, and on Somalia's
initiative, the question of French Somaliland was placed on
the agenda of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State which took
place in Addis Ababa in November 1966(94). The OAU Assembly
was deeply concerned about the conflicting attitudes
adopted by Somalia and Ethiopia. Somalia, supported by
the African radical states, pressed for an unequivocal
endorsement of Djibouti's independence, regardless of the
consequences. They also supported a proposal for a
plebiscite under UN and OAU supervision. The other view
at the OAU Assembly reflected the deep concern that the
withdrawal of France might result in a serious confrontation
between Somalia and Ethiopia(9S). The compromise resolution
that was finally adopted, stated that the OAU approved
France's decision to grant the people of Djibouti sel(-
determination by means of referendum and assured the people
concerned,· of OAU solidarity designed to bring about
independence(96). Somalia, in failing to obtain OAU
support, turned to the UN for a hearing. The UN General
Assembly passed a resolution on December 21st, 1966, and
African states divided on this issue, which called for a
referendum under its supervision(97). As expected,
(94)Ibid pp.228-229............
(9S)New Africa, Issue No.167, August 1981, p.31
(96)Africa Contemporary Record~ 1976-77, p. C146
(97)Africa Contemporary Record, 1968-69, p.266
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France ignored the call for international supervision
and the scheduled referendum was held" which resulted in
the approval of continued association with France(98).
The Somali-Ethiopian competition over the territor~
continued until the 12th Summit of the OAU Assembly of
Heads of State" which took place at Kampala" Uganda in
July 1975, at which Ethiopia and Somalia" mutually ended
their pretension to the French Somaliland(99). Accordingly"
the OAU Assembly adopted a resolution drafted by the
Liberation Committee" in which Ethiopia and Somalia
solemnly undertook to recognise, respect and honour the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Djibouti after
. :. t . d d (100) C tl th1tS acceSS10n 0 1n epen ence • onsequen y" e
last French colony in Africa gained its independence on
June 26th" 1977(101)and concluded a series of treaties
with France, including a military defence pact in order
to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity
against any contemplated aggression by either Ethiopia
or Somalia(102). It was admitted on June 7th" 1977 as
the forty-ninth member state of the OAU and on June 22nd"
1977 it was also admitted as the twenty-second member
state of the League of Arab States(103}.
( 98)Ibid p.265
( 99)~ca Contemporary Record, 1976-77" p. B429
(100)Ibid p. C145-
(101)African Research Bulletin" Volume 14, July 15th, 1971
p.4458
(102)Ibid pp.4458-4459- '
(103)New Africa" Issue No.167" August 1981, p.31
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THE OAU EFFORTS AT ~ffiDIATION:
The Somali-Kenyan dispute, as well as the Somali-
Ethiopian conflict over the Ogaden have always been thrust
upon the stage of Pan-African conferences since Somalia's
accession to independence. Somalia's search for political'
support encountered discouragement since most African states
officially, endorsed the status quo. The issue of Somalia's
irredentist aspiration, was initially raised at the first
Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo in 1957(104).
Somalia gained some support at that Conference with the
argument that all forms of colonialism over Somali-
inhabited territories, which by implication included
Ethiopia and Kenya, be eradicated(10S). Nevertheless,
the most significant support for Somalia's claim came
(104)
Egypt extended support to Somalia by military assistance
which was subsequently replaced by the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, the Egyptian sympathy with Somalia's territorial
aspiration was not officially endorsed and was therefore,
unsatisfactory and disappointing for Somalia. Nevertheless,
Egyptian sympathy was reciprocated by Somalia's identil-fication with the Arab cause. In this respect, Somal, a
successfully managed to secure an invitation to join the
League of Arab States in February 1974. The purposes of
Somalia's moves, were that the Arab League was good
conduit for OPEC aid and a new alliance in its eventual
confrontation with Ethiopia and Kenya. It should be
mentioned that OPEC aid has helped to reduce the economic
problems which faced Somalia, but the Arab League was more
concerned with its general relations with Africa than with
the war aims of one of its members. Accordingly, the Arab
League has remained reticent on the issue of Somali
irredentist aspiration.
(105)
Touval, Saadia, Ope Cit, pp.134-135
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at the second All-African People's Conference, held in
Tunisia in 1960, which endorsed the Somali struggle for
unity(106). Soon after this conference, African states
divided into moderate and radical groups. Somalia
initially associated itself with the moderates and--
participated in the ~ronrovian group conference in 1961(107).
However, Somalia did not obtain any satisfactory gains
at the conference. Therefore, soon after the first
Monrovian Conference, Somalia joined the Casablanca
group, where it had been reasonable to expect ~Ioroccan
co-operation in attacking colonialist-imposed
boundaries(108). Somali general opinion was also stated
at the OAU founding conference in Addis Ababa in May,
1963(109). Nevertheless, the conference from the outset,
\.
p.137
p.138
(108)
The marked change in Somalia's orientation occurred
after the official visit paid by the Somali President to
Ghana in October 1961. At the conclusion of the visit,
the final communique expressed the imperative need to
remove the existing frontiers, artifically imposed by the
colonial powers, without respect to ethnic, cultural or
economic ties. It should be mentioned here that Ghana's
position at that time would be explained as an expression-
of her strong commitment to radical Pan-Africanism and to
the reshaping of the map of the African continent. It was
also Ghana's irredentist claims, with respect to Togoland
and the Ivory Coast, which had influenced the then
Ghanaian position.
(109)
Tandon, Yashpal, The OAU as an Instrument and Forum of
Protest, edited by Rotberg and Mazrui, Protest and Power in
Black Africa, University Press, Oxford, .!.21.Q., pp.1161-1163
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stripped Somalia of all African support, thus making it
obvious that there were no chances of attaining Somali
objectives through the OAU, which had adopted the colonial
status quo in African boundary arrangements. Consequently,
Somalia has hitherto been reluctant to submit disputes
to the OAU. Under these circumstances, events in the
NFD of Kenya had been overshadowed by serious clashes
between Ethiopia and Somalia and the UN was requested
to intervene(ll0). When Kenya became independent in
December 1963, hostilities. broke out between Somali-
speaking groups in Kenya, and Kenyan troops. Similar
clashes between Somali-speaking groups in Ethiopia and
the Ethiopian troops also occurred in the Ogaden(lll).
This could be considered as a repercussion of the
hostilities in the NFD of Kenya, but the skirmishes in
the Ogaden led to intensive armed conflict between Somalia
and Ethiopia. It should be noted that as in the
Algerian-Moroccan border dispute, the first question to
arise was that concerning jurisdiction over the dispute.
It was obvious that the OAU commitment to the principle
of status quo made Somalia fear that it might be very
unsympathetic. Therefore, Somalia preferred the UN
to deal with the issue, rather than the OAU. On February 9th,
1964, Somalia requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security
(110)Meyers, David B., Ope Cit, p.llS
. (111)
Andemicael~ Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.S4
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Council, but the Somali request was not favourably received
by the permanent members of the Security Council in response
to African argument that the dispute should be first referred
to the OAU as a regional arrangement which should have
primary jurisdiction over African regional disputes(112).
Accordingly, the UN Secretary General persuaded Somalia
to accept the possibility of peaceful settlement through
the OAU machinery. Heanwhile, Ethiopia and subsequently
Somalia, requested the OAU Council of Ministers to consider
the matter at its extraordinary session, scheduled to meet
in February 1964 at Dar-el-Salaam, Tanzania(113). At the
same time, Kenya also requested the Council to place the
border dispute between her and Somalia on the agenda of
that session(114). Somalia, however, had only agreed
to submit the issues for limited consideration by the
OAU and it did not entirely abandon its original intention
to place the dispute before the UN Security Council(11S).
It would appear that Somalia did not wish to raise the
wide issues of its territorial aspiration before the OAU,
fearing that such a debate might turn to its disadvantage.
Therefore, Somalia requested the OAU Council to limit the
deliberation to the more immediate question of the dis-
engagement of regular armed forces. Somalia was concerned
that Ethiopia might react to Shifta activities in the
(112)Meyers, David B., Ope Cit, pp.116-117
(113)Touval, Saadia, Ope Cit, p.217
(114)Ibid p.218-
(11S)Thus, it had notified the UN Secretary General that
it was the desire of.the Somali government to suspend the
UN Security Council's consideration of the matter while
the issue was under OAU consideration.
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Ogaden by launching reprisals across the Somali territory.
Consequently, it concentrated on requesting the creation
of a demilitarised zone along the border and the posting
of neutral observers in the disputed areas(116). The
Somali intention was to obtain from such measures, an
implicit international recognition that the Somali-
inhabited regions of Ethiopia and Kenya were actually
disputed territories to which the international community
might have to turn its attention. Accordingly, these
objectives were more likely to be achieved through placing
the issue before the UN Security Council than by submitting
them to the OAU. On the other hand, Ethiopia and Kenya
insisted that the substantive issues be discussed, because
they expected that Somalia would find itself completely
isolated. Despite the animated discussion between the
parties to t~e disputes, the Council adopted a more
modest role than its previous one in regard to the Algerian-
Moroccan conflict(111). It appeared that peaceful settle-
ment to the dispute was going to be a lengthy and
complicated process. Therefore, no machinery was set
up to mediate the two disputes. The Council called
upon the parties to the dispute, to order an immediate
ceasefire and to refrain from hostile actions, as well as
to enter into direct negotiations in order to settle their
differences peacefully(118). It also called upon other
(116)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, pp.55-56
(111)Wild, Patricia Berko, Ope Cit, p.21
(118)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.54
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member states having official representations in the
three countries, to assist in the implementation of the
ceasefire(119). Subsequently, a ceasefire was negotiated
but hostilities resumed shortly afterwards. As a result,
the OAU Council decided to place the issues on the agenda
of its second ordinary session, scheduled to meet'in Lagos.
The Council appealed to the parties in the dispute to
implement its previous resolutions and requested them to
report on their negotiations to the OAU Assembly of Heads
of State. It also decided to keep the disputes on the
agenda of all subsequent sessions of the OAU Council,
until mutually acceptable solutions would be achieved(120).
It would appear that the role of the OAU Council in these
disputes had three aspects. Firstly, the application of
pressure on the disputants to end hostilities and to start
direct negotiations. The other two aspects were, the
discouragement to debate the merits of the disputes at the
OAU meetings and finally, the avoidance of direct invo1ve-
ment in the restoration of peace and the settlement of
disputes(121). The O!U role restricted to introduce
(119)
Meyers. David B., The OAU: Conflict Management by a
Regional Organisation, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of California, Los Angeles, !21J, p.117
(120)
Andemicael. Berhanykum, Ope Cit, pp.54-55
(121) ,
These tendencies can be illustrated by the attitude
of the OAU member states at the second ordinary session
of the OAU Council. They were reluctant to support
either Ethiopia's request for OAU pressure on Somalia
to renounce its irredentist claims against Ethiopia and
Kenya and accept existing boundaries, nor Somalia's
request for direct OAU peace-making efforts, such as
sending observers to supervise the ceasefire.
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regional rules which govern border disputes, thus emerged.
During the first ordinary session of the OAU Assembly of
Heads of State, reference was made to Article 1I1(3) of the
OAU Charter •••••respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity of member states· as a principle which Som~lia,
Kenya and Ethiopia had to take into account in their direct
negotiations(122). In a resolution approved by the OAU
Assembly, African leaders expressed the view that borders of
the African states on the day of their independence constituted
a tangible reality(123). Somalia joined by Morocco,
sought a major change of boundaries, accorded reservations
on the resolution and even declared that they would not be
bound by its provisions(124). It became quite obvious
for Somalia that it 'Would not receive any support for its
irredentist claims within the OAU. Therefore, it.
subsequently concentrated on diplomatic activities
concerning its border disputes. Accordingly, Somalia
requested the Sudan to offer its good offices in the spirit
of the provisions of the OAU resolutions concerning
its disputes 'WithEthiopia and Kenya(12S). The Sudanese
President was able to bring about an agreement for a
ceasefire and for the demilitarisation of the disputed
areas, the establishment of a joint commission to supervise
the withdrawal of forces and the cessation of hostile
activities(126). Ethiopia and Somalia thus agreed to
(122)Brownlie, Ian, Op. Cit, pp.362-363
(123)~ p.362
(124)Wild, Patricia Berko, Ope Cit, pp.27-30
(125)Somalia's search for support was more or less successful
in Africa. Somalia succeeded in establishing close relations
with Sudan despite the fact that the Sudanese government
did not come out openly in support of Somali irredentist
aspirations.
(126)Africa Contemporary Record 1968-62, p.623
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resume negotiations before the second sununit meeting of
the OAU Assembly of Heads of State. The same approach
was followed by the Tanzanian President in assisting to
initiate negotiations between Kenya and Somalia at
Arusha, Tanzania(127). These mediatory initiatives did
not begin during the actual sessions of the OAU organs,
but the indirect role of the OAU in this respect was not
a new one. ~~ilst contact between Somalia and its
neighbours was maintained, the OAU forum also contributed
to the peace-making process. It was at the fourth
ordinary session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State,
that the OAU had its full impact on the leaders of member
. d' t (128)states 1n 1SpU e • This was made possible by the
installation in Somalia of a new government which had a
different stance on the Somali irredentist aspirations.
It was planned to attain self-determination for the Somali
peoples in the disputed territories by peaceful means(129).
(127)
Tanzania was another African state that attracted
Somalia's diplomatic effort. The cultivation of good
relations with Tanzania was important to Somalia for
two reasons. Firstly, Somalia intended, through some
extension of influence, to modify the adamant Kenyan
opposition to Somali claims. Secondly, Tanzania had
played an active diplomatic role in resolving African
regional disputes elsewhere.
(128)
Africa Contemporary Record 1968-69, p.623
(129)
The new government wished to end the conflict on the
borders in order to spread a large percent of the national
budget on development, rather than on defence. The border
conflicts affected the economic development which had been
worsened by the closing of the Suez Canal. These
difficulties made it necessary for Somalia's government
to reduce its military budget. In the meantime, the USA
(the major supporter and arms supplier to Ethiopia), was
also reconsidering foreign commitments, and put pressure
on the Ethiopian government to pursue a peaceful settlement.
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This approach would need efforts to normalise relations
between the neighbouring countries. The first major land-
mark in the development of detente was an agreement between
Kenya and Somalia, arranged through the personal initiative
of the Zambian President during the summit of the OAU
Assembly in Kinshasa in September 1967(130). The agreement
expressed the desire of the two states to respect each
other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and undertake
to settle their differences by' peaceful means, within
the OAU framework(131). Finally, they agreed to meet again
in the following month in Lusaka. At the same time, the
Ethiopian and Somali leaders met at the OAU summit and
agreed to initiate joint ministerial negotiations, with a
view to bringing about a mutually acceptable solution to
their differences(132). The Somali-Kenyan meeting agreed
upon in Kinshasa, took place in Arusha on October 25th,
The two governments reaffirmed their adherence
to the Kinshasa agreement and established a working
committee which was to meet periodically to review the
implementation of the agreement, as well as to propose
ways and means of bringing about a mutually acceptable
solution to the substantive issues of the conflict(133).
Subsequently, a series of successful joint ministerial
meetings between Somalia and Ethiopia took place in Addis
Ababa, which contributed to the conclusion of a number of
(130)
Africa Contemporary Record 1968-69, p.199
· (131)1lli pp.623-624
'(132)~ pp.197-199
(133)
Ibid pp.623-624
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agreements. ~ley reaffirmed the Khartoum agreement
and agreed to reactivate the Somali-Ethiopia joint
military commission, created by the Khartoum agreement,
as well as to convene_periodic meetings in order to bring
about a mutually acceptable solution to their differences(134).
This created an atmosphere conducive to serious negotiations
of the substantive issues of the border conflict. Since
1968, hostilities on the Somali-Ethiopian-Kenyan borders
had been extremely limited and, in general, detente had
been maintained. In October 1969, a military government
came to power in Somalia(135). The prevailing basic
differences on the major issues accentuated by the reported
discovery of large quantities of oil and mineral resources
on the Ethiopian side in the Ogaden desert and posed
a formidable obstacle to the peace-making process(136).
Consequently, the detente between Somalia, Kenya and
Ethiopia gave way to a further armed confrontation during
1973. Kenya strongly condemned Somalia's aggression
(134)
Lailin, David D., The lvar in the Ogaden, Implication
for Siyaad1s Role in Somalia History, JMAS, Volume 17,
.!.21..2., pp.95-99
(135)
Russian aid in the early years to Somalia, had been
expanded after the military government came to power in
1969. In return, the new government allowed the Soviet
Union to control a major military base in Berbara, as well
as access to the point of Kismayo on the Indian Ocean. In
July 1974, the two governments concluded a treaty of friend-
ship and co-operation. The purpose of such an alliance was
seen by the Somali government as the only way to equip her
army so that it could successfully support the lvestern
Somali Liberation Front in the Ogaden.
(136)
Schwab, Peter, Ope Cit, p.l0
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against Ethiopia and rejected Somalia's territorial claims,
and called on all African states to do the same.
Accordingly, the 1973 Summit Conference of the OAU Assembly
of Heads of State was marked by Somalia's charge of
Ethiopian military buildup in the disputed areas. Upon
the Somalian request, the tenth session of the OAU Assembly
of Heads of State had considered the conflict and set up
an eight-member ad hoc committee to offer good offices(137).
Nevertheless, the committee's work had been hindered by
considerable differences ov~r its terms of reference.
In 1974, the political situation' within Ethiopia changed
dramatically. The Emperor, who had ruled since 1930,
was overthrown and a provisional military administrative
committee took over direction of the country(138). The
new Ethiopian junta continued the policies of the former
regime regarding Somalia's territorial aspirations. As
early as 1975, war clouds gathered over the Ogaden desert
when the Somali government began to give attention to the
Organisation of the liestern Somali Liberation Front. As
a result, the Soviet Union started to reassess its military
(137)
African Research Bulletin, Volume 14, 1977, p.4525
(138)
It would appear that the Somali government did not
seize the moment when the Emperor was deposed in Ethiopia.
In early 1975, the Somali government was put under
increasing pressure by some military officers in the
Supreme Revolutionary Council to march on the Ogaden.
They were supported by many political and influential
Somalis. At that time, the Somali President was
Chairman of the OAU and obviously thought that this
was not the right moment to invade Ethiopia. There-
fore, he attempted to negotiate with the new regime
in Ethiopia for the return of the Ogaden, but his
initiative was doomed to fail.
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conunitments to Somalia and with the emergence of the
radical regime in Ethiopia, the Soviet Union proceeded
to seek links with the Junta. In early 1975, the
- Ethiopian Junta requested arms from the United States,
but the American administration refused the full request(139).
The Soviet Union, striving to expand its influence, reacted
positively and rapidly to the Ethiopian request for military
aid and concluded a military agreement in 1976(140). In
response to the existing circumstances, the USA promised
weapons to Somalia, were it to evict the Soviet Union
entirely from Somalia. In November 1977, the Somali
government announced that all Russian advisors had been
expelled from Somalia(141). Earlier in 1977, there had
been a series of more or less skirmishes. However, in
July 1977, the \lestern Somali Liberation Front, heavily
supported by Somali troops and ~weapons, stormed the Ogaden.
Tension between Ethiopia and Somalia worsened in September
1977 when the Ethiopian government announced that it was
breaking off diplomatic relations with Somalia(142) in
response to Somalia's violation of the principles of the
UN and OAU Charters, by continuing aggression against
Ethiopian sovereignty and territorial integrity. The
Ethiopians also took the dispute before the OAU, but
Somalia walked out of the OAU Summit in Libreville, Gabon
in August 1977(143). Subsequently, Somalia broke off
(139) .Schwab, Peter, Ope C1t, pp.l0-18
(140).!2!!! p.17
(141)Lailin, David D., Ope Cit, p.l00
(142)African Research Bulletin, Volume 14, 1977, p.4556
(143)~ p.4557
- 264 -
relations with Ethiopia and accused the OAU of showing
no interest in the border conflicts between Somalia and
its neighbours. The Somali accusation made in Libreville,
Gabon, where the OAU good offices committee meeting stated
that the OAU must adopt a new stand and tackle regional
disputes affecting the continent of Africa(144). In the
event, the OAU's attempts to mediate between Somalia and
its neighbours ended in failure when Somalia delivered a
final snub to the OAU committee of good offices by
boycotting its closing session(145). By September 1977,
advancing Somali forces had fought the biggest battle,
since the war in the Horn of Africa began in July 1977,
and by October 1977, the l'lesternLiberation Front,
supported by Somali troops, had captured the entire
province of the Ogaden. It lias, however-, evident that
the states on the Horn of Africa had been pushed into the
centre of the cold war. The internationalisation of
(144)1h!£ p.4557
(145) . .Soma11a's boycott was made 1n response to unfavourable
attitudes to her conditions by the OAU Committee of Good
Offices to examine in depth the problem of the Ogaden, and
to invite the l{estern Somali Liberation Front to participate
in its deliberation. Ethiopia opposed both conditions.
The Committee finally reported on August 9th, 1977 that
the Committee had affirmed that, in conformity with the
OAU Charter, member states were bound to respect the
borders existing at independence, and adhere to the
cardinal principle upholding as inviolable, the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of member states. It also
appealed to the parties in dispute to cease all acts of
hostility in accordance with the aims and purposes of the
OAU Charter. The Committee also announced that it would
contact the leaders of the states concerned with a view
to affecting a cessation of hostilities and creating an
atmosphere conducive to the peaceful settlement of the
conflicts.
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the border conflicts between Somalia and its neighbouring
states and ~le extra-regional intervention, had trans-
formed the region into a potentially serious flashpoint.
The OAU, in January 1978 warned foreign powers against
seeking to extend their sphere of influence in Africa and -
called upon them to stop meddling in African regional
disputes. As regards the present conflict in the lIornof
Africa, any extra-regional involvement would alIO\17the
situation to assume an international character, thereby
complicating the OAU efforts at mediation(146). In
response to the OAU's appeal, representatives of the USA,
Britain, France and \'lestGermany, met in l'lashingtonon
January 21st 1978 to discuss the situation in the Horn of
Africa. They issued a statement declaring that no lasting
solution to the conflict in the Horn of Africa could be
found by force of arms, and reaffirmed their full support
for the efforts of the OAU at mediation(147). In this
connection, Somalia announced on Narch 9th, 1978 that it
would prepare to withdraw its troops from Ethiopia's
territory. In return, Somalia demanded the withdrawal of
all foreign forces from the Horn of Africa and the
recognition by Ethiopia and Kenya of the right of self-
determination of the Somali peoples in the Ogaden and
NFD. It also called for a negotiated settlement of
the conflicts through the OAU machinery(148). By Mar-ch 1978
(146)
Report of the Heeting of the Ethiopia-Somalia Good
Offices Committee held in Libreville, Gabon, August 5th, 197Z
(147)
African Research Bulletin, Volume 15, 19Z8, p.4702
(148)
Ibid pp.4773-4774
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all Somali regular forces had been withdrawn from Ethiopian
territory(149). Accordingly, Somalia called upon the
super powers to fulfil their promise of seeking to bring
about a just and lasting solution to the conflict, which
.could be found only by granting the Somali peoples in the
Ogaden.and NFD, their rights to self-determination. This
was a reference to Somali fears of an invasion from
Ethiopia when the latter stated that Somalia's withdrawal
of regular troops from the Ogaden did not constitute a
ceasefire. The fact was that the Somali withdrawal from
the Ogaden, left her with a shattered army and refugee
problems. In the meantime, the conflict had brought
Ethiopia and Kenya closer to each other, in addition to
their mutual defence pact which had been in existence for
several years. This was due to their mutual suspicion
of Somalia's irredentist aspirations pursued since its
independence. The Ethiopian leader paid an official
visit to Kenya in 1980 in order to co-ordinate their
responses to Somalia's territorial claims against both
countries(150). The Ethiopian and Kenyan governments
on the conclusion of the visit, gave the Somali govern-
ment the following peace conditions:-
••••• (1) Somalia "must renounce publicly and
unconditionally all claims to the territories of
Ethiopia-Kenya and Djibouti, and declare null and void
all instruments asserting such claims;
(149)Lailin, David D., Ope Cit, p.ll0
(150)African Research Bulletin, Volume 17, 1981, p.5886
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(2) Somalia must openly and solemnly declare
its acceptance of the principles and decisions of
the UN and UN governing inter-state relations,
including the principle of the inviolability of
state frontiers and non-interference in the internal
affairs of other countries;
(3) Somalia must, in particular, withdraw its
reservation to the decisions on state frontiers made
by the first ·OAU summit conference held in Cairo in
1964;
(4) Somalia must solemnly declare that it
will scrupulously respect international agreements,
as well as the principle of non-use of forces in
the settlement of international disputes;
(5) Somalia must pay prompt and adequate
reparation for the war damage she inflicted on
Ethiopia •••• (151).
The two countries also hailed the efforts of the 9AU Committee
of Good Offices at mediation and maintained that non-
acceptance by Somalia of these peace conditions would
mean the perpetuation of 'the existing conflicts in the
border areas. In this atmosphere, the activities of
the Somali liberation movements seeking independence for
the ethnic Somalis in the Ethiopian Ogaden and Kenya's
NFD, continued causing deep concern in Ethiopia and Kenya.
These guerilla organisations pursued political objectives
(151) .
~ pp.5886-5887
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to attain the right to self-determination and to establish
the free state of Western Somalia. They passed a
resolution in February 1981 at their congress in Mogadishu
affirming that the Front was the only legal representative
of Western Somalia and any initiative on the Ogaden taken
without its consent, was illegal(152). Despite these
activities of the guerilla movements in the Ogaden, it
would appear that there is a direct move under way to
reconcile Ethiopia and Somalia. At the same time, relations
between Somalia and Kenya continued to improve, in
consequence of efforts at rapprochement that were
initiated by the conclusion of an accord. The agreement
reached on August 26th, 1981 after the summit of the OAU
Assembly of Heads of State in Nairobi in June 1981, ended
several years of mutual hostilities(153).
The above reveals the limitations of the OAU and
its restricted scope of action. -The dismal picture of
the OAU is nothing new to African eyes. A trend Was
set during the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute which
became a tradition, with mediation being left to the
personal initiative of individual African leaders, to
attempt to settle African regional disputes. Therefore,
the appeal to the UN by the OAU member states would
depend upon the effectiveness of personal efforts of the
individual African leaders. Despite the OAU acceptance
of the principle of uti possiditus as regards boundaries
(152)African Research Bulletin, Volume 18, 1981, pp.8039-6040
(153)Ibid p.6166.-
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existing at the time of independence, major crises over
territorial questions have occurred in Africa. Existing
border disputes have continued in Africa in consequence
of the limited capability of the OAU. This fact in
itself added to the determination of African states to
pursue their objectives and claims by non-peaceful
means, and by allowing external involvement in African
regional disputes leading to internationalisation of
these disputes. The principle of uti possidetis
adopted at the first OAU summit conference in Cairo in
1964, intended to freeze the existing territorial
status quo, but it has only smothered the existing
boundary disputes rather than settling them. The fact
was that African states with major territorial claims
have emphatically indicated that they would not feel
bound by it. This fact would prevent the need for
negotiations of those frontiers which remain undefined
or were not clearly defined during the colonial era.
At the same time, OAU involvement in African regional
disputes remained basically deliberative rather than
one of direct mediation and conciliation. Moreover,
the OAU avoided the allocation of responsibility to
any side in African regional disputes, even where it
was invited to do so by the parties to a dispute.
This was developed from a belief that African solidarity
may be threatened by an active involvement of the OAU
in regional disputes. Therefore, it has pursued a
modest role in order to avoid arousing the resentment
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to any of its member states. The OAU has tended,
after its experience in the Algerian-Moroccan border
dispute, to encourage bilateral negotiation of
substantive issues and to rely more heavily upon the
role of selected African statesmen in emergency
situations. The personal initiative of individual
African leaders has appeared to compensate the
limitation of the OAU role, attributable to the OAU
Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.
A cardinal fact was that the OAU Secretary General had
no role entrusted to him to play by the OAU Charter,
above the administrative functions.
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GHANA IS BORDER DISPUTES \\,ITHCERTAIN NEIGHBOURS:
HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND LEGAL CONSIDERATION OF THE CONFLICTS
The Ghana-Togo border dispute was more complex than
the situation in'Northwest Africa. It originated in the
ethnic nationalism of the Ewe who had been divided after
World War I between British and French jurisdiction(I).
The partition caused most of the unrest of the boundaries
in West Africa(2). Nonetheless, the dispute had been
identified as an outcome of both Ghanaian and Togolese
i~redentist aspirations. The border conflict had been
revived after several years of calm. Actually, demands
for the re-negotiation of the boundaries had been made
openly since 1963, but political agitation had provoked
an escalation of the dispute to the point of armed
confrontation(3). The Ewe number about 2.5 million,
with roughly half on each side of the present Ghanaian-
Togolese border(4). The Ewe was initially divided by
(1)
Brown, David, Borderline Politics in Ghana: The National
Liberation ltlovementof Western Togoland, :!,MA§, Volume 18,
1980, p.575
(2)
All boundaries in Africa were of colonial creation. They
were drawn as a result of the Berlin Conference of 1884,
which presented the legal argument that European powers
could claim the African territories by effective occupation.
(3)
The harbouring of political refugees seeking a base from
which to continue a struggle already lost in their own
country, and accusations by the party leaders in Ghana and
Togo that these refugee organisations were actively sponsored
by the Accra or Lome governments. In January 1963, the
assassination of Syluonas Olympio, the Togolese President,
added a further tragic element to the border conflict.
(4) .
Zartman, William, The Politics of Boundaries in North
and West Africa, ~, Volume 3, ~, p.165
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a colonial boundary in 1884 which split the tribe between
British Gold Coast and German Togoland(S). Subsequently,
after l{orld lvar I , the German colonies in Africa were
handed over to the victors under the League of Nations
Mandates(6). Consequently, the Ewes were further divided
by a new boundary adjustment which appeared between British
and French Mandated territories. The Western part of
German Togoland came under British jurisdiction and was
administered as part of the Gold Coast, while the Eastern
section became French controlled and was administered as
the French colony of Togo(7). At all events, the Ewes had
objected in various ways, initially to the Anglo-German
and subsequently to the Anglo-French partitions. None~
theless, these objections were not in origin, assertions
of ethnic unity~but rathe~ attempts to resolve the social
and economic grievances which had developed as a consequence
of the imposition of the boundaries(8). Trade had also
(5)OIConnell, D.P., State Succession in Municipal Law and
International Law, The University Press, Cambridge, p.75
(6)Whiteman, Marjorie M., Digest of International Law,
Volume I, ~J pp.598-601
(7)OIConnell, D.P., Ope Cit, p.159
(8)
Trade and travel had been severely disrupted between
1904 and 1914 in consequence of the boundary closure
between the British and German colonies. Subsequently,
the trade was restricted by the temporary boundary
closure which occurred between 1940 and 1943, during the
1960-65 period and again, spasmodically since late
1971.
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been restricted by customs duties and more drastically so
by the border restrictions or closures. Therefore, it was
these uncertainties and unpredictabilities which gave rise
to most discontent. Thus, for all the Ewe people, the
hardships were social, as well as economic, repeatedly
threatened by closures or restrictions at the border posts.
Moreover, the border conflict had been exacerbated by the
partitioning of the Ewes into two separate cultural and
linguistic groups, predominantly Anglophone and Franco-
phone in character. Furthermore, the border dispute had
developed major disparities in welfare between the Ewes on
each side of the border(9). During the colonial era, it
was initially the Ewes on the German and subsequently the
French sides of the border who felt unfairly excluded from
the prosperous and liberal environment in the Gold Coast(10).
In contrast, in the post-colonial period, the situation had
been reversed, with the Ghanaian Ewes comparing their own
situation of political subordination and economic decline,
with the prosperity and influence of the Togolese Ewes(11).
( 9)The political agitations over the border were the re-
emergence of socio-economic disparities between the Ghanaian
and Togolese Ewe communities. After the prosperity and
growth of the 1950's, the Ghanaian economy had encountered
various problems which began to produce, initially, stagnation
and subsequently, a reduction in living standards.- In
contrast, after a phase of initial stagnation, Togo
subsequently entered, during the seventh decade, a period of
rapid growth. Therefore, by the early 1970's there was a
marked contrast in the fortunes of the Ewes on each side of .
the border. Those in Ghana became increasingly aggrieved
and disillusioned with their treatment by Ghana's government,
while those in Togo became increasingly optimistic about
their prospects.,
(10)Brown, David, Ope Cit, p.519
(11)~ pp.579-580
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Under these circumstances, appeals for ethnic solidarity
were made by groups of educated Ewes after their
partition in 1919(12). The major problem of the frontiers
was how to unite the southern Ewe community, and has thus
been open to conflicting solutions. This would involve
the removal of the de facto territorial position reached
in 1919 when German Togoland was partitioned to form two
Mandated territories. The bringing together of all the
Ewes in an enlarged former British colony in the form of
a greater Ghana or the reunification of some of the Ewes
in a restored former German Togoland. The initial solution
meant the disappearance of Togo as a separate state, the latter
being a detachment from Ghana of some of its Ewe-speaking
community. However, the specific formula for the
pursuit of Ewe unity varied, but the most straightforward
was the establishment of an autonomous Ewe entity(13).
This formula tended to give way to the demand that all
Ewes should be brought, with the Gold Coast, under British
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this formula of uniting all
the Ewes within the Gold Coast, began to fade and was
substituted by the formula of terminating the Anglo-French
boundary by reuniting the two sections of the old German
colony(14).· It would appear that this formula would
solve the immediate border problems and might be an initial
(12)Austin. Dennis, The Uncertain Frontier: Ghana-Togo,
~, Volume I, !2QJ, p.139
(13).!!U!! p.~40
(14)Krishnan. Haya~ Ope Cit, p.201
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step towards the establishment of a Gold Coast-Togo union
which would bring all Ewes together. Despite the fact,
the boundary itself has remained unchanged and the legal
arguments put forward by Ghana-that the frontier should
be shifted east has been met by similar demands from Togo,
that the boundary should be extended westwards, into
Ghana(15). By 1946, the union of Togo established a
national movement of Ewes in French Togo in order to end
French rule and to terminate the disruptive border by
creating, either an Ewe state or the integration of all
Eweland within the Gold Coast. At the same time, the
Togoland union established in the British sector, sought
to reunify the two Togolands while attempting to maintain
existing links with the Gold Coast. Amongst the Ewe s of
the Gold Coast colony, the all-Ewe Conference established
a national movement for the unification of all EwelaQd
into the Gold Coast(16). Unfortunately, when popular
concern over the border issue came to a focal point
through electoral participation, the colonial powers had
effectively limited the immediate option concerning the
Ewe unification. The option put forward was between the
unification of the two Togolands and their separation from
the Gold Coast, or the integration of British Togoland
alone into the Gold Coast(17). Thus, the formula of
(15)Touval, Saadia, Ope Cit, p.36
(16)Brown, David, Ope Cit, p.581
(17)Ibid p.582
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ethnic unity was not one of the immediate options. Under
these circumstances, it was not surprising that each group
had made different choices(18). The Gold Coast Ewes opted
for the integration of British Togoland with the Gold Coast,
since this was the only solution to keep at least half of
the Ewe population within Ghana. However, a large majority
of the Ewe in both British and French Togolands voted for
Togoland unification since this was the only option which
might remove the partitioning boundary to which they
objected(19). In any event, the development of this issue
in this way, brought the Ewe of French Togoland into direct
(18)
lfuen the UN held the plebiscite in the British territory
in order to choose whether or not they wished to be part of
an independent Ghana, the result was as follows:-
(1) The Northern E,,,e-speaking community for the
union was 49:119; against the union was 12:707.
(2) The Southern Ewe-speaking community, for the
union was 43:970; against the union was 54:785.
(3) Total for the union was 93:095,
against the union was 67:492
After a period of indecision, the UN General Assembly decided
to take the vote as a whole. A majority was thus considered
for integration and the territory of British Togoland became
an integral part of Ghana in Harch 1957.
(Austin, Dennis, Ope Cit, p.142)
(19)
Austin. Dennis, Ope Cit, pp.142-143
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confrontation with the colonial administration(20). Under
these circumstances, the Ewes of British Togoland were
put in the position of having to choose between their
links with the Gold Coast or with French Togoland. The
effect was the majority of the population voted in the
crucial decolonisation referendum of 1956 in favour of
integration with Ghana and independence(21). Therefore,
the colonial power held to maintain the status quo and
Ghana carne into being in 1957 with a border which divided
tribal lines for 170 of its 498 miles(22). Subsequently,
the border agitation entered a new phase in which
governmental irredentist aspirations provided the main
pressure for border change(23). Simultaneously, Ghana
maintained that the frontier should be shifted east in
which Togo would become a region of Ghana, while Togo
demanded that the boundary should be extended westwards into
the former British Togoland. Under these circumstances,
the activists of the British Togoland union attempted
an armed riot at the time of Ghanaian independence and
integration celebration in 1957(24), in protest against
the continuous separation of the Togolands, therefore
(20)Brown. David, Ope Cit, p.582
(21)Dlaustein, Albert P. et al., Independence Documents of
the World, Oceana Publications Inc., New York, !211,
pp.245-246
(22)Zartman, William, Ope Cit, p.165.
(23)Nkrumah had a territorial ambition' in order to establish
Greater Ghana by integrating French Togo, Upper Volta,
Dahomey and the Ivory Coast by which a powerful and active
West African Federation would gain influence and leadership
in Africa.
(24)Brown, David, Ope Cit, p.582
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Ghana continued to campaign for a merger, in which French
Togo would become an integral part of Ghana(25). This
irredentist aspiration reflected Nkrumah's intention to win
the supp~r~ of Ghanaian Ewes by promoting the pan-Ewe cause.
Although, it provoked Togolese hostility which in turn led
Ghana to seal off the border from 1960 to 1963(26). By 1960,
French rule in Togo had ended and Nkrumah's initial hope of
a Ghana-Togo merger was abandoned. The 1958 election in the
French Togo brought to power a government headed by an Ewe
leader whose ambition had paralleled that of Ewe unification(27).
In this respect, the shift was from Ewe communal agitation to
state irredentist aspirations in which the Togolese government
called, after independence, for the transfer of the former
British TOgoland(28). Notwithstanding, the Togolese
(25)Nkrumah1s irredentist aspiration derived from uncertainty
over the future of the French Togo. It was-not completely
removed until Olympio dominated the scene in the· 1958 election
in French Togo. Subsequently, within two years, French Togo
·became an independent state under an Ewe-dominated government.
The Ewe dream of a homeland became a reality. In response to
this situation, Nkrumah began to .controlthe political·life'
in Ghana through a single party under his·Chairmanship. In
Togo, an election was held on a single party·list in 1961 and
Olympio became President of the Republic. Thus, two single
parties faced each other across the border under the control
of a President who dominated the political life of the country.
(26)Touval, Saadia, Ope Cit, p.36
(27)Austin, Dennis, Ope Cit, p.143
(28) .Ghana and Togo continued to press claims for the uniting
of the Eweland. At the same time, each government accused
the other of harbouring and supporting saboteurs who slipped
across the border. The effect of this.quarrel gave an
advantage to the groups of political refugees on each side of
the border, to carry out subversive activities, which led to
the disruption of free movement.of goods and labours.
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irredentist aspiration came to an end in 1963 with the
military coup d'etat, but friction with Ghana continued
and this led the new Togo regime to close.the border
between 1963 and 1965(29). By 1960 then, the Ewes in
both Ghana and Togo could see no way of resolving the
problem of partition. Under these circumstances, their
response was to concentrate on pressure-group policies
within their respective countries in order to gain as
many socio-economic benefits as possible out of the two
governments(30). Nonetheless, the border unrest imposed
hardship on the traditional way of life in the two Ewe
segments on each side of the border.
Ghana also entertained irredentist aspirations against
the Ivory Coast. It would appear that Ghana's irredentist
aspiration could be attributed to a combination of factors.
One of them was the pan-African ideology espoused by Nkrumah
which provided justification for altering the colonial
boundaries in order to reunite tribes separated by
colonialism(31). The second factor was the political
(29)The new regime of Togo had no commitment to the idea
of Ewe nationalism. The major friction was the cross-border·
smuggling which had pro1iferated.since 1965. Cocoa and
coffee were smuggled into Togo where they brought higher
returns to Ghanaian farmers. This smuggling flourished
from 1965 until the early 1970's, but since then it has
been threatened by the economic nationalism of successive
regimes in Ghana. In 1971 the Ghanaian government began
to tighten its border control as part of a shift in economic
policy towards import restriction in order to put an end
to the smuggling. .
(30)Alinyem, Bolaji, A., The OAU and the Concept of Non-
Interference in Internal Affairs by Member States,
BYBIL, Volume 46, 1971.1973, p.394
(31)The intensity of Nkrumah's commitment to the pan-African'
ideology swiftly'responded to the Sanwi secessionist
movement in that, the best means open to.them was to join
Ghana. He justified his claim to the Sanwi region on the
grounds that it would be.a step towards,the abolition of
the colonial legacy and eventually towards the greater unity
of Africa.
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antagonism between Nkrumah and Houphonet-Boigny, President of
the Ivory Coast(32). Finally, the availability of the Sanwi
secessionist movement in the Ivory Coast offered itself to
exploitation by Nkrumah who was tribally related to the Agni
people of Sanwi. The existence of the Sanwi movement had
caused trouble to the Ivory Coast government. The movement
had pursued an opposition of a tribal character by protests
against the predominant position of the Baoule, President
Houphonet-Boigny's tribe. The origins of this opposition
could be traced in the colonial administrative history of the
region and in the social and economic competition between the
Sanwi and the Baoule. The King of Sanwi, who was the first
local chief to sign an agreement with the French colonial
administration in 1843, had been accorded preferential treat-
ment by the French government(33). In this respect, France
continued to recognise the King of Sanwi, even after termination
of the traditional authority of local chiefs. However, during
World War I, French colonial administration imposed levies on
manpower, which led to Sanwi's protests and migration to the
Gold Coast(34). They argued that French colonial adminis-
tration had violated the 1843 agreement by imposing the levies
on manpower. Consequently, the French authorities abolished the
preferential treatment granted to the Kingdom of Sanwi(35).
(32)The Sanwi tribe stayed outside the mainstream of political
life in the Ivory Coast since the beginning of Houphonet-Boignyts
nationalist movement took power in the election of 1957. They
supported opposition candidates or had a high rate of abstention.
Subsequently, they conducted subversive activities in which
many of them were arrested. A number of them fled to Ghana
and joined a freedom fighters front in which Ghana committed
to support their cause.
(33)Touval. Saadia, Ope Cit. p.38
(34)Zartman. William, Ope Cit, p.167
(35)Touval. Saadia, Ope Cit, p.38
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As a result, the political, social and economic primacy
.spread to other tribes, notably the Baoule(36). Subsequently,
when politic~l organisations began to form after
World W~r II, the Sanwi refused to join the Baoule-dominated
Ivory Coast Democratic Party. Instead, they supported the
rival Progressive Party(37). 'ihen the Democratic Party
became standard-bearer of the Ivory Coast independence move-
ment, the Sanwi felt alientated and turned to secession(38).
Under these circumstances, the border dispute between Ghana
and the Ivory Coast over the Sanwi was a tribal matter
exacerbated by Ghana's interference. Nonetheless, Ghana
openly claimed the Sanwi region in the name of tribal unity.
This border dispute had neither turned into a major conflict
nor had it been solved.
Finally, Ghana-Upper Volta dispute occurred over the
interpretation of documents and maps'de~ining the border(39).
(36)The first to acquire European education, the Sanwi tribe
lost their political position through the abrogation by the
French of the 1843 agreement. This measure led the Sanwi
to concentrate their attempts on regaining their previous
position and the re-establishment of their entity, but these
efforts led them to stay outside the mainstream of the
political life in the Ivory Coast.
(37)Trouval, Saadia, Ope Cit, pp.38-39 .
(38)The Sanwi case demonstrated the complex case of secessionism.
They also justified separation on the grounds of ethnic
differences when it associated with economic, social and
political issues of conflict.
(39)upper Volta illustrated the diverse consideration that
might prompt boundary dispute. The territory was initially
constituted in 1919 and subsequently, abolished in 1932 and
its administrative divisions were absorbed by the French
neighbouring territories of Mali, Niger and the Ivory Coast.
In 1942, it was reconstituted as a separate colony and the
region previously annexed by each of the neighbouring
colonies were separated from them and reincorporated into
Upper Volta.
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The issue was a strip of land constituting some 50 miles
of the 350 mile border between the two states(40).
Nonetheless, the deep cause was to be found in the mutual
~ntagonism between the two governments. It should be
noted that in.the period between 1961 and 1964, relations
between Ghana and Upper Volta had developed considerably.
The two states concluded a series of economic co-operation
and set up a customs union(41). Unfortunately, difficulties
arose in their attempts at mutual co-operation which led to
the closure of the border between the two states as a security
measure. Upper Volta reacted by scaling down its economic
co-operation with Ghana and endeavouring to improve relations
with its other neighbouring states(42). As a result, relations
between Upper Volta and Ghana quickly deteriorated. In
this atmosphere, the two governments developed genuine
differences over the interpretation of the nineteenth century
Anglo-French border treaties and maps(43). Therefore, it
was the consequences of worsening relations which gave the
dispute an important dimension and made the settlement
difficult. The dispute was also aggravated when Ghana used
the conflict to demonstrate to Upper Volta its capacity to
cause trouble, while Upper Volta used the dispute to embarrass
Ghana by branding the country as -expansionist.-
Subsequently, Ghana commenced building a road and school in
the disputed territory which was claimed by Upper Volta as
(40)Touval, Saadia, Ope Cit, p.41
(41)Meyersa David B., Ope Cit, p.119
(42)polhemusa Higbie James, Op. Cit, pp~184-185
(43)zartmana William, Ope Cit, p.167
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an integral part of its territory. Under these circumstances,
a joint border commission from the two states met in order
to find a mutually acceptable solution, but its attempts
were unsuccessful. Subsequently, Ghana built a police
post in the disputed area and raised its flag on this
post(44). At this stage, Upper Volta decided to take the
border dispute to the OAU(45).
(44)
Meyers, David B., Ope Cit, p.120
(45)
The border disputes between Ghana and its neighbours
were scheduled for consideration at the first summit
conference of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State. In
addition to the Algerian-~Ioroccan border dispute and the
Somali-Ethiopian-Kenyan border disputes. Although not
referred to the OAU, a third dispute between Dahomey and
Niger, which contributed to the feeling that border
disputes had come to plague inter-state relations in
Africa.
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EHPLOYNENT OF THE OAU AUTHORITY:
Ghana's border conflicts with its three neighbouring
states, were the consequence of Nkrumah's concept of pan-
Africanism through which he was inten~ing to establish a
state of Greater Ghana over which he would assume leader-
ship, thus significantly increasing his influence in Africa.
Accordingly, the call for the removal of colonial boundaries
in Africa was an important theme in Nkrumah's pan-Africanism.
The invocation of this doctrine was, in fact, intended for
the justification of Ghana's territorial aspiration against
Togo, Ivory Coast and Upper Volta(46). Nevertheless, this
doctrine did not find favourable grounds with the majority
of African states which came out strongly in favour of the
principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Many
African states discerned that Nkrumah's doctrine harboured
irredentist ambition for expansion in order to swallow up
Togo, Ivory Coast and Upper Volta. Under these circumstances,
the maintenance of the status quo began to be associated with
the preservation of the state as a political unit(47).
(46)This doctrine found vent for the first time in one of the
resolutions of the first all-African People's Conference which
took place at Accra, Ghana in December 1958. It denounced
the artificial frontiers drawn by imperialist powers to divide
the people of Africa, particularly those which cut across
ethnic groups. Subsequently, the continued expression of
this doctrine also found a place in the joint communique
issued by President Osman of Somalia and Nkrumah,in October
1961 at Accra, which stressed the imperative need to remove
the artificial colonial frontiers which were drawn up without
any respect for ethnic, cultural or economic ties.
(47)Cervenka~ Zdenek, The Unfinished Quest.for Unity,
Friedmann, London, 1977, p.7~
- 285 -
This led the majority of African states defining themselves
by means of colonial boundaries. As a result, the principle
of preserving the status quo was recognised in the OAU
resolution on border disputes among African states, which
-was adopted at the first ordinary summit of the OAU Assembly
of Heads of State which took place at Cairo in 1964(48).
The resolution declared that all OAU member states pledge
themselves to respect the border existing on the day of
accession to national independence(49). Accordingly, the
OAU member states agreed to maintain the boundaries as
they had been carved out by the Berlin Conference of
1884(50). However, several reasons are behind this attitude.
(48)Unfortunately, the resolution suffered from several
weaknesses. Firstly, it was not applicable to the existing
disputes. Secondly, it was intended as a guide for the
'future and should not prejudice any settlement already in
progress. Thirdly, there was nothing in the resolution
that might help to resolve border disputes arising from
different interpretations of documents as was the case in
Ghana-Upper Volta. Therefore, this was in contradiction
to the member states' pledge to respect the sovereignty and
territorial integrity.
(49)
Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, pp.36o-361
(SO)Most African boundaries were merely administrative divisions
within British, French, Spanish and Portuguese African
territories. They were drawn with no greater awareness of
human or physical geography. Thus, the boundaries are
geometrically straight lines. Such borders obviously correspond
to no natural human or physical feature. The pre-colonial
boundary concept was also one of frontier marches, not of
border lines. The classical African entities were composed
of one or more centres of power with control and allegiance
conceived in terms of people rather than land. The entity
was where the tribe lived and maintained control and'they could
move long distances and keep: the entity intact, as long as
they preserved a cohesive society and independent political
control. This boundary concept is similar to the Muslim
boundary concept in North Africa by which the (Umma) or
community of believers that determined the geographic scope
of the state and not the territorial limit of the state,otherwise its.effe~tive.control that determined the allegianceof the commun1ty of bel1evers.
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Firstly, most OAU member states had not yet achieved internal
stability and cohesion, and any concession to demands of
boundary revision could only be a further step of disruption.
Secondly, if the right to secede was granted to any region,
no matter how well justified its claim to self-determination
might appear in international law, the likely outcome to
this would be the stimulation of further secessionist demands
in other regions which would result in disintegration of
the OAU member states. Thirdly, the tribal equilibrium
which the political structure of present African states
depend upon, would be upset by any further changes of the
frontiers which divide tribes between African states.
Accordingly, the annexation of a tribe would increase the
size of a tribe inside a state, which might then lead to
internal conflict. Finally, the regrouping of African
states according to tribal or ethnic affinities would lead
to the proliferation of small units and the balkanisation
of the'African continent into entities that could not possibly
be viable economically. Under the impact of these reasons
~hich struck many African leaders as seriously impeding
the movement for pan-African solidarity. Consequently,
an initiative was taken to have the OAU affirm explicitly
and more strongly, the principle already embodied in the
OAU Charter concerning the preservation of the territorial
(51)status quo. When the OAU Assembly of Heads of State
(51)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Article III (3),
pp.l0-11
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scheduled its first ordinary summit in Cairo in 1964, the
border disputes between Ghana and its neighbouring· states
were added to the agenda of the meeting(52). Despite the
fact, the Cairo summit of the OAU Assembly were highly
concerned in general with African territorial disputes(S3).
Therefore, these conflicts aroused little discussion or
interest which gave most of the delegations the feeling
that the OAU action would be premature as bilateral settle-
ment still seemed possible. Accordingly, the OAU Assembly
recommended the states in dispute to hold direct negotiations
with a view to finding mutually acceptable solutions to
their border conflicts(S4). It would also appear that the
OAU Assembly did not recommend any kind of resort to third
party proceeding. In any event, despite the urging of the
resolution of the OAU Assembly to the states in dispute to
hold direct negotiations, the states concerned did not appear
to have met together to discuss the disputed .territories.
Unfortunately, relations between Ghana and Togo, Ivory Coast
and Upper Volta worsened during the first half of 1965, with
renewed allegations that Ghana pursued an expansionist
aspiration(SS). Under these circumstances, the border disputes
(S2)Cervenka, Zdnek, Ope Cit, p.69
(S3)The OAU member states inherited disputes over boundaries
or parts of territories. These disputes placed on the agenda
of the first summit of the OAU Assembly were Somali-Ethiopian-
Kenyan border conflicts. Algerian-Moroccan border dispute;
Moroccan claim against Mauritania; Tunisian ~laim to parts of
Algerian Sahara; dispute between Niger and Dahomey over the
island of Letta; border dispute between Malawi and Zambia;
Malawi and Tanzania; Ghana and Togo; Ivory Coast and Upper
volta and the Chad and Libyan border dispute •
.(S4)polhemus, Higbie James, Op. Cit, pp.186-187
(SS)~~yers, David B., Op. Cit, pp.120-121
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remained unsolved until the first half of 1965 as the date
set for the second ordinary summit of the OAU Assembly in
Accra, Ghana. In this connection, Togo, Ivory Coast and
Upper Volta took advantage of this opportunity, by raising
a series of grievances against Ghana, and threatened to
boycott the second summit of the OAU Assembly scheduled
to meet in Accra, Ghana(56). It was important to Ghana
that the Accra summit of the OAU Assembly be a successful
one and she had invested considerable financial and
political capital in the scheduled summit. However,
only at this time did the OAU show interest in these border
disputes between'Ghana and its neighbours. In this respect,
at the fifth extraordinary session of the OAU Council of
~nisters which took place in Lagos, Nigeria in June 1965,
in order to discuss the venue of the second ordinary summit
of the OAU Assembly, the states in dispute again presented
their complaints against Ghana(57). The major·theme in
their legal arguments was Ghana's irredentist aspiration
and its unwillingness to pursue peaceful settlements to .
the border conflicts. The OAU Council of M1nisters did
(56)polhemuSt Higbie James, Ope Cit, p.186
(57)Ibid pp.187-188
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not respond specifically to the border disputes, but in
a blanket resolution on the venue of the Accra summit
of the OAU Assembly, appealed to.the states in dispute
to make every effort fraternally, to settle their border
conflicts by means of bilateral negotiations(58).
Notwithstanding, the border dispute between Ghana and
its neighbours remain~d unresolved until after the
overthrow of Nkrumah. So long as Nkrumah remained in
power, the neighbouring states of Ghana were unable to
agree on peaceful settlements of the border conflicts.
At any event, after the Ghanaian coup of 1966, the new
military regime sought to improve Ghana~s relations with
its neighbouring states and to resolve outstanding
border disputes.
(58)Krishnan. Haya, Ope Cit, p.203
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WESTERN SAHARA COKFLICT:
HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND LEGAL CONSIDERATION OF THE CONFLICT
The Spanish presence in Africa dated originally from
the building of the fort of Santa Cruz de Mar Pequena on
the southern coast of Morocco in 1476. Nonetheless, the
outpost was subsequently abandoned owing to Moroccan
pressure in 1524(1). A Spanish presence in the Western
Sahara, prior to the nineteenth century, was of a limited
nature but the entire region was officially annexed in
In January 1885, Spain established a protect-
orate over the North-West coast of Africa. Despite this
fact, the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1900 was usually regarded
as the basis for the Spanish claim over Western Sahara(3)
which defined the sphere of each power(4). Subsequently,
(1)
Reyner, Anthony S., Morocco's International Boundaries,
~, Volume 1, ~, p.3
(2)Marks. Thomas A., Background to Conflict, JAA, Volume7S,
No. 298, January 1976, pp. 1-7
(3) The annual rainfall in the Western Sahara is usually four
inches and natural vegetation is limited to desert shrubs and
grasses in the dried-up river beds. The population is
75,425 according to an official Spanish census of 1970, and
consists largely of Moslem nomads. The capital of EI-Aaiun
contains about 24,048 people and the second city is Villa
Cisueros.
(4) Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p~149
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a second Franco-Spanish Treaty in 1912 defined the boundary
between French and Spanish jurisdiction to the south of
Morocco(5). The Western Sahara is situated along the
_ Atlantic coast of Northwest Africa and has a tiny popul~tion,
the majority of whom are nomadic desert dwellers. In
addition to them, a number of urban populations
have been living in neighbouring countries, especially
Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria for either political or
economic reasons(6). In this respect, both
Morocco and Mauritania have taken the attitude that the
Sahrawis are their citizens, no border barriers have
existed, even in the colonial era, to record their move-
ments. Moreover, ethnic and social links between the
people in Western Sahara and those nearby in Algeria,
Mauritania and Morocco, make it difficult to identify who
is, and who is not a Sahrawi{7~. This fact took on an
important legal implication when the issue of a plebiscite
on self-determination came up for discussion at the UN,
and subsequently at the OAU forum. In virtually every
African state there are tribes with close historic and
social ties across territorial boundaries. The problem
is every bit as acute as (and not dissimilar to) that of
the Somalis in the Ethiopian Ogaden and the Northern
(5)~ p.149
(6)The last estimate of the number of those exiles has
ranged from the Spanish figure of 10,000 to a high of about
50,000 claimed by the Saharan Liberation Movements and
neighbouring countries.
(7)One of the exiled leaders of the Polisario is Ahmad
Bala Miske, the former Mauritanian ambassador to the UN
and United States.
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Frontier District of Kenya. It is worthwhile mentioning
here that the contemporary principle of self-determination
is based on two considerations. Initially, there is the
assumption which is widely observed that states or colonies
with established boundaries and fixed populations should
have their own independent sovereign state. Secondly, any
other approach would lead to endless conflicts as modern
states found themselves under pressure to join a general
regression to a status quo aute of uncertain validity.
It is for these considerations that the OAU has insisted
that each African colony in the final stage of decolon-
isation, must exercise its right of self-determination
within the confines of established boundaries and fixed
populations(8). Despite the fact, in some cases this
principle seems to perpetuate certain historic injustices
or cultural and social hardships, but it has been obvious
that other alternatives are worse. Therefore, any attempt
to redraw the map of Africa on the basis of historical or
ethnic claims could only lead to chaos, war and the
unravelling of a continents' state system. Hardships could
be dealt with through federations and confederational
co-operation arrangements between OAU member states. It
was at the insistence of African states, in conjunction
with the third world, that the UN Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
came into existence in 1960(9). The Declaration proclaims
(8)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, pp.360-361
(9) Whiteman, Marjorie, Digest of International Law, Volume 5,
1962, p.78
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that all peoples have the right to self-determination.
Notwithstanding, it has been ascertained that any attempt
aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national
unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible
with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter(10).
In this respect, the OAU has recognised the principle by
which territories must exercise their rights to independence
with established colonial boundaries and fixed populations(ll).
On the other hand, if a colonial territory in Africa wishes
to unite with another African country, it should have the
right, but it must be manifested in the process of de-
colonisation. Consequently, it must be the free choice
of the majority in that particular colony to be absorbed
or dismembered. As early as 1954, it became virtually
standard practice to encourage colonial populations, at the
time just before decolonisation, to participate in genuine
acts of free choice. These acts might also determine
which party or movements would assume the reins of power.
Consequently, the UN General Assembly decided that in
agreement with the administering power, a UN mission should
visit the non-self-governing territory before the population
is called upon to decide on its destiny(12). Accordingly,
(10)
!2!B p.80
(11)Brownlie. Ian, Ope Cit, pp.360-361
(12)lYhiteman. Marjorie, Digest of International Law,
Volume 13, !i2l, p.680 and p.687
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the UN supervised plebiscites in the British Togoland Trust
Territory in 1956, in French Togoland in 1958 and in the
British administered Northern Cameroon, Trust in 1959 and
With the establishment in 1961 of the UN
Special Committee on the situation regarding the implement-
ation of the 1960 declaration on the granting of independence
to colonial countries and peoples, the UN had a clear legal
interest in demanding the decolonisation of the Trust
Territories(14). Therefore, the Special Committee has
ascertained the UN presence in the final stages of de-
colonisation in non-self-governing territories, particularly
in those situations where the people are being asked to
decide on a controversial formula of decolonisation, by
which they have the choice of independence or integration
with other sovereign states(lS). Thus, the Special Committee
(13)The territory of Cameroon' was a German colony. The
latter renounced its right over the Cameroon, under the
Treaty of Versailles. It was placed under the Mandates
System of the League of Nations. The territory was ,
divided into two Mandates - one administered by France and
the other by Great Britain. The latter divided its mandated
territory into the Northern Cameroon" which was administered
as part of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria, and the southern
Cameroon· was administered as a separate province of Nigeria.
The Mandated Territories of the Cameroon· were placed under
the UN Trusteeship System by a trusteeship agreement approved
by the UN General Assembly on December 13th, 1946. The French
administered Trust Territory of the Cameroon' became the
Republic of Cameroon. on its accession to independence on
January 1st, 1960. In a plebiscite held under the UN auspices
on February 11th, 1961, the southern Cameroon voted to achieve
independence by joining the Republic of Cameroon,. In a
plebiscite held in the northern Cameroon on 'February 11th,
1961, the people were asked whether they wished to achieve
independence by joining the Republic of Cameroon or the
Federal Republic of Nigeria. The people voted in'favour of
joining the Federation of Nigeria. On April 21st, 1961, the
UN General Assembly terminated the Trusteeship Agreement of
December 13th, 1946.
(14)Whiteman, Marjorie, Ope Cit, p.703
(15) Ibid p.712 and p.73
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recommended the holding of a plebiscite in the British
Northern Cameroons in 1961 with UN participation, prior
to decolonisation, and Great Britain implemented the
recommendation(16). It is this principle which was so
dramatically broken in the issue of the Western Sahara,
where a plebiscite for self-determination had not been
ensured by the UN at the final stage of decolonisation.
It was not only a break with a well-established principle
but also with the consistent demand of UN resolutions,
adopted specifically for the Sahara in more than a decade(17).
The question of the former Spanish Sahara has been
elaborately discussed at the UN Special Committee since
September 1963 and in subsequent General Assembly plenary
sessions. The first resolution proposed by the Special
Committee and passed by the UN General Assembly on
October 16th, 1964 called upon Sp~in to implement the
Sahara's right to self-determination(18). The Spanish
position during that period was that the Sahara was made
an integral part of Spain, equal in status to the metro-
politan provinces, by virtue of ministerial decree of
April 21st, 1961(19). However, the Moroccan position
was revealed at a meeting of the UN Special Committee
(16)Krishnan, Maya, Ope Cit, pp.201-210
(18)Franck, Thomas M., The Stealing of the Sahara, A1!1,
Volume 70, !212, p.702
(19)Thomas. A., Ope Cit, p.7
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held in Addis Ababa in August 1966 where she took the
initiative in pr~posing that Western Sahara should, as
soon as possible, be granted its independence(20). Yet,
the Hauritania position was that the Western Sahara,
while historically an integral part of its territory,
should be completely independent(21). The UN General
Assembly Resolution 2229(XXI) of December 20th, 1966
reaffirmed Resolution 1514(XV) concerning the right of
the Western Saharan people to self-determination(22).
It called upon Spain to determine, at the earliest possible
date, in conformity with the wishes of the l~estern Saharan
people and in consultation \iith Mauritania and Horocco and
other interested countries, the procedures for the holding
of a plebiscite under UN supervision with a view to enabling
the Sahrawis to exercise freely, their right to self-
determination. It also requested the UN Secretary
General to appoint and despatch to the Sahara, a special
UN mission for the purposes of recommending practical
procedures for the implementation of the relevant UN
General Assembly resolutions, and the extent of UN
participation and supervision of the proposed referendum.
(20)
Franck, Thomas M. , Ope Cit, p.702
(21)Ibid p.702
(22) Ian, Ope Cit, p.365Brownlie I
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Indeed all six resolutions adopted by the UN General
Assembly between 1967 and 1973 echo the prescription of
the 1966 resolution(23). Despite such a repeated
display of publi~.unanimity among al~ the states concerned,
namely J.Iauritania,Horocco and Spain, the clear prescrip-
tion of the resolutions were not followed. Unfortunately,
during the critical years of 1974 and 1975, the acceleration
of efforts were made by the states concerned to arrange
their preferred outcomes behind a facade of support for
self-determination. In this connection, Spain maintained
an argument that the physical features of the country and
nomadic nature of its population, could not help to
accelerate the count~y's preparation for self-determination(24).
Morocco and J.Iauritaniaendeavoured to exploit time to instal
their pro-traditional Sahrawis in the Sahara's national
assembly (Yema'a) with a view to ensuring their victory in
an eventual referendum(25). At the same time, both
(23)On December 18th, 1968 the UN General Assembly passed
Resolution 2428(XXIII) reaffirming the right of the Saharan
people to self-determination, and established a total
differentiation between Ifni and Western Sahara by making
reference in the preamble to the different natures of the
jurisdictional statutes of these two territories and the
processes of decolonisation. In this respect, Spain handed
over sovereignty of Ifni to Morocco on December 16th, 1969.
The UN Resolution 2592(XXIV) of December 1969 and 2711(XXV)
of December 1970, again reiterated the right of the Saharan
people to self-determination. Yet another UN Resolution
2983(XXVIX) of December 14th, 1972 was passed using
repeatedly the terms self-determination and independence,
followed by Resolution 3162(XXVIII) of December 14th, 1973
expressing identical sentiments.
(24)African Contempo~ary Record, 197~-ZZ, p. B141
(25)Marks, Thomas A., Ope Cit, p.9
- 298 -
countries, as concerned parties, exercised their right,
as defined by the UN General Assembly resolutions, and
requested Spain to consult them on the legal and political
development in the Sahara(26). It was a way of preventing
rather than accelerating the evolution of self-government.
At all events, in public the three states concerned, shared
an adherence to self-determination while in private shared
an abiding. mistrust of genuinely free, popular decision-
making. During this period, Algeria began to emerge more
clearly as an interested country but maintained that it had
no territorial claims. It had only demanded to be consulted
in any settlement, insisting that its interests were based
on obvious political, economic, strategic and social consider-
ations and on the need for regional stability(27).
Undoubtedly, the cardinal factor in this position was the
increasing evidence that the Western Sahara contained consider-
able riches of mineral resources(28). As far as the
(26)Franck. Thomas M., Ope Cit, p.702
(27)The Western Sahara was divided by Spain into three di~tinct
regions, each having a different form of economic and soc~al
life: (a) The north with a nucleus of mountains, and tribes
leading a settled life. (b) Further south, partial nomads,
a group of tribes who own houses and engage in agriculture,
but migrate south at certain times of the year.
(28) .The vast mineral resources had made Spanish efforts
worthwhile for at Bu eraa, approximately 100 kilometres in-
land from the capital El-Aaium are phosphate reserves
estimated at 1.6 thousand million tons, with a purity of 31%,
one of the high~st levels in the world. Plans were underway
to prospect for aluminium, copper, zinc, titanium, vavadium,
lead, manganese, kaolin, bento~i~e and balogen salts. Iron
has alreadY been found in suff1c1ent quantities to justify
feasibility studies. Moreover, there are expectations of
finding considerable quant~ties of oil and natural gas in
the Western Sahara's offshore continental shelf. In the .view
of the Spanish authorities, the phosphate industry could'
furnish the present Sahrawi~ population of the territory, a
per capita revenue equal to that of some developed countries
in Europe. In this respect,.Morocco revealed its views i.e.
to see injustice in restrict1ng SUch disparately vast mineral
resources to a tiny population and privately said that one
Kuwait in the Arab World is enough.
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evolution of self-government was concerned, the Spanish
government transferred to the Sahara National Assembly
(Ycma1a) a degree of internal legislative powers, while
maintaining the external affairs. Moreover, Spain pledged
that the Sahrawis could vote to determine the destiny of
their country when they ~reely requested her to do so(29).
Subsequently, in July 1974, Spain informed the states
concerned, Morocco and Mauritania and the interested state,
Algeria, about a new constitutional law for the Western
Sahara which substantially increased the powers of the
Sahara's National Assembly (Yema1a). At the same time,
it stated that it would hold a plebiscite for self-
determination under the UN supervision during the first half
of 1975. It also announced that this proposed plan should
be preceded by a series of consultations with the concerned
and interested states, in order to arrange the practical
procedure Cor implementing a referendum(30). Unfortunately,
Spanish attempts to win J.ioroccanand ~Iauritanian co-
operation proved unsuccessful. The Spanish foreign minister
met his Moroccan counterpart in Rabat in March an~ in Madrid
in April 1975 where the Moroccan foreign minister pointed
out that his country would allow a referendum only if the
Sahrawis were limited to an option between integration with
Morocco or remaining a Spanish colony(31). Thus, it excluded
the free choice of independence. In the meantime, the
Spanish minister also met his ~Iauritanian counterpart in
(29)~~rks. Thomas A.,.Op. Cit,.p.9
(30)Franck. Thomas M., Ope Cit, p.702
(31)Ibid p.705
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Nonakchott in April 1915 without securing any commitment
of co-operation. On the other hand, when the foreign ministers
of the concerned and interested states met in Nonakchott on
May 10th, and in Agadir on July 24th, 1915 they publicly re-
affirmed their adherence to the principle of self-determination
for Western Sahara(32). They also issued a joint statement
declaring that self-determination should be implemented in
conformity with relevant UN resolutions. This, however, was
the last Moroccan adherence to the principle of self-
determination for Western Sahara. Subsequently, Morocco
asserted its historical territorial claim to the Sahara and
threatened general mobilization if necessary, to regain the
territory. When Spain eventually acceded to the UN General
Assembly's call for a self-determination plebiscite, Morocco
suddenly improvised an entirely new strategy. In this respect,
Morocco requested that the UN General Assembly should refer
the Western Sahara question to the ICJ to examine the
validity of Morocco's historical title in such a way as to
make the issue dispostive(33). Initially, the Mauritanian
position faithfully respected the freely expressed choice
of the Saharan population and did not join in the request
for putting the issue before the ICJ. However, at a
bilateral summit meeting in Rabat in October 1915 between
the Moroccan and Mauritanian leaders, the latter agreed to
the Moroccan proposed plan of going to the ICJ. It would
(32)Ibid p.705
(33)Ibid p.705
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appear that the two leaders also engineered a partition
plan of the Sahara regardless of the outcome of the ICJ's
advisory opinion(34). On the other hand, Algeria
reluctantly endorsed the Moroccan-~lauritanian plan to go
to the ICJ, having been persuaded to do so in the name of
African solidarity. In the UN General Assembly, state
after state agreed to submit the issue to the ICJ provided
that this was not to be interpreted as a departure from the
principle of self-determination(35). Spain was more
suspicious of Moroccan motivation. In an attempt at
compromise, it agreed to support the Moroccan request, but
only if the ICJ would also consider the legal effects of
the provisions of the UN Charter and the UN General Assembly
resolutions regarding the Sahara's issue. ~torocco, however,
rejected the Spanish proposal(36). At all events, the UN
General Assembly's fourth committee voted on December 11th,
1975 in a resolution requesting an advisory opinion of the
ICJ on the Western Sahara case(37). Subsequently, the UN
General Assembly endorsed the fourth committee's decision
on December 13th, 1975 by passing Resolution 3292(XXIX)
which contained the following mandates:-
(1) the postponement of the plebiscite
(2) the dispatch of a UN visiting mission to the Sahara
(3) the request to the ICJ for an advisory opinion(38)
In respect of the second mandate, the Special Committee's
Chairman appointed representatives from Cuba, Iran and
(34)Ibid p.706
(35)~on, K.C., The Western Sahara Case, ICLQ, Volume 28!212, pp.299-304
(36)Ibid pp.299-304
(37)Ibid p.297
(38)International Legal Material, Volume 14, !21i, p.1503
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Ivory Coast to constitute the UN mission under the presidency
of the Ivory Coast's permanent representative to the UN.
The mission was entrusted with responsibility for obtaining
information on the situation prevailing in the Western
Sahara, including information on political, economic, social,
cultural and educational conditions, as well as identifying
the wishes of the Sahrawis people(39). To this effect
the mission visited the concerned and interested states and
travelled extensively in the Sahara in order to fulfil its
mandate. It became evident to the mission that there was
an overwhelming and unequivocal consensus among the Sahrawis
within the territory, in favour of independence and against
integration with any neighbouring country. That impression
was based on public manifestation which was identified by
an extremely large number of interviews with various groups
and individuals representing different shades of opinion.
All these interviews were in private in the absence of any
representative of the Spanish authorities(40). Nonetheless,
outside the territory, opinions among the Sahrawis refugee
movements were more mixed, reflecting the respective positions
of the Algerian, Mauritanian and Moroccan hosts(41). The
mission submitted its recommendation to the UN General Assembly
and concluded that steps should be taken to enable the
Saharan population to determine their own future incomplete
freedom(42).
(39)Ibid pp.1505-1507
(40)Ibid p.1508
(41)Ibid pp. 1506-1507
(42)It is worthwhile mentioning that the Irani~n member and
the Ivory Coast Chairman were both under considerable pressure
from their respective governments to report findings more '
favourable to the Moroccan cause. Nonetheless, the visiting
mission was unanimous in calling for self-determination
p~ebiscite and for eventual independence.
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THE ADVISORY OPINION OF THE ICJ:
The proposal for an advisory opinion from the ICJ
was presented by Morocco at the September 3rd, 1974 meeting
-~f the UN General Assembly(43). The question to be
entertained was whether the territory of Western Sahara
had at the time of colonisation been terra nullius, or
under Moroccan sovereignty(44). The motivation of
Morocco was obviously, it would seem, to obtain a state-
ment that if the territory were not terra nullius, then
the court's decision would follow that it was under
Moroccan sovereignty. Thus, it would strengthen
Moroccan territorial claims for reintegration of Western
Sahara. In fact, there were extensive discussions in
the UN fourth committee to revise the question in order
to include the serious point regarding the application of
the principle of self-determination, but Morocco rejected
the idea(45). In any event, on December 13th, 1974 the
UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 3292 which denoted
that the legal controversy had arisen over the status
of Western Sahara at the time of Spanish colonisation.
Consequently, also mentioned was the desire to refer
the matter to the ICJ for an advisory opinion on some
legal aspects of the issue, without prejudice to the
application of the principle of self-determination(46).
(43)African Research Bulletin, Volume 12 No.l0, November 15th,!iZi, p.3806
(44)~ p.3807
(45) .Afr1can Research Bulletin, Volume" 12, No.ll, December 15th,
!i2i, p.3836
(46)International Legal Material, Volume 15, 1975, p.1355
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Accordingly, the UN General Assembly requested the ICJ to
respond to the following questions:-
(i ) ••••Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and
Sakiet El-Haman) at the time of colonisation by Spain
a territory belonging to no-one (terra nullius)?
(ii) If the answer to the first question is in
the negative,
(iii) What were the legal ties between this
territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian
entity? ••(47).
Morocco and Mauritania each submitted a request to the ICJ
for the appointment of an ad hoc judge(48) since a Spanish
judge had been on the ICJ's bench(49). In appointing a
Moroccan ad hoc judge, the ICJ itself had declared that
there appeared to be a legal dispute between Morocco on
the one hand, and Spain on the other, regarding the
territory of lvestern Sahara. With respect to Mauritania,
the court ruled out the appearance of any legal dispute
between Mauritania and Spain over the territory of
Western Sahara(50). The Court's order concerning the
appointment of a Moroccan ad hoc judge was opposed by
(47)Western Sahara Advisory Opinion of October 16th, 1975,
ICJ Report, p.14
(48)The ICJ's competence to authorise the appointment of an
ad hoc judge is based on Article 31 and 68 of the Statute
and Article 89 of the Rules of the Court. The ICJ ruled by
an order of Hay 22nd, 1975 that by virtue of Article 31 and
68 of the Statute and Article 89 of the Court Rule, Morocco
was entitled to appoint an ad hoc judge.
(49)Western Sahara Advisory Opi~ion of October 16th, 1975,
ICJ Report, p.6
(SO).!!U!! p.S
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two judges who denied the existence of a bilateral legal
dispute. They stated that the object of the request was
to obtain from the ICJ an advisory opinion which the UN
General Assembly deemed of assistance to it, for the
proper exercise of its functions regarding the de-
colonisation of Western Sahara. Moreover, they mentioned
that Morocco did not dispute the present sovereignty of
Spain over the territory of Western Sahara. Furthermore,
both Morocco and Spain accepted the applicable resolutions
of the UN General Assembly for the decolonisation of
Western Sahara(SI). Under these circumstances, the court
.considered the question involved, in the context of
proceeding in the direction of decolonisation of Western
Sahara in conformity with the UN General Assembly
Resolution 1514 of 1960(52). In any event, since the
request referred to the time of colonisation by Spain, the
court decided that it was necessary to adopt the period
commencing 1884, the year of the proclamation of the Spanish
protectorate over Western Sahara(53). Consequently, the
court would face examining historical assertions within a
very long period. Therefore, it was important that
sufficient material should be provided for it to reach a
valid conclusion. In this respect, Spain, Morocco and
Mauritania furnished extensive documentary evidence. In
addition, the opinions of Algeria and Zaire were heard
before the court, as well as a file extended by the UN
General ~ssembly(S4). The interpretation of the material
(51)~ pp.17-18
(52)Ibid p.19
(53)~ p.38
(54)Ibid p.17
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as well as the conflicting views of the history, was a very
complicated matter. Nevertheless, the court reached a
conclusion regarding the existence of legal ties with the
territory of Western Sahara but not ties of territorial
sovereignty(SS).
As far as the concept of terra nullius was concerned,
the ICJ denoted the principle of the acquisition of
territory by occupation, but this referred to the peaceful
acquisition of sovereignty over territory by cession or
succession(S6). It was essential to mention that territory
be terra nullius belonging to no-one. In this connection,
it is clear that certain types of territory are without
doubt terra nullius, such as uninhabited areas, abandoned
territories and areas inhabited by relatively few people,
totally lacking any kind of social or political
organisations(S7). In contrast, there has been considerable
ambiguity in cases of territory inhabited by recognisable
entities. Under these circumstances, various views have
been presented. The survey of history from antiquity to
modern times could be traced in three major epochs in the
evolution of the concept of terra nullius, as follows:-
(1) Roman antiquity presented the theory that if any
territory was not Roman, then it was terra nullius.
(2) The epoch of the European great discoveries of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries presented the theory
that any territory not belonging to a Christian sovereign
state was terra nullius.
(SS)~ pp.47-48
(S6)~ pp. 38-40
(S7)Glahu. Gerhard van, Law Among Nations, Macmillan
Publishing Co. Inc., New York, !i22, p.273
(3) The epoch of the European civilised nations
during the nineteenth century presented the theory that
any territory which did not belong to the civilised states
was terra nullius(58) •
.The first theory presented the view that peoples possessed
sovereign right, thus precluding the occupation of their
territory by means of conquest under the Law of Nations.
This theory was put forward by the founders of the Law of
Nations. The essence of this theory was that the
acquisition of sovereignty over the territories of such
people, depended on the concept of conquest and not
occupation. Consequently, the theory centred around the
principle of war and the legality of hostilities against
~on-Romans(59). The second theory dealt with the relation-
ship between a people and their territory under international
law, bearing. in mind that such people could exercise
sovereign rights in certain circumstances. The concept
of this theory was·that if the occupying state was in
need of more territory, then it could satisfy this need by
occupation. Despite the facts, the territory had to be
part of the territory of tribes which could be deemed
to be in excess of the requirements of their people. This
conclusion could be attributed to the divine obligations
imposed on human beings to cultivate the earth. Thus,
this meant that tribes could not take for themselves more
territory than they had need of(60). The third one
(58)Report of the ICJ, Ope Cit, p.86
(59)Briggs, Herbert, The Law of Nations, Appleton, Century-
Crofts Inc., New York, ~, pp.251-252
(60)Ibid pp.273-276
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espoused by the Family of Nations throughout the nineteenth
century when Africa was being divided among the competing
European major powers at the Berlin Conference of 1884.
This theory presented the view that the organised tribes
or peoples of non-European territories had no sovereign
rights. Consequently, the inhabitants of such territories
were factually, but not legally in occupation of the
territories which could, therefore, be regarded as terra
nullius, and acquired under international law(61). This
marked the exclusive concept of state in international law
to the European civilised nations which could occupy a
territory which was not at the time subject to the
sovereignty of these states. Consequently, nations which
existed under tribal organisation were not regarded as states
for this purpose. The historical survey demonstrated how
international law had its roots in Roman antiquity and in
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, while in the
nineteenth century, saw the method of adjusting relation-
ships between the colonising powers. Despite the fact,
the practice of the Family of Nations of the period
prevailed, that Africa was not regarded as terra nullius.
This could be explained in the then European argument
that occupation was available as a mode of acquiring legal
title to territory. In this respect, legal title was
acquired on Africa primarily by means of agreements of
cession with tribal leaders. Therefore, the Berlin
Conference of 1884 established the method of peaceful
(61)Smith. Herbert Auther, Great Britain and the Law of Nations,
P.S. King & Son Ltd., London 1935, pp.1-20
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acquisition of African territories by occupation. In fact,
the ICJ made this concept obvious. It declared that the
principle of the acquisition of territory by occupation
meant the peaceful acquisition of sovereignty ov~r territory
by cession or succession(62). This did not mean to
signify that sovereignty was actually acquired by means of
an occupation of a terra nullius in the legal sense. Thus,
this led to the conclusion that Western Sahara was not
terra nullius at the time of the Spanish colonisation. In
this respect, Spain had declared before the UN General
Assembly that it had never regarded the territory as terra
nullius(63). While the issue was not discussed in the
Spanish submission in the oral pleadings, Spain in fact
denied that either Morocco or the Mauritanian entity
possessed sovereign rights over the territory of Western
Sahara at the time of its colonisation(64). Morocco
declared that the territory was not terra nullius since
Morocco was at that time a recognised state, and its
presence in the territory was thus in the nature of a
sovereign state(65). Subsequently, this argument was
carefully modified to take account of the Mauritanian
claim in the light of the partition agreement reached
between the two states. In this respect, Mauritania
maintained that the territory was not terra nullius since
the ICJ arrived at the conclusion that tribes at that time
(62)Report of ICJ, Ope Cit, p.39
(63)African Research Bulletin, 'Volume 12, No.S, June 15th
1975, p.3638
(64)Report of ICJ, Ope Cit, p.46
(65)Ibid pp.44-45
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had legal personality. Thus, it did not regard their
territories as terra nullius and therefore the southern
part of Western Sahara linked with the Mauritanian entity(66).
In contrast to these arguments, the Algerian which in fact
led to the conclusion that under the international law of
the period, the territory of Western Sahara was indeed
terra nullius(67). However, Algeria was unhappy at this
conclusion which would appear to have required a positive
response to ~he first question and thus no consideration
for the second. Accordingly, it suggested that the
application of the modern norms of international law might
provide a satisfactory answer to .the problem of Western
Sahara(68). Under these circumstances, a number of
judges pointed out that the question as to whether the
Western Sahara was terra nullius at the time of Spanish
colonisation was not legal b~t purely academic and served
no useful purpose(69). This resulted from the fact
that none of the states interested in the territory's
status disputed the present sovereignty of Spain. This
approach was adopted by the court because the essence of
the case centred around the territorial claims put forward
by Morocco and Mauritania and any discussion of the terra
nullius question would be superfluous. Moreover, the
court pointed out that neither Spain's original title
(66)Ibid pp.46-47...........
(67)~ p. 86
(68)African Research
!2Z!, p.3910
(69)~ p. 30
Bulletin, Volume 13. No.1, February 15th,
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was in question, nor l-loroccoand Hauritania in fact
contended that the territory of Western Sahara was at the
relevant time, terra nullius(70). However, the question
was of some legal relevance,- so long as it had served
as an introduction to the important question dealing with
Moroccan and Mauritanian claims of historical ties with
the territory. Therefore, the court ignored any reference
to the process of colonisation and declared that Western
Sahara was not terra nullius(71). It was inhabited by
people who, though nomadic, were socially and politically
organised in tribes and under chiefs competent to represent
them(72). Moreover, Spain had regarded its acquisition of
(70)Ibid p.31
(71)Ibid pp.38-40
(72) .The court's answer to the first question reflected the
multi-cultural composition of the court, whether they were
civilised or uncivilised by European standards. It is no
longer the criterion for determining whether a territory
inhabited by native peoples is terra nullius. This
constitutes a radical departure from the doctrine widely
propounded by eminent Western jurists. The Zairian
jurist dismissed the materialistic concept of terra
nullius which led to the dismemberment of Africa. He
substituted a spiritual concept, the ancestral ties
between the territory and the man who was born of it,
remained attached to it, and must one day return to it
to be united with his ancestors. He argued that this
link should be the basis of ownership to sovereignty.
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Western Sahara as achieved by virtue of a series of
agreements with independent tribes of the area. In fact,
the Spanish decree of December 26th, 1884 regarded by the
court as the startin, date of the time of colonisation,
proclaimed the creation of a Spanish protectorate based
on local agreement. Despite the fact, the court declared
that the protection agreement did not constitute a .
recognition of right of sovereignty of both the ruler and
the people concerned over their own land(73). Unfortunately,
this conclusion led to confusion and opened the door to the
possibility that the territory in question was being
considered terra nullius. Nonetheless, it would appear
that the court meant that the agreement of protection did
not upgrade the ruler or Western Sahara to the status, of
a recognised member of the community of nations. This
certainty made by acceptance of the contracting parties
as representing an organised tribe or people by the
relevant European power, and thus negating the possibility
of a terra nullius.
As far as legal ties were concerned, the court
declared that while some legal ties did exist, they did
not constitute legal ties of territorial sovereignty(74).
Therefore, they were not of such a nature that could
affect the application of the principle of self-determination
to the territory. The court did pay attention to the rights
extended by the UN General Assembly Resolution 3292 to
(73)Report of ICJ, Ope Cit, pp.SS-S7
{74}~ pp.3S-48
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Morocco and Mauritania but the court concluded that
these rights might only affect the policy to be followed
in the decolonisation of Western Sahara(7~). On the one
hand, Morocco argued that it had possessed sovereignty
over the territory by virtue of immemorial possession
found on the public display of sovereignty, uninterrupted
and uncontested for centuries. .The Moroccan argument
based upon personal allegiance and Islamic significance,
is the crucial factor in Moroccan political systems.
These internal aspects should, however, be understood in
the light of the special nature of the Islamic concept of
state which did not accept borders with the then Muslim
community (Dar-el-Aslam)(76). Therefore, Moroccan
territorial sovereignty extended as far as religious
authority of the Sultan. When European colonisation
commenced, Morocco was divided into the territory which
was fully under the control of the Sultan and those
territories which detached, where the inhabitants did not
possess a great deal of power and were, in fact, under
submission. Nevertheless, the latter territories were
still part of Morocco since the inhabitants acknowledged
the spiritual authority of the Sultan, and this was not
denied by Spain(77). Thus, these religious ties maintained
political allegiance which were evidenced by documents
dealing with the appointment of caids. Moreover, the
allegiance of the Sahrawis, maintained by the imposition
(75)~ pp.59-60
(76)~ p. 44
(77)~ pp.4S-46
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of Koranic taxes and customs levies, as well as the paying
of spiritual homage on the accession of every Sultan. The
Sahrawis' local leaders represented the Sultan in Western
Sahara and therefore they were the_agents in control of
this territory(78). Finally, Morocco pleaded the
geographical contiguity to Western Sahara and desert
character of the territory and invoked the Permanent
Court's decision in the legal ·Status of Eastern Greenland
Case in order to support its claim(79). Mauritania was
in a different position since it had not existed as a
sovereign state during the colonisation of Western Sahara.
Therefore, it had to base its territorial claim on a
modified form of recognised European state requirements
for the acquisition of title to the territory. Mauritania
made reference to the Shinguitti entity in order to
substantiate its territorial claim, which was centred
around the reunification of its people. It was
emphasised that it was a distinct cultural entity in-
habiting a certain territory, possessing its own language,
social structure and way of life, but did not constitute
a sovereign state at that time. Nonetheless, it was a
league such as those which existed in ancient Greece,
which was enforced by a unified Saharan law(80). This
could be attributed to inter alia with the use of water-
holes, grazing areas and agricultural lands,·.as well as
the collection of rules relating to war between tribes
and methods for the peaceful settlement of tribal disputes(81).
(18)!2!S pp.45-46
(19)Ibid p. 34
(80)Ibid pp.57-58
(81)JB!g p. 59
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The identical social, political, legal and economic structure
of the various tribes was evident from the fifteenth
century. This was not denied by the European powers by
which Spain and France entered into an agreement in 1954
to maintain the free circulation of tribes, which was
essential for nomadic life(82). Such a community
developed a system of law well-fitted to their way of life,
by which it constituted an actual nation. Therefore, inter-
national law could no longer ignore their existence. Under
these circumstances, the Shinguitti entity during the
period in question, constituted such a nation. This meant
that the Shinguitti entity could be regarded as an
independent nation despite its political reality justified
in terms of the facts of Saharan nomadic life. Moreover,
the Saharan people organised separately in confederations
of tribes and emirates jointly exercised sovereignty over
the territory of the Shinguitti entity(83). Consequently,
the inhabitants of Western Sahara shared the sovereignty
in this Shinguitti entity and, therefore, had legal ties
with Mauritania. At the same time, Mauritania accepted
the reality and legality of a Moroccan presence during
the relevant period, in the north. While l-Iorocco
conceded that the Shinguitti entity had legal ties with
(82)I2!S pp.59-60
(83)The precedent case in determining whether a group
constituted a legal entity was declared in the
Reparation for Injuries Case •. The decision established
that such an entity be in such a position that' it
possesses in regard to its members rights bY·which it is
entitled to request them to respect and be an entity
capable of availing itself of obligation incumbent
upon its members.
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the Saharan tribes in the south. On the other hand, Spain
denied both the J.toroccanand Hauritanian allegations,
holding that ~torocco had never exercised state functions
over the territory of Western Sahara. At the same time,
the Shinguitti entity was purely an area of common culture
with no legal implication. Therefore, both Morocco and
Mauritania had no legal ties with the territory in
question(84). Moreover, the number of treaties concluded
by Morocco with regard to the territory which could
demonstrate international recognition of the Z.roroccanclaim,
revealed that J.foroccodid not, during the crucial period
exercise any state functions over the territory of Western
sahara(8S). The absence of Moroccan protests regarding
the Spanish presence in Western Sahara was of legal
significance in determining the unfounded Moroccan claim.
In addition to these facts, the agreement concluded between
Spain and the leaders of Saharan tribes in 1886 evidenced
the Western Sahara independence from external powers(86).
In respect to the Algerian approach to the question of
legal ties, the latter based its arguments on the principle
of self-determination. It argued that such legal ties
could only prevail if they existed by the acquiescence of
the Saharan population(87). In response to these
conflicting arguments, the court concluded that even after
making allowances for the specific structure of the Moroccan
state, the evidence before it did not establish any legal
ties of territorial sovereignty(88). In this respect,
(84)Report of ICJ, Ope Cit, p.61
(86)~ pp.61-62
(88)~ p. 67
(85) Ibid pp.S3-58
(87) Ibid pp.99-100
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Morocco did not display effective and exclusive state
activity in the territory of Western Sahara. Concerning
the various international treaties concluded by Morocco
which claimed to indicate international recognition, the
court considered these treaties as being of limited value.
It was not their purpose either to recognise an existing
sovereignty over Western Sahara or to deny its existence.
At the best, they were merely providing an indication of
international recognition at the relevant time of colon-
isation of the territory and influence of the Moroccan
Sultan over some nomads in Western Sahara(89). The evidence
proved that legal ties of allegiance did exist at the
relevant period between the Sultan and some of the nomadic
peoples of the territory, but this did not amount to any
legal ties of territorial sovereignty. The court declared
that common religious ties of course existed in many parts
of the world without signifying legal ties of sovereignty
or subordination to a ruler(90). On the other hand,
political ties to a ruler had frequently formed a major
element in the composition of a sovereign state. Despite
the fact, Morocco later misinterpreted and misused this
part of the court's opinions. With respect to reference
of geographical contiguity of Morocco with Western Sahara,
the court rejected the analogy with the legal status of
Eastern Greenland, since the territory had been inhabited
separately by socially and politically organised nomadic
tribes(91). As far as the Shinguitti entity was concerned,
(89)~ p. 56
(90)~ pp.43-48
(91)~ pp.42-43
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since Uauritania had accepted that no sovereign state was
in existence at the relevant time, therefore no legal ties
of state sovereignty were involved. As a matter of fact,
the court declared that the Shinguitti entity did not
constitute an entity such as could ,have exercised
sovereignty in '~estern Sahara. The court, however, said
this did not mean that other legal ties did not exist,
but that they were not those of state sovereignty(92).
The court felt that the conjunction of legal ties extended
to Mauritania and Morocco in Resolution 3292, allowing
the possibility of some special legal ties which were
enforced by the special nature of the Saharan region(93).
They proceeded from the facts of nomadism which could be
recognised as sharing legal rights respecting the land
over which they have customarily migrated. In this
respect, international law should be sufficiently flexible
to take account of the development of tribal rights based
upon customs. Unfortunately, this conclusion might lead
to confusion and open the door to the possibility of
Mauritanian territorial claims. This approach of the
court appeared only to imply the right of self-determination
which realised explicitly ~he existence of some legal ties
between Western Sahara and Morocco and Mauritania.
Despite the fact, the court concluded that the existence
of such legal ties did not constitute of such nature as
(92)Ibid pp.60-61
(93)~ pp.67-68
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to affect the application of Resolution 1514 and particularly
the principle of self-determination to the Saharan people(94).
It should be noted that all the parties in this case were
in favour of UN General Assembly resolutions proclaiming
the right of self-determination for the Sahara people(95).
The problem was that the parties had different views on
the application of self-determination within the context
of decolonisation. Morocco maintained that the funda-
mental rule was that decolonisation by which self-
determination be accomplished by territorial integration
with Morocco(96). It would appear that Morocco accepted
the right of self-determination with respect to non-
governing territories only in case of no state having been
in existence in the area, and recognised by the international
community in the nineteenth century. Consequently, the
right to self-determination did not apply to existing
independent states at the relevant period so as to dismember
the territorial integrity of such states. This concept of
self-determination in Moroccan terms could give way to re-
unification of the arbitrary territorial dismembermen~.
Morocco, however, stated that the ICJ's opinion meant
one thing, the so-called '''esternSahara was part of the
Kingdom of Morocco(97). Sovereignty was exercised by
the J.loroccanmonarch and the population of this territory
considered themselves, and were considered, to be Horoccan.
(94)Ibid p. 68
(95)Franck, Thomas.M., Op. Cit, p.702
(96)Shaw, J.falcolm,The Western Sahara Case, BYBIL, Volume 49,
~' pp.120-121 .
97 Franck, Thomas M., Ope Cit, p.711
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This interpretation posed a fatal threat to the stability
of the African continent and to the vast majority of
African states which are state-nations in which diverse
ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural groups have
to be reconciled within the framework of one state. The
necessity of maintaining colonial frontiers is clearly
accepted by the overwhelming majority of African states
which could only be understood in terms of the necessity
of establishing stability and legitimacy. This
established a general freezing of territorial entities
as at the eve of decolonisation and consequent disregard
for ethnic and historical aspiration. Consequently, the
prin~iple of self-determination exists in practice to
safeguard the colonial delimitation. Therefore, self-
determination must be reserved solely within the colonial
territorial context. While all the OAU member states
accepted this approach, Morocco and Somalia did not.
For many years, Morocco pursued an ~xpansionist aspiration
to the territory of Mauritania and to parts of Algeria.
In recent years, however, Morocco has increasingly
concentrated its attention upon the territory of lvestern
Sahara. A number of factors, however, have combined to
make the Sahara case unusual. The special status
accorded to Morocco and Mauritania in Resolution 2229 is
highly unusual in decolonisation practice(98). This could
(98) •The special status accorded to Morocco and Mauritan1a
by the UN resolutions is highly unusual in decolonisation
practice. However, no such special status was accorded to
Somalia and Ethiopia, with respect to the former French
Somaliland (Djibouti).
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be explained by considering the territory of Western Sahara
partly at least, as a colonial enclave to tovhichdifferent
rules of decolonisation might apply. This could be
attributed to the site of Western Sahara which totally
surrounded on its landward side by Morocco and Mauritania,
as being implicitly recognised as a colonial enclave.
The consequence of designating a territory as a colonial
enclave is in effect to restrict the exercise of self-
determination(99). This means that self-determination
is the reintegration of the colonial enclave with the
sovereign state of the surrounding territory. The ICJ
did not consider the question, but the court felt that
general geo-po1itica1 considerations in the region impelled
the UN General Assembly to extend special legal rights to
Morocco and Mauritania(100). Spain mentioned that these
special considerations given to Morocco and Mauritania
were only as a matter of concern by the UN General Assembly
for the stability and security of the region. This could
not be interpreted as a means of the existence of territorial
right to Western Sahara(101). It should be noted that
the day after the ICJ published its advisory opinion,
Morocco declared that there would be a massive march of
350,000 unarmed civilians from Morocco into the Western
Sahara to assert recognition of l-torocco's right to
territorial integrity and national unity(102). In response
(99)lfrica contemeorarx Record, 1926-77, p. 8151
(100 eport of ICJ, Ope Cit, pp.67-68
(1011bid p. 68
(1021frica Contemporary Record, 1976-77, p. B141
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to the Moroccan march into Western Sahara, Spain notified
the UN that Moroccan action would threaten international
peace and security and invoked Article 35 of the UN Charter
to bring.about the situation to the UN Security Council's
attention(103). Subsequently, Costa Rica submitted a
terse draft resolution to the UN Security Council demanding
that ~Iorocco must desist immediately from the proposed march
into Western Sahara. At all events, the permanent members
were not ready to take the unqualified action proposed by
Costa Rica, instead the Council requested the UN Secretary
General to engage in immediate consultations with the
parties concerned(I04). It also requested the Secretary
General to report to it as soon as possible on the
consequence of the consultations, in order to enable it
to adopt the appropriate measures to deal with the present
situation. This resolution also reaffirmed Resolution 1514
(XV) and all other relevant General Assembly resolutions on
Western Sahara. It also appealed to the parties concerned
to exercise restraint in order to enable the good offices
of the UN Secretary General to find a satisfactory result(105).
This attitude adopted by the UN Security Council represented
some sort of victory for Morocco, which envisaged a further
delay in the preparation for the plebiscite for eventual
independence. The UN Secretary General acting on the
Security Council mandate paid respective visits to Morocco,
(103)Franck, Thomas M., Op. Cit, p.712
(104)~ p. 712
(105~id p.712
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Hauritania, Algeria and Spain to discuss the \vestern Sahara's
situation with the authorities of these states(106). This
was followed by further field visits by the Secretary
General's personal representative who held discussions
with the authorities of .the concerned and interested
states. These negotiations gave an expression that all
the parties would be ready to recognise the UN role as
an essential element in the search for a peaceful settle-
ment(107). As far as Spain was concerned, it was ready
to co-operate with the UN to find an appropriate solution,
even if this might include a UN temporary administration
until such time as the wishes of the \vestern Sahara people
be ascertained(108). On November 1st, 1975 Spain again
requested an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council
in the wake of the -Moroccan Green March- announced by
the Moroccan government. Spain, this time stated that
it would take the necessary steps to defend the Western
Sahara with military force if called for(109). The
Security Council, however, adopted a stronger resolution
than the precedinc one. It reiterated the call to all
parties concerned and interested to avoid any unilateral
action which might further escalate the tension in the
region. It also requested the UN Secretary General to
intensify his consultative efforts with the parties
concerned and interested, in order to bring about an
(106)Ibid p. 713
(107)Ibid p. 714
(108)Ibid p. 715
(109)Africa Contemporary Record, 1976-77, p. B142
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acceptable solution to the situation in Western Sahara(110).
Subsequently, the Security Council met again after ~Iorocco's
march had crossed the international frontier of Western
Sahara. Unfortunately, the Council did not reach an
agreement to order Morocco to call off the march. Instead,
the Council President was entrusted to address an urgent
request to the ~toroccan government to put an end to the
declared march into Western Sahara(111). Subsequently,
the Council adopted a 'toothless' resolution that deplored
the march and called on Morocco to withdraw immediately
from the territory of Western Sahara. It also called
on Morocco to resume negotiations under the auspices of
the UN Secretary General(112). Non~theless, the march
continued and Morocco ignored all UN efforts(113). Under
these circumstances, the UN Secretary General's personal
representative visited Spain, Morocco, Mauritania and
Algeria between November 3rd and 6th, 1975(114). He
proposed interim administration of the UN was rejected
(110)International Legal Materials, Volume 14, ~, p.l503
(111)Ibid p. 1504
(112)Ibid p. 1503
(113)When the Moroccan march commenced, the elected president
of Western Sahara National Assembly (Yema'a) Mr. Khatri
Ould Jounaini fled to Agadir, Morocco, and paid a ritual
homage to King Hassan of Morocco.
(114)It appeared to the personal representative that
something had been going on which had stiffened the
position of the Moroccan authorities and softened that
of Spain.
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outright by the Moroccan authorities stating that a
trilateral agreement could provide an appropriate solution
if the UN were prepared to agree to it(llS). The leaders
of the parties concerned, namely Spain, Morocco and
}Iauritania had agreed to abandon the principle of self-
determination and to divide the Sahara. On November 11th,
1975, tripartite negotiations commenced in Madrid at which
Spain agreed to a decolonisation formula that allowed
Western Sahara to be partitioned in the way previously
agreed between Morocco and ~lauritania(116). Consequently,
the proposed plebiscite under the UN supervision would be
buried. In return for this offer, Spain would retain a
35% interest in Fosbucraa, the 700 million dollar Saharan
phosphate industry. In addition to this, Morocco agreed
to offer concessions regarding fishing rights off the
Western Sahara and Moroccan coasts which were of particular
importance" to the Spa~ish fishing industry(117). Finally,
(11S)By the end of October 1975, the Spanish Secretary General
of the Falangist movement was authorised to open negotiations
with Morocco. Algeria heard of these negotiations and sent
its representative to Madrid to make efforts to persuade
Spain to cancel the proposed decolonisation formula. The
tripartite negotiations were adjourned by Prince Juan Carlos,
who at that moment was assuming power from the dying General
Franco. In these efforts Algeria had some leverage, since
Spain is heavily dependent on Algerian supplies of natural
gas. The Prince, who became acting head of Spain, visited
Western Sahara and pledged to lead Spanish forces to defend
the territory concerned.
(116)Africa Contemporary Record, 1976-77, pp. B141-142
(117)
Franck. Thomas M., Ope Cit, p.715
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Spain agreed that it would immediately establish an
interim regime in Western Sahara with }.Ioroccoand
Mauritania(118). By mid-November 1975, hostilities
were underway in the Sahara with both Moroccan and
~Iauritanian forces engaged by well-trained forces of
Polisario. Throughout December 1975, the Moroccan and
Mauritanian forces pushed the Polisario forces out of
the principal towns and villages of Western Sahara(119).
Under these circumstances, the UN General Assembly
adopted two conflicting resolutions. The first,
Resolution 3458(a) called on Spain to arrange a free
and genuine plebiscite of self-determination under
UN Supervision. The second, 3458(b) denoted the
tripartite agreement and called on the UN Secretary
General to appoint an envoy to consult with the three
states concerned for a UN interim administration. It
also called for the Sahrawisl inalienable right to
self-determination(120). Nonetheless, it recognised
(118)
On November 6th, 1975 the l-IoroccanPrime Hinister
visited Madrid where he resumed negotiations with the
Spanish ultras. The result of these negotiations, a
draft agreement, was reached. The draft agreement
provided that the -Moroccan Green March- should go on
as planned, but there would be only a token occupation.
The march would stop as soon as the Spanish forces .
arrived at the Sahara, allowing both governments to
save face.
(119)Africa Contemporary Record, 1976-77, p. B142
(120)
International Legal ~faterials, Volume 14, !.2.ll, p.1503
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the fait accompli which imposed unrealistic circumstances.
Unfortunately, the opportunity to hold Spain accountable
to the UN for not arranging the stipulated plebiscite on
self-determination as expressed by the UN resolution,
was vitiated by Resolution 3458(b) which recognised the
fait accompli status created in Western Sahara(121).
(121)Among the 40 African states voting on Resolution
3458(b), 12 African states joined Morocco and Mauritania,
while 21 were opposed, and 7 abstained. Thus, OAU
members were Zambia, Lesotho, Kenya, Botswana, Swaziland,
Malawi and Ghana, who voted for self-determination and
against any legitimization of the Madrid agreement.
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'I'HE OAU EfFORTS AT HEDIATION:
The J.toroccanand Mauritanian occupation was soon
contested by the Polisario Front which, relying on
classic hit-and-run guerrilla tactics, kept the-two
states off balance. Heanwhile, the overwhelming
majority of the Saharan population fled the conflict
to settle in refugee camps in Algeria's Tindouf area.
From these refugee camps came the main recruits for the
Polisario Front which led effective insurgent forces.
The Front, backed by Algeria, opposed the Madrid agreement.
Thus, an Algerian resolution was adopted by the OAU
Liberation Committee at its 27th Session held in Dar-
'-es-Salaam on May 31st, 1976(122~ which called
for urgent suppo~t to Western Saharan nationalist
movement and was put before the OAU Council of Ministers,
despite Moroccan and Mauritanian protests. They argued
that the Algeria~ resolution had violated the OAU
procedures and was thus invalid(123). In protest
against the adoption of a pro-Saharan resolution by
the OAU Council of Ministers, Morocco boycotted the
13th ordinary session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of
State which took place in Port Louis, Mauritius on
July 2nd, 1976(124). In this connection, Morocco had
(122)African Research Bulletin, Volume 13, No.6,
July 1976, pp.4046-4047
(123)African Research aulletin, Volume 13, No.7,
August 15th, 1975, pp.4078-4081
(124)~ p. 4018
- 329 -
suffered a string of diplomatic reversals with the
mounting expenses of the war. The military pace had
been quickening with the guerrillas stepping up their
hit-and-run raids in both Moroccan and ~Iauritanian
sectors of Western Sahara. On January 28th, 1919, the
Polisario chalked up its greatest military success against
Morocco since the war started in December 1915(125).
The Polisario Front managed for the first time to break
its way into a Moroccan city apparently inflicting heavy
casual ties on ~{oroccan troops. There could be no doubt
that the Moroccan government was shaken by the Polisario
success. The most dramatic consequence of the Saharan
war was the withdrawal of Mauritania from the southern
third of Western Sahara. The growing success of the
Polisario guerrillas in Mauritania, including their
capability of virtually paralysing its economic sector,
led to the downfall of Ould Daddah regime in 1918(126).
The new government signed an'agreement in Algeria on
August 5th, 1919 ending the four years war over the
Western Sahara with the Polisario Front(121). The
agreement contained references to modalities for the
withdrawal of Mauritanian troops, as well as the
renunciation of all territorial claims to Western Sahara.
Shortly thereafter, Morocco announced that it would take
(125)African Research Bulletin, Volume 16, No.1,
February 15th, !212, pp.5140-5141
(126)Lewis, William H., Western Sahara Compromise or
Conflict, d£H, Volume 81, 1982, pp.410-412
(121)African Research Bulletin, 'Volume 16, No.8,
September 1979, p.5319
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all necessary steps to redeem the Southern part of the
Western Sahara which was ceded to Mauritania. Subsequently,
Mauritanian forces pulled out on August 15th, 1979 and
Moroccan troops moved into the Mauritanian-administered
territory which already had contingent forces there(128).
As a result, Mauritania protested to the UN and the OAU
over the Moroccan annexation of its former administered
territory of Western Sahara which constituted an act of
aggression against its provisional administration(129).
Subsequently, a string of humiliating reverses on the
battlefield had occurred, in which hundreds of Moroccan
troops lost their lives. This was coupled with
successive setbacks for Morocco in the UN and the OAU
forums. Consequently, Morocco's international isolation
had increased markedly with the Polisario victories at
the 1979 OAU Summit Conference held in Monrovia,
Liberia(130). The OAU Assembly of Heads of State had
voted in favour of a self-determination plebiscite in
Western Sahara. The OAU Assembly also welcomed the
Mauritanian-Polisario peace agreement and deplored the
Moroccan annexation of the southern part of Western
Sahara, previously administered by Mauritania. It
decided to set up a special committee to implement its'
resolution which expressed the right of Western Saharan
people to self-determination and independence(131).
(128)Ibid p. 5380
(129)Ibid p.5380
(130)African Research Bulletin, Volume 16, No.l1,
December 15th, !212, p.5477
(131)~ p.5478
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Under the existing circumstances, the UN Decolonisation
Commission adopted a similar resolution on November 2nd,
1979 which reaffirmed the right of Western Saharan people
to self-determination(132). It also recognised for the
first time at UN level, the Polisario Front as the legitimate
representative of the Sahrawis people(133). The resolution
declared support for the peace agreement between Mauritania
and the Polisario Front and strongly deplored the occupation
of Western Sahara by Morocco. It called upon Morocco to
put an end to the occupation of the territory and to participate
in the OAU attempts at mediation, to find a just and lasting
settlement to the conflict of Western Sahara(134).
Subsequently, an equally strongly-worded resolution in support
of the Sahrawi cause was passed by the UN General Assembly on
November 21st, 1979(135). After the formation of a self-
proclaimed Sahrawis Democratic Arab Republic by the Polisario
Front, 26 OAU member states requested the 1980 OAU Summit
Conference, held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, to extend
recognition to the SADR(136). As a result, Morocco felt
(132)Ibid p.5479
(133)The resolution submitted by 40 countries and 82
voted for it, 32 of them African states including Mauritania,
while 7 abstained and 8 did not vote. Morocco, Gabon and
Zaire voted against.
(134)African Research Bulletin, Volume 16, No.ll,
December 15th, !i12, p.S481
(13S)~ p.5481 .
(136)At the Summit Conference, a draft resolution was sub-
mitted by the 26 members which contained OAU recognition
of the SADR.and support for its admission as a full member
state under Article 28, which requires a simple majority.
Nonetheless, the resolution was shelved when Morocco threat-
ened an official withdrawal if the OAU Assembly endorsed this
resolution. Consequently, the issue of the SADR's admission
was shelved. Morocco argued that the OAU Charter would be
violated because Article 28 should"be'invoked since the
SADR was not a sovereign independent state.
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constrained to threaten an official withdrawal if the OAU
Assembly endorsed the SADR for full membership(137). This
diplomatic victory for the Polisario Front was a disaster
for Morocco. It was the impact of the war that raised
-serious doubts about the prospect for ~ioroccan military
victory. The Moroccan troops were apparently addicted
to a strategy of static defence, leaving options for a
war of manoeuvre to the Polisario guerrillas. Despite
increasing infusion of Moroccan troops, the latter
appeared to lack a coherent military strategy to deal
with the Polisario. Moroccan troops were seeking the
earliest possible settlement by a direct attack on
Polisario bases in Algerian territory.
risk of such action could have resulted in a humiliating
defeat for Morocco and the 'end of the Sherifian
monarchy(138). The OAU Assembly, after an animated
debate, adopted a resolution urging all the parties in
dispute to observe an immediate ceasefire, requested the
UN to provide a peace-keeping force and to assist in the
conducting of a fair and free pl~biscite. It also decided
to set up an Implementation Committee to work out
modalities for the proposed referendum(139). Subsequently,
the Committee held a meeting in Freetown, Sierra Leone on
September 9th, 1980 in order to carry out the OAU's decision
(137)New Africa, August 1981, p.23
(138). Lewis, William H., Ope Cit, pp.411-412
(139) , "
African Research Bulletin, Volume 17, October 15th,
1980, p.S794
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taken at the July Summit Conference of 1980. It
suggested that the OAU Assembly decision be implemented
before December 1980(140). The Committee also drew up
a peace plan which contained the following points:-
(1) ••••A fair and general referendum in
lvestern Sahara;
(2) A ceasefire by December 1980;
(3) The parties are asked to have their forces
in their bases and barracks during the
ceasefirej
(4) UN peace-keeping troops are to be entrusted
with ensuring the effectiveness of the
ceasefirej
(5) The OAU with assistance from the UN is to
organise a referendum;
(6) The Secretary General of the OAU is to inform
the parties involved of the decision
taken •••(141).
So far, the Moroccan position did not change, but the
meeting had one important achievement to its credit, it
brought together all the parties involved in the conflict,
namely, Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, the Polisario Front
and ten pro-Moroccan Sahrawi groups, who also attended the
meeting. The groups called by the OAU Committee of
.Wise ~ren·were appointed by the OAU in order to bring about
an acceptable solution to the conflict of Western Sahara(142).
(140)~ p. 5794
(141)~ p. 7594
(142)Ibid p. 7594
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At all events, ~Iorocco remained intransigent on the two
major recommendations of a cease fire and referendum.
It argued that such recommendations had to be adopted by
a two-thirds majority of the OAU Assembly and not by the
OAU Implementation Committee. Consequently, the -l'lise
~Ien· Committee and the Implementation Committee had been
powerless to get the warring parties to respect the
December 1980 deadline for a ceasefire. Thereupon, the
two Committees handed over the Western Saharan file to a
six-member ad hoc Committee which had been established at
the OAU Summit Conference of 1978 in Khartoum, Sudan(143).
}Iorocco, who was now very much on the defensive, pledged to
co-operate with the OAU ad hoc Committee whose previous
attempts at mediation in Monrovia in December 1979 had been
undermined by Morocco's refusal to take part. The OAU
ad hoc Committee once again agreed on a programme for
a ceasefire and referendum in Western Sahara, but the
fighting continued between Morocco and the Algerian-backed
Polisario(144). The credit for the initial breakthrough
must be given to the OAU ad hoc Committee(14S) which
persuaded Morocco to withdraw its opposition to a plebiscite
among the inhabitants of Western Sahara(146). This
(143)African Research Bulletin, Volume 17, No.ll,
December 15th, 1980, p.5869
(144)New Africa, August 1981, p.23
(14S)The OAU ad hoc Committee chaired by President ~loi of
Kenya, who was also the current OAU Chairman, included the
Presidents of Nigeria, Tanzania, Sudan and Guinea, with
ministers representing the Presidents of Sierra Leone and
Mali.
(146)King Hassan II on his departure for Nairobi on June 24th,
1981 said that Morocco would not renounce a single grain of
sand of Moroccan Sahara. Subsequently, at a press conference
on July 2nd, 1981 after his return from Nairobi, King Hassan II
said the referendum would be an act of confirmation of the
Moroccan citizens of the Sahara.
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remarkable breakthrough occurred after the OAU ad hoc
Committee held separate consultations with the main
parties involved in the Sahara conflict who participated
at the OAU Summit Conference which took place in Nairobi,
Kenya "in June 1981(147). The plebiscite would provide
the Western Saharan people with a choice between
independence or unification with Morocco. It also
proposed a ceasefire and an international peace-keeping
force. Nonetheless, Morocco had insisted that the
referendum must be restricted to the 75,000 people listed
in the 1974 census, held under Spanish administration.
The Polisario Front argued that many of the people listed
in 1974 were now housed in refugee camps in Algeria(148).
The OAU ad hoc Committee proposed a compromise that the
people listed in the Spanish census should participate,
plus those who registered as refugees from the Sahara
with the UN High Commission for Refugees(149). So far,
(147)African Research Bulletin, Volume 17. No.ll,
December 15th, 1980, p.S874
(148)African Research Bulletin, Volume 18. No.8,
September 15th, 1981, p. 6131
(149)The decision left the door open as to who would be
allowed to vote and what body would be set up to determine
the eligibility of voters. The difficulties would be
immense because the Sahrawis were traditionally nomadic.
Moreover, some of the Sahrawis settled in Algerian __
refugee camps would not probably be allowed to vote in
the Tindouf refugee camps. They could go to vote in
Morocco if they wanted, but the latter announced that
if they were against Morocco, there was no need of
troublemakers. It was difficult to imagine even how
a ceasefire would be arranged by the OAU Committee, since
Morocco had still refused to engage in direct negotiation
with the Polisario Front. Without a ceasefire, there
could be no UN peace-keeping force and no referendum.
~rorocco and the Polisario Front agreed to study the OAU
ad hoc Committee proposal and submit their detailed
views on them, but there was still a wide gap between the
Horoccan and the Front views. Nonetheless, neither side
had rejected the CAU Committee's proposal but they continued
fighting. Hopes for peace in lV-esternSahara suffered a
serious setback with the shooting down of two }toroccan
aircraft by the Po1isario Front. It was a triumph for
the guerrillas and a disaster for l>lorocco. This, coupled
with the recent diplomatic victory for the Polisario when
the latter's self-proclaimed Sahrawi Democratic Arab
Republic was given full membership of the OAU. The OAU
Council of Ministers decided at its regular session on
February 22nd, 1982 in Addis Ababa to admit the Polisario
Front's SADR as the OAU's 51st member state(150).
Consequently, Morocco stormed out of_the Council's meeting
in protest at the SADR's admission. At all events,
Morocco would find it difficult to have the admission re-
voked, at least without making new and substantial
concessions to the Po1isario Front. Accordingly,
Morocco could not expect to be able to call for an extra-
ordinary summit on this issue(151). The pro-Polisario
member states argued that the fait accompli resulted from
Morocco's failure to follow up its referendum pledge
in good faith. These states proposed the admission under
(150) .African Research Bulletin, Volume 19, No.2,
March 15th, 1982, p.6353
(151) . .Only one-third of African states joined Morocco's
walk-out at Addis Ababa. Few of J.lorocco'sallies would
not likely wish to jeopardise the ~uture of the OAU, or
their own re1~tions with the OAU. .On the other hand,
26 OAU member states officially recognised the SADR.
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Article 28 of the OAU Charter which requires a simple
majority for membership, but Horocco contested this
decision on the grounds that the SADR was not a genuine
sovereign state(152). Consequently, a decision on
this issue requires a two-thirds majority under Article-
27 of the OAU Charter(153). Under these circumstances,
the opening of the 39th session of the OAU Council was
postponed on July 27th, 1982 because a quorum of a two-
thirds majority was not secured. The postponement was
caused by the dispute over the presence of the Polisario
delegation. The Council met in order to prepare for
the annual OAU Summit Conference scheduled to take place
in Tripoli, Libya on August 5th, 1982, but the business
was vitiated by the boycott of a number of member states(154).
(152)
Guardian, l-tarch29th. 1982
(153) .At all events, the SADR was admitted to the Council
of Ministers meetin~ in Addis Ababa. Moroccan delegation
boycotted the opening session of the Council, while
King Hassan despatched an immediate message of protest
to the Kenyan President, who was the current Chairman
of the OAU. Subsequently, the Heads of State from
West African countries (Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal
and Guinea) called, on April 1st 1982, for an urgent
summit of the OAU, to avoid a rupture or a weakening
of the organisation. The leaders adopted this
position after examining the situation facing the OAU
since the date when the SADR was admitted to the OAU.
(154)
International Herald Tribune, Friday August 6th, 1982
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Consequently, the 19th annual Summit Conference of the
OAU Assembly failed to open on August 5th, 1982 despite
the presence of 17 African heads of state. For the first
time since the OAU was founded in 1963, the annual Summit
was unable to secure the two-thirds quorum required
under the OAU Charter. Nineteen of the 50 member states
boycotted the Summit in protest against the admission of
the Western Saharan Liberation Front, as a full member(155).
The African leaders who attended the Summit held an
unofficial private meeting to discuss how to resolve the
deadlock. Delegation sources revealed that some leaders
urged a postponement of the Summit, while the others
preferred to go ahead regardless of the lack of a
quorum(156). A quorum is 34 delegates, not necessarily
heads of state, but to ensure the unquestioned legality
of the Summit, a controversial delegation from the
Polisario Front could not be counted as part of the quorum.
The Saharan impasse might result in '~he break-up of the
(155)
Guardian, April 1st, 1982
(156)
African Research Bulletin, Volume 19. No.7,
August 15th, ~, p.6544
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OAU which would lead to very grave consequences. The
real problem was that the OAU position on the Sahara
issue, was fundamentally confused(151). ~eSOR
was voted into membership without the Front actually
holding sovereignty over the territory of Western
Sahara. It would seem that there was no prospect
of an early compromise and the break-up of the OAU
(151)
No framer of the OAU Charter in 1963 could have
foreseen how Article 21 and 28 could have been,used
in contradiction of each other in this way. The
radical African states led by Algeria, Angola,
Seychelles, Mozambique, Madagascar, Guinea-Bissau
and Zimbabwe claimed that a simple majority of the
OAU Assembly of Heads of State is enough to admit a
new member. On the other side, Morocco is supported
by the conservative Francophone states such as
Senegal, Ivory Coast, Tunisia, and conservative
Anglophone countries like Nigeria, Sudan and Sierra
Leone. They"cited a different Article of the OAU
Charter which requires a two-thirds majority for the
question of deciding the SADR as being a sovereign
independent state.
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over this issue would leave wounds that could not be
healed quickly. The survival of the OAU itself should
surely be the overriding aim of its members(158). Despite
its failure to move towards a pan-African approach, the
OAU has, nevertheless, a record of some achievement. The
frontiers inherited from the colonial era have been a
serious irritant for emerging pan-Africanism. Numerous
crises have erupted, and the OAU through its machinery
has been able to intervene quickly to propose a peaceful
settlement. Despite widely varying regimes and
ideolo~ies, African states through the OAU continued to
speak to each other. The OAU, in concentrating on an
international political role and the settlement of
regional disputes, has clearly neglected other areas of
policy such as health, transport, defence, famine relief,
where a strong pan-Africanism is still badly needed. At
all events, the OAU must be saved because of its record
of maintainin~ peace and security. Without it, Africa
would lose its last hope of resisting extra-regional
interference by outside powers.
(158)
The African Heads of state had tried to side-step
the deadlock by organising a ceasefire and referendum
in the Western Sahara. But the referendum and cease-
fire were no longer feasible now than when they were
planned in the June 1981 OAU Summit Conference in
Nairobi, Kenya. The technical admission of the
Polisario at Addis Ababa made that formula impossible
unless the Heads of State now reversed the unilateral
admission decision taken by the OAU Secretary General.
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